Opinion
No. 07-688.
Filed April 1, 2008.
Sampson County No. 06JB85.
Appeal by juvenile from order entered 25 January 2007 by Judge Leonard W. Thagard in Sampson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2007.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Alexandra Gruber, for the State. Michael E. Casterline, for juvenile-appellant.
R.A.T. ("the juvenile") appeals a disposition order committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("DJJDP") and placement in a youth development center for an adjudication of delinquency entered on 25 January 2007. We affirm.
On 28 August 2006, Sampson County Police Chief P.M. Howell, Jr. filed petitions alleging the juvenile wilfully and maliciously attempted to injure a minor, S.C., by the use of an explosive device and threatened to physically injure two other minors, T.S. and C.C. The 20 October 2006 disposition order, entered in Sampson County District Court by the Honorable Leonard W. Thagard, adjudicated the juvenile as delinquent for two counts of communicating threats and malicious use of explosives to damage property, placed him on intensive probation for twelve months, and ordered him to cooperate with placement in a Wilderness Program.
On 2 November 2006, the juvenile was involved in a fight with another student in school and a small amount of marijuana was found in the juvenile's shoe. As a result, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Doyle Grady of the Sampson County Sheriff's Office filed two juvenile petitions alleging the juvenile committed two delinquent acts: simple misdemeanor possession of marijuana and a simple affray. Subsequently, a juvenile court counselor filed a motion for review regarding the juvenile's probation violations.
Both the probation violations and the charges of marijuana possession and simple affray were heard on 24 January 2007. The trial court found the State proved the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. On 25 January 2007, the trial court's dispositional order referenced the juvenile's previous adjudication as well as the new adjudication. The juvenile was committed to the DJJDP for placement in a youth development center for a minimum period of six months. In addition, the trial court ordered that a six month period was the maximum time the juvenile could remain committed before the DJJDP either released the juvenile or made a determination that the juvenile's commitment should be extended. Finally, the court ordered to transfer the juvenile to the Wilderness Program when the next opportunity for placement became available. From this order, the juvenile appeals.
I. Jurisdiction
The juvenile argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the juvenile's probation or to enter a disposition order because the trial court failed to enter an order finding the allegations had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and adjudicating the juvenile as delinquent prior to the entry of the disposition order. We disagree.
There are two phases in juvenile hearings: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405, 2411, 2501 (2007). During the adjudicatory phase, the State seeks to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the petition's allegations that a juvenile is delinquent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2409 (2007). If the trial court finds that the allegations of delinquency have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court shall state such findings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2411. However, the statute governing adjudication hearings does not require that the adjudication of delinquency be in writing. Oral findings are sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency, even if they are omitted from a written order. In re Rikard, 161 N.C. App. 150, 154, 587 S.E.2d 467, 469-70 (2003). Furthermore, while the statute expressly requires dispositional orders to be in writing ( see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2512 (2007)) no such requirement is stated for adjudication orders.
Here, the trial court initially adjudicated the juvenile as delinquent on 18 October 2006 and later on 24 January 2007. In addition, the trial court found that the State's allegations against the juvenile at the January 2007 adjudication hearing were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to enter a dispositional order in January 2007 based on the prior adjudication of delinquency.
II. Level Three Disposition
The juvenile next argues that the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2513 and abused its discretion when the court committed the juvenile pursuant to a Level Three disposition without making additional findings. We disagree. The trial court has discretion in determining the proper disposition for a delinquent juvenile. In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175, 176, 589 S.E.2d 894, 895 (2004) (citing In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 580 S.E.2d 395, 398-99 (2003)). "It is well settled that a decision vested in the discretion of the juvenile court will not be disturbed absent clear evidence that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason." In the matter of N.B., 167 N.C. App. 305, 311, 605 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004) (citing In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002)). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501 requires the trial court to consider certain factors:
In choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court shall select the most appropriate disposition both in terms of kind and duration for the delinquent juvenile. Within the guidelines set forth in G.S. 7B-2508, the court shall select a disposition that is designed to protect the public and to meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile, based upon:
(1) The seriousness of the offense;
(2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable;
(3) The importance of protecting the public safety;
(4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and
(5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501 (2007). The purpose of a disposition in a juvenile action is to design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and protect and promote public safety. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2500 (2007); In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. at 737-38, 567 S.E.2d at 229. "Upon an adjudication of delinquency, a juvenile is . . . placed in a level of punishment, 1, 2, or 3, depending on the juvenile's delinquency history and the type of offense committed." Id., 151 N.C. App. at 737, 567 S.E.2d at 229. "A court exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent and for whom the dispositional chart . . . prescribes a Level 3 disposition shall commit the juvenile to the Department for placement in a youth development center in accordance with G.S. 7B-2506(24)." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508(e) (2007). Failure to make findings of fact supported by the evidence is error. Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. at 176, 589 S.E.2d at 895.
In the order, the trial court found as fact: inter alia, the juvenile was adjudicated for committing a simple affray; when the juvenile committed the offense of simple affray, the juvenile was on probation for a previous adjudication for two counts of communicating threats and the malicious use of explosives; the juvenile had been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense; the court received and considered the predisposition report and incorporated it by reference; and a disposition level of Level Three was authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508.
The predisposition report incorporated into the court's order indicated that the juvenile violated his probation by testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamine, by not attending school on a regular basis, by being disrespectful, by cursing at school officials and by excessive tardiness to class. In addition, the juvenile engaged in horseplay in class and failed to report to the court counselor. The juvenile's prior offenses included malicious use of explosives to damage property, communicating threats, simple affray and marijuana possession.
Furthermore, the juvenile's total risk score was high. Specifically, his risk score was sixteen; a high risk score is fifteen and above. The predisposition report also indicated that the juvenile's parents were willing but unable to provide supervision.
At the disposition hearing, the trial court considered dispositional alternatives. The juvenile requested house arrest until he could be admitted to the Wilderness Program. The State informed the court that juveniles on house arrest have a longer waiting period to be accepted to the Wilderness Program and for that reason, the State recommended commitment to a youth development center. The trial court determined the juvenile would be best served by placement in the Wilderness Program and that a commitment to a youth development center would achieve that result more quickly than house arrest.
III. Conclusion
We conclude the trial court properly considered all the statutory factors and designed an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and protect and promote public safety. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing the juvenile to a youth development
center. Furthermore, no additional findings are necessary to support the dispositional order.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).