Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD224648, JD225686
RAYE, J.
Jose S. (appellant), the father of Raymond S. and Alex S. (the minors), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (b), 395.) Appellant contends the social services agency failed to make adequate efforts to notify him of the dependency proceedings and the juvenile court improperly denied him reunification services. We conclude that notice to appellant was proper and that, as a noncustodial parent who had not requested custody of the minors, he was not entitled to reunification services.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2007 dependency proceedings were initiated by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) concerning two-year-old Raymond and three-day-old Alex based on the mother’s failure to rehabilitate from substance abuse, which resulted in her testing positive for methamphetamine six days before Alex’s birth. Additionally, it was alleged that the mother continued to associate with appellant, who was “a known substances abuser.” According to the petition, Raymond previously had been made a dependent of the juvenile court after the mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of his birth. Appellant’s reunification services were terminated in the prior proceeding as a result of his failure to participate in his case plan, and Raymond was returned to the mother’s care. Dependency jurisdiction was terminated in the prior proceeding on March 16, 2007, based on the mother’s successful reunification with Raymond. Two days later (and less than a week before Alex’s birth), the mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
Appellant signed a declaration of paternity concerning Alex three days after his birth, declaring under penalty of perjury that he was Alex’s biological father and that the information provided in the declaration was “true and correct.” In the declaration, appellant listed an address in Citrus Heights, which was the paternal aunt’s address and appellant’s last known address in the prior dependency proceeding, and notice of the proceedings was sent to him at this address.
Appellant did not appear at any of the scheduled hearings in the minors’ matters. Notice of each continuance was sent to appellant at the Citrus Heights address. At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petitions and denied reunification services to appellant based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) (failure to reunify with a sibling).
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant claims the Department failed to provide him with adequate notice of the proceedings. This claim is without merit.
“The ‘interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights [citations][.] [T]he state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must afford him adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.’ [Citations.]” (In re Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598.) “The means employed [to give notice] must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” (Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 315 [94 L.Ed. 865, 874] (Mullane); see In re Antonio F. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 440, 450, disapproved on another ground in In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 831.)
Here, the Department utilized appellant’s last known address from the prior dependency proceeding, which terminated less than two weeks before the new proceeding commenced. On the same day that the petitions were filed in the present matters, appellant provided this address under penalty of perjury on the declaration of paternity, confirming that this was his current address. Furthermore, the mother believed appellant was living with the paternal grandmother, who reportedly lived with the paternal aunt. The fact that the paternal grandmother appeared at the initial jurisdictional hearing in the current matters suggests that appellant also had received notice of the proceedings.
Nor would appellant’s failure to appear in court or otherwise respond to notice necessarily indicate to the Department that it was utilizing an incorrect address. In light of appellant’s lack of involvement in the later stages of the previous dependency proceeding, the Department had no reason to assume that his failure to respond in the current matters signaled he had not received the notices. This was reinforced by the mother’s representation that appellant “does not want to participate in the case and does not want to talk to any Child Protective Services Social Worker.”
Appellant suggests the Department was required to make greater efforts to locate him because the minors’ mother “indicated, on at least two occasions, that appellant did not reside at the address listed on the petition.” While the mother did state in the prior dependency proceeding that appellant had been told to leave the paternal aunt’s home, that was seven months before the current petitions were filed. Moreover, the mother reported this information when confronted with reports that she had been seen with appellant after stating she planned to have no contact with him. The mother denied she had contact with appellant and, when questioned about whether appellant still lived with the paternal aunt (whom the mother relied on as “her support system”), she reported he had been asked to leave. The mother had demonstrated a lack of candor in other respects with regard to appellant, initially maintaining she did not know the identity of Alex’s father but later revealing that appellant was his father. Thus, there is reason to be skeptical about the mother’s representations as to appellant’s whereabouts in the earlier proceeding. In any event, during the current proceedings, the mother informed the social worker that appellant received mail at the address on record.
Appellant cites In re Arlyne A., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 591 as support for his position. In that case, the social services agency relied on information that was five years old to serve notice on the parent, rather than following up on current information it had been provided that the parent was living elsewhere or, at the very least, utilizing the parent’s last known address. (Id. at pp. 598-599.) In contrast, in the present matter, the Department did not rely on stale information, but instead used the very same address that appellant himself had provided on a form signed under penalty of perjury on the day the petitions were filed. Thus, we conclude that “[t]he means employed [to give notice to appellant were] . . . such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” (Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at p. 315.)
II
Appellant contends that because he was not a custodial parent at the time of the minors’ removal, the juvenile court erred by evaluating whether to provide him reunification services under section 361.5 instead of section 361.2. The Department concedes this point, but maintains that appellant is not entitled to services because he did not come forward and request custody of the minors. We agree with the Department.
We decide the issue in the Department’s favor on the merits and decline its invitation to apply the doctrine of disentitlement to preclude consideration of appellant’s claim.
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides: “When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (Italics added.) If the child is placed with the noncustodial parent, the juvenile court has the option of terminating its jurisdiction or ordering services for one or both parents. (§ 361.2, subd. (b).)
Under section 361.2, a noncustodial parent is not entitled to reunification services unless he or she requests custody of the child who has been removed from the other parent. (R.S. v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271 (R.S.); Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 619, 627-628; In re Terry H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1854.) Providing services to a noncustodial parent who does not seek custody of the child would not facilitate reunification of the family, which is the purpose of providing such services. (R.S., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1270-1271.) Thus, the noncustodial parent must indicate a desire to assume custody of the child before the juvenile court can consider providing reunification services.
In the present matter, the minors did not reside with appellant at the time of their removal. Consequently, section 361.2 applied. As appellant never appeared in the proceedings or contacted the Department to communicate his desires regarding the minors, appellant was not entitled to services on this basis. The juvenile court erred when, instead, it applied the provisions of section 361.5 to deny reunification services. However, the record is uncontroverted that appellant did not request custody of the minors. Consequently, the denial of reunification services was proper, albeit on a different basis than that relied upon by the juvenile court.
Appellant claims he did not have an opportunity to express his wishes with regard to the minors because he was not given proper notice of the proceedings. We have already rejected his notice claims. Accordingly, we shall vacate the juvenile court’s findings as to appellant under section 361.5 but affirm its order denying reunification services.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings under section 361.5 as to appellant are vacated. The order denying reunification services to appellant is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., BUTZ, J.