Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Peter A. Warmerdam, Juvenile Court Referee. Super. Ct. No. JW106102
Tara K. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Harris, Acting P.J., Wiseman, J., and Gomes, J.
The court readjudged appellant, Raul C., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after Raul admitted allegations in a petition charging him with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and violation of probation (§ 777). On October 26, 2006, the court committed Raul to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice (DJJ), for a maximum term of confinement of seven years six months. On appeal, Raul contends the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the DJJ.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
On October 9, 2006, 15-year-old Raul was a passenger in a car driven by parolee, Jimmy Lindsey, who was stopped by sheriff deputies while driving in a parking lot with the car’s lights out. The deputies found three rounds of .38 caliber ammunition and a glass smoking pipe on Raul. They also found a .38 caliber handgun on the floorboard in front of his seat.
During an interview with deputies, Raul stated that he and Lindsey were using drugs when they decided to steal gas to sell to buy more drugs. They were driving in the parking lot looking for cars from which to steal gas. Raul was carrying the gun in the event they were confronted by anyone.
On October 12, 2006, Raul admitted the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm offense in exchange for the dismissal of one count each of felony possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)) and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364).
Raul told the probation officer that he began using methamphetamine at age 12, alcohol at age 13, cocaine at age 14, and that he previously smoked marijuana approximately every other day, drank alcohol a few times a week, and used inhalants on five occasions. He also admitted using methamphetamine daily by smoking or snorting it. Raul felt he was addicted to methamphetamine.
In July 2006, Raul overdosed on Wellbutrin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine and was transported to the hospital. Raul also reported that he had been previously diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and had previously attempted suicide, with the last attempt occurring when he was 13 years old.
The report also noted that in May 2002 Raul was referred to Early Intervention School. In 2004 he had five referrals to Prevention, including one for petty theft (Pen. Code, § 488) and three for trespass by threat and unlawful entry (Pen. Code, § 601, subd. (a)).
On March 4, 2005, the court placed Raul on probation after it sustained allegations charging him with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148) and trespass (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (l)). It also committed him to the Pride Academy and ordered him to perform 40 hours on the Juvenile Court Work Program. However, he was subsequently dropped from the academy for inappropriate behavior.
On April 29, 2005, following Raul’s adjudication for violating probation based on his dismissal from the Pride Academy, the court continued him on probation, ordered him to serve 25 days in juvenile hall, and placed him back in the Pride Academy.
On June 27, 2005, the district attorney filed a supplemental petition alleging that Raul violated his probation by being dropped from Pride Academy for non-attendance.
On July 22, 2005, following Raul’s adjudication for another probation violation, the court continued Raul on probation, ordered him to serve 30 days in juvenile hall, committed him to Camp Erwin Owen, and ordered him to attend the Sandstone Academy. The court, however, stayed the camp commitment until October 25, 2005.
On October 25, 2005, Raul failed to appear at a status review hearing.
On November 10, 2005, the previously stayed camp commitment was imposed and the court set aside its orders requiring Raul to participate in the Juvenile Work Program and attend the Sandstone Academy.
On November 23, 2005, following Raul’s adjudication for residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)) and violating his probation, the court continued Raul on probation and continued his commitment to Camp Erwin Owen.
On December 11, 2005, Raul and another ward ran away from their camp commitment but were apprehended approximately two hours later.
On January 20, 2006, following his adjudication for escaping from a county facility (§ 871) and violating probation, the court continued Raul on probation, set aside his Camp Erwin Owen commitment, and committed him to the Kern Crossroads Facility.
In addition to his delinquent history, the probation report noted that Raul’s school performance was “distressing” because he had earned only 64 credits and failed court-ordered school programs three times because of nonattendance or delinquent behavior. The report further noted that Raul was formerly affiliated with a street gang and went by the monikers “Hell Boy” and “Crazy.” The report recommended a recommitment to the Kern Crossroads Facility and concluded that he was inappropriate for commitment to the Avenues To Change Program because of his criminal sophistication and his potential for violent behavior. The report did not recommend a commitment to the DJJ because Raul was only 15 years old and one more commitment to the Crossroads Facility program would provide Raul with a final opportunity to reform before he exhausted all local resources.
