Opinion
3 C039302
04-10-2002
In re RAYMOND E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHELLE R. et al., Defendants and Appellants. C039302 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) Filed
In re RAYMOND E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE R. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
C039302
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Filed 3/19/02
4/10/02
(Super. Ct. No. JD213192)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Natalie S. Lindsay, Referee. Affirmed as modified.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Michelle R.
Alice C. Shotton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Derrick E.
Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, Vicki J. Finucane, Deputy County Counsel, for plaintiff and respondent.
DAVIS, J.
Michelle R. and Derrick E. (appellants), the parents of Raymond E. (the minor), appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights.(FN1) Claiming a statutory exception to adoption applied, appellants contend the court committed reversible error in terminating their parental rights. Michelle also claims the court erred in finding the minor adoptable because, according to Michelle, the minor was a member of a bonded sibling group. Finally, Michelle asserts the matter should be remanded with directions for the juvenile court to consider the applicability to this case of a recently enacted statutory exception to the termination of parental rights.
We shall affirm the order terminating parental rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 8, 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the four-year-old minor. That petition alleged appellants had a substance abuse problem that rendered them unable to provide care for the minor. The petition also alleged appellants were incarcerated and had failed to arrange care for the minor.
The juvenile court sustained the petition as amended and adjudged the minor a dependent child. The court ordered DHHS to provide appellants with reunification services. The court also granted appellants weekly visitation with the minor.
The minors 11-year-old sibling, John, was detained at the same time as the minor. After the minor and John were placed separately, the social worker recommended they visit each other regularly. Thereafter, John indicated he wished to remain with his foster parents in a guardianship. The record does not reflect the disposition of Johns dependency.
As of August 1999, appellants were complying with the requirements of their reunification plan. They visited regularly with the minor, and the visits were going well. The minor reported that he enjoyed staying with appellants during his weekend visitations. The minor also visited with John regularly.
In August 1999, Derrick was incarcerated. As a result, he was unable to visit the minor. However, Derrick maintained contact with the minor through written correspondence.
According to an April 2000 report, both the minor and John indicated they wanted to live with appellants. Thereafter, there were some problems regarding visitation. Depending on Michelles transportation and housing situation, her visitation schedule changed. At one point, the minor had not had a visit with Michelle in approximately three months. Moreover, due to Derricks continued incarceration, the minor had not seen him in nine months.
According to a September 2000 report, the social worker had arranged for the minor and John to visit each other on non-school days. They saw each other on August 26, 2000, for the first time in a month. The minor and John also wrote letters to each other. In October 2000, the juvenile court ordered visitation between the minor and John to be at least three times monthly and visitation between Michelle and the minors to be at least twice monthly.
In her December 2000 report, the social worker noted that Michelle was incarcerated for eight days prior to the October 4, 2000, hearing, and had been sentenced to 120 days weekend work project. Michelle also had failed to complete the requirements of her reunification plan. Thereafter, the juvenile court terminated services for appellants. The court granted Michelle supervised visitation twice monthly with the minor.
The minor was doing well in foster care. However, his foster parents did not wish to adopt him. Noting the possibility of a bond existing between the minor and Derrick, in March 2001 the social worker recommended against termination of parental rights.
In her May 2001 report, the social worker noted that both appellants were incarcerated. As long as they were incarcerated, appellants would not be visiting the minor. DHHS agreed to arrange visitation between the minor and John every other month.
In May 2001, the social worker changed her mind about the adoptability of the minor. Acknowledging the minor enjoyed his visits with Derrick, the social worker noted that Derrick had never been a primary care provider for the minor. According to the social worker, the minor "deserves a family that can commit to him and provide for him permanently . . . ." DHHS had located a prospective adoptive family for the minor and the minor had begun visiting with that family.
Michelle was incarcerated and absent from the August 31, 2001, section 366.26 hearing. Counsel for appellants argued that, due to the existence of a "positive and beneficial" bond between the minor and appellants, it would be detrimental to the minor to terminate appellants parental rights. Rejecting the argument of appellants, the juvenile court found it likely the minor would be adopted and terminated appellants parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I
Relying on one of the statutory exceptions to adoption, appellants contend the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental rights. According to Michelle, the minor had lived with her for most of his life; when he was out of her custody, they had visited regularly; the minor wanted to live with Michelle; and the record reflects the minor enjoyed a significant relationship with his extended biological family. Michelle asserts that "[o]n these facts, it would be detrimental to [the minor] to terminate [her] parental rights." Derrick argues he made efforts to maintain contact with the minor, and the two enjoyed a bond that even DHHS acknowledged. Therefore, Derrick claims, the evidence suggests both that the minor would benefit from a continued relationship with Derrick, and that a severance of that relationship would be detrimental to the minor.
