Opinion
F04CP16011012A
10-02-2018
IN RE RACHEL G.[1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Robert W. Clark, Judge
On October 4, 2017, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Monique G., the biological mother, and John Doe, the putative father, of Rachel G., who was born on January 2, 2016. The respondent mother has failed to identify the biological father. She initially identified an adult male, but DNA testing determined the individual she identified was not the biological father. Another adult male subsequently came forward and identified himself to DCF as the potential biological father, but DNA testing determined that he too was not the father of the child. After the mother informed DCF that she had been living in the Norwalk area at the time of Rachel’s conception, DCF caused notice of the petition to be published in the Connecticut Post and the Norwalk Hour on October 6, 2017 and October 20, 2017, respectively. John Doe failed to appear and was defaulted on November 2, 2017. The respondent mother, Monique, appeared and was represented by counsel. The matter proceeded to trial on September 5, 2018. No respondent parent claims Indian tribal affiliation. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the child. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction.
The statutory grounds alleged against the respondent father, John Doe, are: 1) the child has been abandoned by the respondent parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility, as to the welfare of the child, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) and 2) there is no ongoing parent/child relationship, which means the relationship which ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2)(D). The statutory ground alleged against the respondent mother, Monique, is as follows: the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position within the life of the child, General Statues § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
FACTS & FINDINGS
At the trial, which commenced on September 5, 2018, the respondent mother, Monique, was advised of her rights pursuant to In re Yasiel, 317 Conn. 773 (2015). The court received or heard evidence in the form of testimony from Amy A., a DCF social worker assigned to the case, and from Monique, the respondent mother. The court also received documentary evidence, including: the court’s January 4, 2017 order adjudicating Rachel G. neglected and committing her to the custody of DCF as to respondent mother (Exhibit A), a social study in support of the petition for termination of parental rights filed with the court on October 4, 2017 (Exhibit B), an addendum to the study dated May 22, 2018 (Exhibit C), a court update dated August 2, 2018 (Exhibit D), a Triple P Level 4 referral for respondent mother dated September 22, 2016 (Exhibit E), and copies of specific steps as amended by an order entered on September 29, 2016 (Exhibit F).
The court takes judicial notice of the following proceedings and orders.
1. An ex parte order of temporary custody was granted by the court (Ginocchio, J.) on September 20, 2016.
2. On January 4, 2017, the court (Ginocchio, J.) adjudicated Rachel neglected and committed her to the care and custody of the Commissioner of DCF. Final steps were ordered for Monique at that time.
3. A permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption was approved by the court (Ginocchio, J.) on July 27, 2017.
4. The termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 4, 2017.
5. A second permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption was approved by the court (Maronich, J.) on May 29, 2018.
The court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence. Rachel was born at Bridgeport Hospital on January 2, 2016. She was in the care of respondent mother Monique and other family members and friends of mother until September 16, 2016, when DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on her behalf. The court entered an ex parte OTC for Rachel on September 20, 2016 and adjudicated Rachel neglected on January 4, 2017. At that time, Rachel was committed to the custody of DCF. Beginning on October 1, 2016 and throughout these proceedings, following an initial, brief two-week stay with a non-relative foster family, Rachel has remained in the care of her maternal aunt, Tanisha W., and Tanisha’s husband, Sean W.
As to Respondent Mother, Monique G.
Twenty-one-year-old Monique G. was born in Jamaica to an unmarried couple. She is the youngest of five siblings. Her mother brought her to Connecticut when she was ten years old, but was unable to address her challenging behaviors. Monique resided with her maternal and paternal grandmothers until she was 13 years old. She has her own history with DCF as a minor dating back to 2012. As a child, Monique was a victim of physical neglect, physical abuse and sexual abuse. She was under DCF’s care from 2013-2015. During that time, she resided in a therapeutic foster home and Kids in Crisis. Monique attended two different high schools, but did not achieve a high school degree. While in DCF care, she received individual counseling and completed intensive anger management training. She remained in DCF care until 2016, when she signed herself out of DCF care and gave birth to Rachel on January 2, 2016.