A juvenile hall observation report dated October 26, 2006, indicated that Raul had been in custody at the hall since October 10, 2006. The report also indicated that Raul had made a good adjustment to juvenile hall and had stayed away from trouble in his unit. It noted that he was cooperative and respectful with staff although he could be “attention seeking” at times.
At the beginning of Raul’s disposition hearing on October 26, 2006, the court asked the probation officer why the department had not recommended a DJJ commitment. Following some discussion, the court asked defense counsel why it should not commit Raul to the DJJ. Defense counsel noted that Raul entered an early plea in the instant matter. The court then reviewed Raul’s delinquent history and committed Raul to the DJJ for a maximum confinement time of seven years six months. In so doing, the court, in pertinent part, stated:
“It doesn’t look like anything we’ve done has had any impact on this young man. And I can see nothing at this point that gives me reason to be optimistic that a second commitment to the Kern Crossroads facility would be any different that the first commitment.”
DISCUSSION
Raul contends that the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the DJJ because there was no evidence that he would benefit from a commitment there or that a recommitment to the Kern Crossroads program would be inappropriate or ineffective. We disagree.
“The appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision. [Citations.] Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a CYA commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.] A CYA commitment may be considered, however, without previous resort to less restrictive placements. [Citations.]” (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)
Here, the court tried Raul in various placements, including in the Juvenile Court Work Program, juvenile hall, the Pride Academy, the Sandstone Academy, Camp Erwin Owen, and the Kern Crossroads facility and none of them had been successful in curbing Raul’s delinquent behavior. Further, the court could reasonably find from Raul’s conduct in flaunting the court’s authority by running away from one placement, failing to appear at a court hearing, and his commission of most of his offenses while on probation, that Raul needed to be in a secure placement. It could also reasonably conclude from Raul’s substance abuse problems, his former gang affiliation, and his previous suicide attempts that Raul would need a long-term program to address these issues. Additionally, the juvenile court law now recognizes the rehabilitative effect of punishment and a concern for the safety of the community. (§ 202.) Raul’s offenses were beginning to escalate in seriousness with his most recent offense involving a firearm. Thus, the court could reasonably conclude from the failure of past placements, the danger Raul posed to the community, and the need to hold Raul accountable, that any placement short of a DJJ commitment would be ineffective or inappropriate.
Moreover, the court could reasonably conclude that Raul would benefit from a DJJ commitment. Raul’s good behavior in and adjustment to juvenile hall showed that he responded well to being placed in a secure setting and that he would probably benefit from the structure and discipline inherent in a DJJ commitment and from the rehabilitative effect of being held accountable for his delinquent conduct in a secure placement from which he could not run away. Further, Raul’s poor school performance, his former gang affiliation, his substance abuse problems, and his past suicide attempts made it likely that Raul would probably benefit from the educational, vocational, and counseling programs available there. (Cf. In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 153 [trial court properly found that DJJ, with its specialized institutions and rehabilitative programs tailored to delinquent’s sophistication and need for security, probably would benefit minor].)
Raul appears to contend that, although DJJ programs can benefit minors with psychological, emotional, or substance abuse problems, the record does not support the court’s finding that he would probably benefit from a commitment there because the court did not specifically identify any probable benefit to the minor. We disagree.
“By statutory mandate, the juvenile court must find such commitment to be a probable benefit to the minor. (Citation.) However, the specific reasons for such commitment need not be stated in the record. Rather that determination must be supported by substantial evidence contained within the record.” (In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 773.) In accord with Robert D., we reject Raul’s suggestion that the court was required to specifically state what programs Raul could receive at the DJJ or how he would benefit from these programs or a commitment to the DJJ. Thus, we conclude that Raul’s commitment to the DJJ was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.