Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County, Super. Ct. No. J0801451
Ruvolo, P. J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
R.B. (appellant), a 14-year-old ward of the juvenile court, appeals a condition of his probation following his admission to possessing a knife on school grounds in violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. While he does not contest the condition that he not use or possess any illegal drugs or alcohol, he argues that the condition requiring him to submit to drug testing at the direction of a peace officer is unwarranted, unreasonable and unconstitutional. We disagree, and affirm the juvenile court’s probation order.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The assistant principal at appellant’s school was told by a student that appellant had a knife. Apparently, appellant had asked a student if he wanted to see a knife, and then discreetly pulled it from his pocket. Appellant opened the knife, but then quickly closed it. He did not threaten anyone with it.
After learning that appellant possessed a knife, the assistant principal went to find appellant. When he was located, appellant was removing a cell phone from a trash container. Appellant denied having thrown anything in the trash can, and the assistant principal escorted him to the school’s main office. The assistant principal then returned to the trash can, where he found a knife and four cigarette lighters inside. Appellant told the school police officer that he was wearing the pants he had worn on the previous Saturday, and forgot to remove the knife and lighters when he dressed for school that morning. Though the officer referred appellant to the juvenile diversion program instead of the probation department, appellant failed the diversion and the district attorney’s office subsequently filed a juvenile wardship petition.
Appellant argues that this failure was due to a “lack of understanding” of his obligations and not due to his ignoring those obligations.
The juvenile wardship petition alleged that appellant possessed a knife on school grounds, a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).) Appellant admitted the charge and the juvenile court declared him a ward of the court, but allowed him to remain in the custody of his parents. Appellant was placed on probation, which imposed a curfew, a nominal restitution fine, and the requirement that he complete 30 hours of community service. The conditions of probation included that appellant not use or possess illegal drugs or alcohol, and that he submit to drug testing if ordered to do so by a peace officer. He was also ordered to engage in counseling and to submit school progress reports monthly. The juvenile court stated its intention to dismiss the petition at the end of June 2009 if appellant’s grades improved, and if he complied with his probation conditions.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Notice of Appeal
As a preliminary matter, we note that appellant’s notice of appeal filed in the juvenile court appealed only from the “November 19, 2008 disposition orders that found minor to be a ward of court rather than placing minor on Welfare and Institutions Code section 725(a) 6 month probation.” Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a), specifically provides that if a juvenile court does not declare a minor a ward of the court, it may place the minor on probation for no longer than six months. Therefore, it appears that appellant intended to challenge the juvenile court’s declaration of wardship itself, without which he could not be placed on probation for more than six months. However, in his appellate briefs, appellant argues not that the juvenile court erred in declaring him a ward of the court, but rather error in imposing drug testing as a condition of his probation.
An appeal must be preceded by the filing of a notice of appeal in the trial court but “[t]he notice of appeal must be liberally construed, and is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed. . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.400(c)(2).) Where a notice designates the appeal of one element of an order, yet the briefs argue a different part of that order, we may treat the entire order as one act. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 143, 146.) So long as there has been no prejudice to respondent, a notice of appeal improperly specifying one element of a larger order as the subject of the appeal is sufficient to appeal the merits of the entire order. (Id. at p. 146.)
Respondent did not object to the notice of appeal filed in this case, nor does it claim prejudice as a result of the discrepancy between the notice and the issue actually argued by appellant on appeal. Instead, respondent addresses the merits of the drug testing condition, and we will exercise our discretion to do so as well.
B. The Drug Testing Probation Condition
As to probation conditions, generally a juvenile court may “impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) In determining which conditions would be appropriate for a minor’s probation, the juvenile court considers the minor’s social history and circumstances of the charged offense. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.3 specifically authorizes a juvenile court to require drug testing upon the request of a probation officer when the court has not removed the minor from his parents’ custody. Whether the juvenile court exercises this authority is committed to its discretion. (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 708.) Generally, a juvenile court’s broad discretion to impose probation conditions cannot be reversed absent “manifest abuse.” (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
There is no indication in this matter that the juvenile court abused its discretion. Under the so called “Lent test,” a probation condition is inappropriate if it “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted; In re Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 709; In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500.) We adopt the reasoning of the court in In re Kacy S., supra, which concluded that not only does a drug testing condition relate to the use of drugs, conduct which is in itself criminal, but that it also reasonably relates to future criminality since alcohol or drug use might be a precursor to other criminal conduct. (In re Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.)