Monique has a history of suicidal ideations, including at least one inpatient hospitalization in May 2014. She also has a history of substance abuse, including marijuana use starting at the age of 14 and alcohol use as a young teenager in her mother’s care. Although Rachel was Monique’s only child at the time of trial, Monique was pregnant and due to give birth to another child in October 2018.
On September 16, 2016, DCF received a report that Monique was physically neglecting Rachel, who was approximately eight months old at the time. After DCF invoked a 96-hour hold, the court granted DCF’s motion for an OTC and ordered specific steps. The court amended those specific steps at the first hearing on the OTC on September 29, 2016. Final steps were ordered at the time Rachel was adjudicated neglected on January 4, 2017. While the specific steps were in place, DCF provided a number of programs and services intended to address Monique’s parenting skills, housing needs, substance abuse and mental health needs. DCF also offered Monique supervised visitation with Rachel at DCF’s offices in Bridgeport. Additionally, Monique had unlimited visitation opportunities with Rachel at the home of the maternal aunt where Rachel was placed.
With respect to substance abuse, Monique was referred to Southwest Community Health Center in October 2016. Following an evaluation, that treatment center determined that Monique did not need treatment for substance abuse at that time.
With respect to parenting skills, Monique was referred to at least one parenting program at the Kennedy Center, Inc. called "Triple P-Positive Parenting Services." Monique failed to complete that program and was unsuccessfully discharged for lack of attendance. Although Monique testified that she thought the program was helpful, the staff at the Kennedy Center reported that Monique told them that she did not need the training that program offered.
With respect to her mental health needs, Monique was initially referred to a therapist who did not accept Monique’s health insurance. DCF subsequently referred Monique to Life Bridge several times for two mental health sessions to find a suitable therapist. Monique failed to engage in services until July 2017, when she attended just two counseling sessions with a provider from Challenge to Change Services in Bridgeport. Monique did not begin counseling again until July 2018, when she began seeing a counselor at Connecticut Renaissance.
At the time DCF became involved with Rachel’s case, Monique did not have stable housing. DCF referred her to the Supportive Housing Program in October 2016. In April 2017, Monique was able to obtain her own apartment with the assistance of Supportive Housing. After DCF filed its petition to terminate Monique’s parental rights, however, she was no longer eligible for a housing subsidy from Supportive Housing. As a result, Monique could no longer afford that apartment and eventually had to find alternative housing.
It is not clear where Monique resided immediately following her removal from that apartment, but she eventually took up residence with the family of a previous boyfriend, whose initials are C.P. Monique and C.P. were both arrested in January 2017 in connection with a domestic violence incident. According to the DCF social worker who testified at the trial, C.P. acted violently towards Monique during that incident. Following that incident, Monique was not receptive to DCF’s recommendation that she end her relationship with C.P. By the time of trial, Monique was no longer living with C.P.’s family. She had obtained her own apartment beginning in July 2018 and was employed as a home health aide at a local home care agency since June 2018.
The DCF social worker testified that DCF obtained records from Jamaica indicating that C.P. had a history of sexual abuse against his own minor child and his younger sibling. Monique testified that by the time of trial she had ended her relationship with C.P. because she believed DCF would find that relationship objectionable and hold it against her in connection with these proceedings. She continues to believe that C.P. never sexually assaulted a minor and testified that one of the alleged victims, C.P.’s younger sibling, told her that C.P. never assaulted her.
DCF offered Monique ample opportunities to visit with Rachel while the child was in DCF’s custody. Initially, DCF scheduled weekly visits for Monique on Mondays and Fridays in DCF’s Bridgeport offices. Monique failed to attend visits, failed to call DCF to confirm she would be coming for visits, was constantly late for visits, brought unauthorized visitors with her, failed to interact with Rachel during visits, instead using her phone for the majority of the visits, and failed to bring appropriate supplies to care for Rachel during the visits. Eventually, in June 2017, DCF stopped Monday visitation because Monique missed five consecutive visits. In September 2017, DCF stopped Friday visitation as well after Monique had missed four consecutive visits.