"At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.] [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child."(FN2)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: "The parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship."(FN3) The benefit to the child must promote "the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated."(FN4)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances which constitute an exception to termination of parental rights.(FN5) The juvenile court is not required to find termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances.(FN6) Even frequent and loving contact is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child.(FN7)
In this case, because of their incarceration at various times, appellants did not have regular personal contact with the minor. On the other hand, Derrick made an effort to maintain contact with the minor by corresponding with him, and the record suggests the minor shared some bond with Derrick. However, the record does not reflect whether Derrick corresponded regularly or frequently with the minor, and Michelles visitation pattern was not always consistent. The social worker noted the minor "very rarely lived with [Derrick]" throughout his life. Moreover, the minor was adjusting well in foster care.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. In re Autumn H. interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test,(FN8) and both In re Autumn H. and In re Beatrice M. posit a high level of parental-type involvement and attachment.(FN9) Even assuming those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support appellants assertions the minor would benefit from continuing his relationship with appellants simply because in the past he had stayed with appellants and stated he wanted to live with them.(FN10)
Appellants suggest the record establishes the existence of a beneficial relationship between the minor and appellants, precluding a finding of adoptability. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude otherwise. Evidence of a significant attachment by itself does not suffice. Instead, the record must show such benefit to the minor that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to him.(FN11)
In In re Brandon C., cited by Derrick, the juvenile court found it was in the best interests of the minors to establish a guardianship, rather than terminate parental rights, so the minors could maintain their relationship with their mother.(FN12) Affirming, the Court of Appeal held substantial evidence supported the juvenile courts conclusion that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, since their mother had maintained regular, beneficial visitation with them.(FN13)
In re Brandon C. is distinguishable from the proceedings here. The court in In re Brandon C. found ample evidence of benefit to the minors from continued contact with their mother.(FN14) Here, by contrast, and contrary to appellants claims, the record supports the juvenile courts implied conclusion there would be little benefit to the minor if the relationship with appellants were continued. As the record shows, appellants had had little or no personal contact with the minor for many months before the section 366.26 hearing. In the meantime, the minor was doing well in foster care.
Derrick claims that the circumstances of his case differ from those found in other cases because he maintained a well-established parent-child relationship with the minor, which included regular contact. In support of that claim, Derrick cites In re Casey D.(FN15) Finding the absence of an "exceptional case" where a beneficial relationship existed precluding adoption, the Court of Appeal in In re Casey D. affirmed the order terminating parental rights.(FN16) However, the court in In re Casey D. did recognize the possibility of a beneficial relationship existing despite the absence of daily contact between a parent and child.(FN17)
Here, the issue is as follows: In light of the minors adoptability, would a continued relationship with appellants benefit the minor to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefit the child would gain in a permanent adoptive home? The record supports the juvenile courts implied finding in the negative.
Emphasizing the degree of bonding that existed, in his pretrial statement Derrick suggested either guardianship or long-term foster care was a more appropriate disposition than adoption for the minor. However, on this record, the juvenile court was authorized to, and did, conclude that only adoption, as the preferred disposition,(FN18) would promote the best interests of the minor. As the social worker stated, "[the minor] has waited for permanency long enough . . . ."
After it became apparent appellants would not reunify with the minor, the juvenile court had to find an "exceptional situation existed to forego adoption."(FN19) In this case, on the contrary, the court implied the minor would not benefit from continuing his relationship with appellants. Appellants had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. We conclude appellants failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating appellants parental rights.(FN20)
II
Michelle contends the juvenile court erred in finding the minor was adoptable because he was a member of a bonded sibling group. Noting the minor had enjoyed a relationship with his brother John for many years, Michelle asserts a bond existed between them. Appellant suggests the courts adoptability finding ignored any evidence of the relationship between the siblings.
If the juvenile court did not consider the nature of the relationship between the minor and John, perhaps that was because the issue was never tendered to it. It is true, as Michelle notes in her brief, that she asserted in a pretrial statement the minor was not adoptable. However, she proffered nothing either in that statement or at the section 366.26 hearing about the nature of the sibling relationship and its connection with the courts adoptability finding. By failing to tender the issue in the juvenile court, Michelle has waived any claim of error on appeal.(FN21)
III
In a supplemental brief, Michelle claims remand is required for the juvenile court to consider the applicability here of a recently enacted statutory exception to termination of parental rights.
Effective January 1, 2002, the Legislature amended section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), creating an additional exception to the termination of parental rights. Under new subdivision (c)(1)(E), the juvenile court may find a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor where "[t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption."(FN22)
Michelle contends the "legislative history and context of the enactment of the amendment to section 366.26 shows that the Legislature intended this amendment to apply retroactively, so [she] and [the minor] should receive the benefit of the change in the law, and since the record on appeal clearly shows a strong likelihood that [Michelles] parental rights would not have been terminated had the juvenile court considered the new section 366.26 exception to the preference for adoption, a new permanency planning hearing should be held in the juvenile court."