Nevertheless, appellant argues that the drug testing condition meets the Lent test because a refusal to submit to a drug test is not criminal. But the Lent factors do not require that the proscribed conduct itself be illegal; rather, they require only that the conduct relate to criminal activities. (In re Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710; but see dis. opn. of Blease, J., at p. 714).) The drug testing condition relates directly to the prohibition against using drugs or alcohol, a condition of probation not challenged by appellant. Imposing a prohibition on the use of drugs or alcohol, but not imposing a means to enforce it, defeats the purpose of the prohibition. Since a violation of the prohibition on the use of drugs or alcohol itself related to future criminality (the use of these substances by a minor are criminal offenses and constitute violations of the terms of probation), the testing provision relates to such future criminality and is not improper. (Id. at p. 710.) Therefore, the drug testing condition does not meet the Lent test, and was not an improper exercise of the juvenile court’s discretion.
Relying on In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577 and People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576, cases which involve adult defendants, appellant also argues that a probation condition must have some “factual nexus” to either his offense or historical propensities, and in a related argument, that the condition is not sufficiently tailored to appellant’s needs.
However, appellant’s “factual nexus” argument fails in light of the specialized purpose of the juvenile court which distinguishes between adult and minor offenders. (In re Todd L., supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at pp. 18-19.) “A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 19.) The juvenile court’s purpose is to provide “ ‘care and guidance . . . as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor . . . .’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.)” (Id. at p. 19.) Again, the juvenile court is given great discretion to determine how to best serve the interests of the minor before it. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
The probation department’s report recommended appellant’s probation include a condition that he not use or possess illegal drugs or alcohol and that he submit to drug testing at the discretion of a probation officer. The report also made a finding which suggests that imposing the testing condition was tailored to appellant’s needs, and in his best interests: “Probation should serve to be a wake up call for this fourteen year old, give him the tools to set goals and deter him from further serious criminal behavior.” Regardless of appellant’s claim that he did not use drugs, and regardless of the fact that the offense committed was not drug related, the probation report indicated that appellant was at risk to reoffend, a conclusion bolstered by appellant’s failure in his juvenile diversion program. Imposition of conditions specifically prohibiting the use of drugs and alcohol and giving law enforcement a tool to enforce the provision through testing, indirectly addressed this concern. It is therefore reasonable for the juvenile court, in furtherance of deterring appellant’s future criminal behavior, and in its discretion serving what it believed to be appellant’s needs, to require testing to ensure that appellant will not engage in future criminal behavior by using drugs or alcohol.
Generally, a juvenile court’s broad discretion to impose probation conditions cannot be reversed absent “manifest abuse.” (In re Josh W., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 5.) Because the juvenile court’s decision seems reasonable, there is no indication of a manifest abuse of discretion. We therefore cannot say that the juvenile court, in exercising its discretion, did not tailor the probation conditions to appellant’s needs.
Finally, appellant argues that the drug testing condition unjustifiably infringes on his constitutional rights to privacy and against unreasonable search and seizures. Regardless of a minor’s past history with drugs and alcohol, or whether the offense charged related to drugs or alcohol, a testing condition of probation does not unconstitutionally invade a minor’s privacy or subject him to unreasonable search and seizure. (In re Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 710-711.) Also, given a juvenile court’s broad discretion to condition a minor’s probation, it “may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile. [Citation.]” (In re Josh W., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 5.) As discussed above, the testing condition is tailored to appellant’s needs as set forth in the probation report. We therefore will not overturn the drug testing probation condition.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s disposition order is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, J., Rivera, J.