Although Monique was free to visit with Rachel at the home of the maternal aunt with whom Rachel has been placed, the DCF social worker testified that Monique had only visited with Rachel at the aunt’s home on two occasions: once in January 2017 and once in January 2018. At the time the TPR petition was filed, DCF reported that Monique would frequently contact her sister, but not ask about Rachel or her well-being during those calls. Monique testified that she has never visited Rachel at the maternal aunt’s home and only visited with Rachel once at the aunt’s workplace. In either case, Monique had seen Rachel just once during the one-year period preceding the trial on DCF’s petition to terminate her parental rights.
In June 2018, Monique started to contact the maternal aunt every other day to speak with Rachel over the telephone. At the time of trial, Monique testified that she was still engaged in frequent telephone contact with Rachel. She also testified that she loves Rachel and cares deeply for her. She was unable to visit with Rachel, however, due to work conflicts and prenatal appointments for her unborn child. Monique never informed DCF that her work or medical conditions interfered with her ability to visit with Rachel. Nor did she ask DCF for help with transportation to the maternal aunt’s home.
As to the Child, Rachel
Rachel G. was approximately eight months old when she was removed from her mother’s custody and care on September 16, 2016. She initially was placed with a non-relative foster family for approximately two weeks. On October 1, 2016, she was placed in the home of her maternal aunt, Tanisha W., and Tanisha’s husband, Sean W. She has remained in their care through the date of trial.
When Rachel initially came into DCF custody, she was vomiting frequently. She was diagnosed with reflux. Rachel was prescribed medication, which resolved the condition. Rachel no longer needs that medication. DCF also referred Rachel to Birth to Three Services in December 2016. After an assessment, Birth to Three determined Rachel did not need services.
Rachel has thrived in the care of her maternal aunt and uncle. At the time the TPR petition was filed, Rachel was being seen by physicians for her routine medical examinations, gained appropriate amounts of weight, and no longer needed medication for her reflux condition. She appeared to be doing well, loved to eat and slept through the night without any concerns.
By May of 2018, DCF reported that Rachel had been in the maternal aunt’s care for approximately 20 months. At that time, Rachel continued to thrive and was meeting all developmental milestones. She was up to date medically, with no concerns noted, and attended day care full time. She was doing very well at day care, was meeting all her milestones there, and enjoyed being the teacher’s helper. The maternal aunt and her husband expressed a willingness to adopt Rachel. DCF made a similar report about Rachel in August 2018. The maternal aunt and uncle continued to express a desire to adopt Rachel, who by that time had come to view them as her psychological parents.
By the time of trial, Rachel was approximately 2 years and eight months old. She continued to thrive in the care of her maternal aunt and uncle. At trial, the DCF social worker testified that Rachel is now a healthy, sweet, active, talkative, and energetic child. Rachel has bonded with her aunt and uncle as her primary caregivers and psychological parents. She refers to them as "mommy" and "daddy." The aunt and uncle remain interested in adopting Rachel.
Relative Resources
Rachel has been in the care of Monique’s sister, Tanisha, and Tanisha’s husband, Sean, since October 1, 2016. Tanisha and Sean are interested in adopting Rachel. Rachel has thrived in their care and refers to them as "mommy" and "daddy." Monique testified that she now has a positive relationship with Tanisha. Monique believes that she would be able to see Rachel if Tanisha and Sean adopt her.
ADJUDICATION
Reasonable Efforts
In order to terminate parental rights the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and reunify the child with the parent ... unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from the reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing ... or determines at trial on the petition that such efforts are not required ..." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
As to John Doe, DCF made reasonable efforts to identify and locate Rachel’s father. Monique identified just one individual as the potential father. DCF determined through DNA testing that he was not the father. Another person also came forward to DCF as the possible father, but DNA testing ruled him out as the father as well. The only other information Monique provided to DCF was that she was living in the Norwalk area at the time Rachel was conceived. DCF published notice of these proceedings in the Connecticut Post and the Norwalk Hour October 6, 2017 and October 20, 2017, respectively. John Doe failed to appear and was defaulted on November 2, 2017. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that John Doe is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.