It is axiomatic that ordinarily statutes are presumed to operate prospectively; a retrospective application is appropriate only where there is a clear expression of legislative intent to do so.(FN23) Here, Michelle does not contend that subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 contains express language mandating retroactivity. Indeed, manifestly it does not.(FN24) Instead, Michelle argues the amendment is analogous to criminal statutes amended in order to lessen the punishment applied on conviction of a criminal offense. Under such circumstances, the lesser punishment is applied to cases not yet final on appeal.(FN25)
Michelles analogy is inapt. By creating an additional exception to adoption based on substantial interference with a sibling relationship, the Legislature was not, as Michelle asserts, necessarily conferring a new "benefit" on parents and minors akin to a lesser punishment in the criminal context. Moreover, contrary to Michelles claim, there is no indication the Legislature had determined that some orders terminating parental rights had interfered unduly with strong sibling relationships. It is just as likely the Legislature acted simply in recognition of the importance placed recently on preserving sibling relationships and sought to provide the juvenile court with the flexibility required to address that issue.
Seeking judicial notice of Senate floor and committee analyses concerning the legislation that enacted subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26, Michelle argues those materials evince a legislative intent to apply the new law retroactively. Absent any opposition from DHHS, and in order to resolve the issue, we grant Michelles request.(FN26) We reviewed the materials to determine whether the issue of retroactivity was considered by the Legislature.(FN27)
Our examination of the legislative materials submitted by Michelle compels this conclusion: Nothing contained in those materials suggests any intent to apply subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 retroactively. Michelle argues a statement by an interest group in support of the new legislation demonstrated the "urgency" of the amendment. The group stated that maintaining sibling relationships was "imperative" "now and in the future."(FN28) Elsewhere in the materials, the word "imperative" is used in connection with a statement made by the sponsor and supporters of the legislation.(FN29)
We are not persuaded that describing legislation as "imperative" demonstrates an intent to apply it retroactively. Instead, such a word suggests no more than ascribing significance to the legislation and treating it as important. It simply is not the case that considering something "imperative" is tantamount to a finding of retroactive application.
Michelles final argument in support of a retroactivity finding is as follows: The Legislature had intended the amendment to be enacted along with other amendments to the dependency statutes passed into law in 2000. Unfortunately, however, the new legislation was "chaptered out by another bill." Therefore, according to Michelle, the Legislature intended the new provision to become effective on January 1, 2001, rather than January 1, 2002.
According to the legislative materials submitted by Michelle, it is true the new amendment to section 366.26 had been "chaptered out inadvertently" by other legislation.(FN30) But it simply does not follow from that fact that the Legislature intended retroactive application of the new amendment. There simply is no indication anywhere of such an intent.
In In re Cindy B., the juvenile court applied a newly amended version of former subdivision (a)(2) of Civil Code section 232 retroactively to allow termination of parental rights in that case.(FN31) Section 232 of the Civil Code was the predecessor statute to section 366.26. On appeal, this court reversed, finding an absence of legislative intent to make the new law retroactive and no express declaration of retroactivity.(FN32)
Similarly, as we have seen in this case, the amendment to section 366.26 was not accompanied by any expression of intent or language making it retroactive. Thus, no reason exists to depart from the general presumption in the law against retroactivity.(FN33) Accordingly, we must reject Michelles claim.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of appellants is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., ROBIE, J.
Notes:
(FN1). Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26, 395. Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(FN2). In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.
(FN3). Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
(FN4). In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.
(FN5). In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.
(FN6). In re Cristella C., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at page 1373.
(FN7). In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924.
(FN8). In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575.
(FN9). In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pages 575-576; In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at page 1418.
(FN10). Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.
(FN11). Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
(FN12). In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.
(FN13). In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pages 1533, 1534, 1537, 1538.
(FN14). In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pages 1537, 1538.
(FN15). In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38.
(FN16). In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pages 51, 53, 54.
(FN17). In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at page 51.
(FN18). In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at page 1368.
(FN19). In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 576.
(FN20). In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at page 821.
(FN21). Cf. In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502.
(FN22). Statutes 2001, chapter 747, section 3.
(FN23). Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207-1208.
(FN24). Statutes 2001, chapter 747.
(FN25). People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 69-70.
(FN26). Evidence Code sections 452, 459.
(FN27). Cf. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1211.
(FN28). Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses, third reading analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 28, 2001, page 5.
(FN29). Senate Health and Human Services Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2001, page 5.
(FN30). Senate Health and Human Services Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2001, page 6; Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2001, page 6.
(FN31). In re Cindy B. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 771, 778, 779.
(FN32). In re Cindy B., supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at pages 779-782, 787.