As to Monique, DCF has offered services and visitation to Monique since the time Rachel was first placed in DCF custody. DCF offered Monique substance abuse evaluation and treatment, mental health evaluation and treatment, parenting classes, housing assistance, supervised visitation and travel assistance for Monique to visit Rachel at the maternal aunt’s home. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent mother, Monique.
Grounds as to John Doe
"A parent abandons a child if the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ... General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct ... Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare ... Section 17a-112(j)(3)(A) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ... It is not lack of interest alone which is the criterion in determining abandonment. Abandonment ... requires failure to maintain interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997); In re Paul M., 148 Conn.App. 654, 664 (2014).
John Doe has never come forward to claim his paternity. He has had no contact with Rachel since her birth. Despite diligent efforts, DCF has not been able to locate or identify him. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child, Rachel, has been abandoned by the respondent father, John Doe, in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility, as to the welfare of the child. The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Rachel and John Doe that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Rachel.
Grounds as to Monique
Under the provisions of General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the issue is whether the respondent, Monique, has "achieve[d] such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position within the life of the child." In considering rehabilitation "the critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001). Further, before the trial court can terminate parental rights it must find, "by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [that the parents have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child’s life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 149, 962 A.2d 81 (2009). With regard to the scope of the court’s inquiry, the court in a termination of parental rights hearing should consider all potentially relevant evidence, no matter the time to which it relates. In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696 (2007). See also In re Christopher B., 117 Conn.App. 773, 787, 980 A.2d 961 (2009). The trial court may also, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree or personal rehabilitation within the meaning of the statute. In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748-49, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
Monique has failed to avail herself of the services and programs DCF has offered her. She has not engaged consistently in mental health services. She did not successfully complete the parenting classes DCF made available to her. She remained in an unhealthy relationship, which ultimately led to her arrest on domestic violence charges. She has not maintained stable and appropriate housing over a significant period of time.
Perhaps most importantly, Monique has not had successful visitation with Rachel since the time Rachel was first placed in DCF custody. She was so inconsistent, disengaged and unprepared for her supervised visitation sessions that DCF eventually had to cancel supervised visits with Rachel. Even though Monique had unlimited access to Rachel while Rachel was in the care of her maternal Aunt, Monique visited with Rachel no more than twice during the nearly two-year period Rachel resided there. According to Monique’s own testimony, she saw Rachel just once outside of the ultimately unsuccessful supervised visits at DCF’s offices. Although Monique claimed her work schedule and transportation costs prevented her from visiting with Rachel more frequently, she admitted that she never asked DCF to adjust scheduled visitations or help with transportation costs.
While Monique very recently began working as a home health aide, obtained her own apartment, and began having more frequent telephone contact with Rachel, her failure to engage meaningfully with the services DCF has offered and her longer history of repeated failures to maintain steady employment and stable housing do not encourage the belief that she will successfully rehabilitate in a way that would enable her to begin the reunification process with Rachel. There is no reasonable prospect that given additional time Monique could assume a responsible position in the life of her daughter, given Rachel’s age and needs.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child, Rachel, has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the respondent mother, Monique, has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position within the life of the child.
DISPOSITION
Mandatory Findings
In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, "the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors" specified in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). "[Those ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ... There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’ " In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46-47, 940 A.2d 733 (2009). As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors, here and elsewhere within this decision, and makes the following written findings with regard to DCF’s petition to terminate the respondents’ parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining whether it is in best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent father. In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).
1. As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the respondents, the court finds the following
(A) As to John Doe, the respondent father has not come forward or been identified. DCF has been unable to offer him services.