(FN33). Cf. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 153.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION(FN*)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND CERTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 19, 2002, be modified as follows:
1.On pages 1 and 2, delete the first two paragraphs beginning with the words "Michelle R. and Derrick E." and ending with the words "terminating parental rights." and insert the following:
Michelle R. and Derrick E. (appellants), the parents of Raymond E. (the minor), appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights.(FN1) Appellants claim the court erred when it failed to find that it would be detrimental to the minor to sever their relationship with him. Michelle separately claims that the court erred when it failed to properly consider the effect of adoption on the minors relationship with his brother. We disagree and will affirm the order terminating parental rights.
Effective January 1, 2002, the Legislature amended section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), creating an additional exception to the termination of parental rights upon a finding of adoptability. Under new subdivision (c)(1)(E), the juvenile court may find a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor where "[t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption."(FN2) In the published portion of our opinion we conclude that neither the statutory language itself nor pertinent legislative history suggests any intent to apply subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 retroactively. Therefore, no reason exists to depart from the general presumption in the law against retroactivity.
2.On page 12, in line 1 of the first full sentence, insert the words "that a" following the words "Michelle claims"; in line 2, replace the word "for" with the words "so that" and delete the word "here"; and on line 4, add the words "upon a finding of adoptability" at the end of the sentence, so that the sentence reads:
In a supplemental brief, Michelle claims that a remand is required so that the juvenile court can consider the applicability of a recently enacted statutory exception to termination of parental rights upon a finding of adoptability.
3.On page 13, in the first sentence of the first full paragraph, delete the words "It is axiomatic that" and capitalize the word "ordinarily."
4.On page 13, in the third sentence of the first full paragraph, delete the word "manifestly" following the word "Indeed."
5.On page 14, on the second line of the page, delete the word "had" following the word "Legislature."
6.On page 14, in the text of footnote 26, add the following sentence:
We take judicial notice of the following legislative materials: (1) Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses, third reading analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 28, 2001; (2) Senate Health and Human Services Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2001; and (3) Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 705 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2001.
7.On page 14, in line 2 of the first sentence of the second full paragraph, replace the words "compels this conclusion: Nothing" with the words "leads us to conclude that nothing" so that the sentence reads:
Our examination of the legislative materials submitted by Michelle leads us to conclude that nothing contained in those materials suggests any intent to apply subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 retroactively.
8.On page 14, in the second sentence of the second full paragraph, delete the quotation marks around the word "urgency."
9.On page 15, in line 1 of the first sentence of the first full paragraph, delete the words "We are not persuaded that" at the beginning of the sentence and capitalize the word "describing"; and on line 2, delete the word "demonstrates" and insert "does not demonstrate" in its place so that the sentence reads:
Describing legislation as "imperative" does not demonstrate an intent to apply it retroactively.
10.On page 15, in the second sentence of the first full paragraph, delete the words "Instead, such a" at the beginning of the sentence and insert the word "The" so that the sentence reads:
The word suggests no more than ascribing significance to the legislation and treating it as important.
11.On page 15, in the third sentence of the first full paragraph, delete the word "simply"; add the word "certainly" between the words "is" and "not"; delete the words "the case that considering something imperative is"; and add the words "the need for" between the words "of" and "retroactive" so that the sentence reads:
It is certainly not tantamount to a finding of the need for retroactive application.
12.On page 15, in line 1 of the first sentence of the second full paragraph, delete the word "a"; in line 2, delete the word "finding" and delete the words "as follows: The" and insert the words "that the"; in line 2, delete the word "had"; delete the period at the end of the sentence, along with one of the spaces and replace the period with a comma; and delete the words "Unfortunately, however," at the beginning of the second sentence and insert the word "but" so that the revised combined sentence reads:
Michelles final argument in support of retroactivity is that the Legislature intended the amendment to be enacted along with other amendments to the dependency statutes passed into law in 2000, but the new legislation was "chaptered out by another bill."
13.On page 15, in line 2 of the first sentence of the third full paragraph, delete the words "it is true" between the words "Michelle," and "the."
14.On page 16, on line 2, delete the word "simply" between the words "it" and "does."
15.On page 16, in the last sentence of the second full paragraph, delete the words "Accordingly, we must" and insert the words "We therefore" in their place.
16.The addition of footnote 2 in modification 1 above necessitates renumbering of all subsequent footnotes.
There is no change in the judgment.
The original opinion was not certified for publication in the official reports. For good cause it now appears that the introductory paragraphs and part III of the Discussion, as modified herein, and the disposition, should be published. Accordingly, it is ordered that those portions of the opinion, as modified herein, shall be published in the official reports.
(CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.)
SCOTLAND, P.J., DAVIS, J., ROBIE, J.
Notes:
(FN*). Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1, only the introductory paragraphs and part III of the Discussion, as modified herein, and the disposition are certified for publication.
(FN1). Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26, 395. Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(FN2). Statutes 2001, chapter 747, section 3.