(b) As to Monique, the respondent mother has been offered substance abuse evaluation and treatment, mental health evaluation and treatment, parenting classes, housing assistance, and supervised visitation, all appropriate to facilitate reunification and all in a timely fashion.
2. As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds the following
(A) As to John Doe, the respondent father has not come forward or been identified. DCF has been unable to offer him services.
(B) As to Monique, the court finds that efforts, as noted above, to reunite the respondent mother with the child have been reasonable and appropriate.
3. As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds the following
(A) As to John Doe, the respondent father has not come forward or been identified. The court was unable to make any binding orders with respect to John Doe.
(B) As to Monique, the court finds that specific steps were ordered at the time of the ex parte order of temporary custody, reconfirmed at the preliminary hearing, and made final at the time of the neglect adjudication. The respondent mother failed to successfully avail herself of mental health evaluation and treatment, parenting classes, housing assistance, or supervised visitation. She has failed to benefit meaningfully from any of the services DCF offered to her. She also failed to comply with the specific steps requiring her not to get involved in the criminal justice system and to visit Rachel as often as DCF permitted The court finds that DCF has fulfilled its obligations under the steps.
4. As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds the following
(A) As to John Doe, he has never come forward to identify himself as the father. Rachel does not know who her father is.
(B) As to Monique, Rachel knows who Monique is and recently began having more frequent telephone contact with her. Rachel is not bonded to Monique as a child to a parent and she does not look to her to meet her needs on a daily basis.
(C) As to the maternal aunt and uncle, Rachel has been placed with them since October 1, 2016. She has been in their care for nearly two years. She is bonded to her maternal aunt and uncle as her psychological parents. The maternal aunt and uncle are an adoptive resource.
5. As to the age of the child
The court finds that Rachel was born on January 2, 2016 and is approximately two years and nine months old.
6. As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to, (1) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (2) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds the following
(A) As to John Doe, the respondent father has never been identified.
(B) As to Monique, as noted above, she has failed to engage in, and benefit from, all of the services and treatment necessary to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation with respect to her mental health and parenting skills as are necessary for her, and as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her daughter. She did not successfully or meaningfully avail herself of supervised visitation or the opportunity to visit Rachel at the home of the maternal aunt. She has not seen Rachel since January 2018 and had not visited with Rachel prior to that time since September 2017, when DCF terminated supervised visitation. She only recently, within the two-month period prior to trial, began having more frequent telephone contact with Rachel.
7. As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds that neither John Doe nor Monique interfered with the other’s right to have contact and a meaningful relationship with their daughter. In addition, no third parties or economic circumstances prevented either parent from having a meaningful relationship with Rachel. There has been no unreasonable conduct on the part of the DCF.
Best Interests of the Child
The court, at this phase in the dispositional stage of these proceedings, must now address the issue of whether the termination of the parental rights of the respondents is in the best interests of the child. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of the respondent father, John Doe, and the respondent mother, Monique, is in the best interests of the child, Rachel. In making this determination, the court has considered the child’s age, growth, development, need for stability, length of stay in the foster home, nature of her relationship with the foster family and with her biological family, the degree of contact maintained by the biological parents and the genetic bond to the respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court also balanced the child’s intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the remote potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). In making this determination, the court notes the following observations and findings regarding the respondent parents and their child.
Rachel has been in the care of her maternal aunt and uncle since October 1, 2016, when she was just nine months old. John Doe has never been identified. Monique had sporadic, unsuccessful supervised visitation with Rachel until those visits were terminated in September 2017. During the year leading up to trial, Monique saw Rachel just once or twice. Although she began having more frequent telephone contact with Rachel during the two-month period prior to trial, Rachel has bonded with the maternal aunt and uncle, who are now her psychological parents. Monique’s failure to avail herself of the services DCF offered her over the course of nearly two years and her failure to demonstrate an ability to maintain stable and consistent housing and employment make it unlikely that she will be able to care for Rachel’s day to day needs. With the passage of time, the prospect that she will ever be able to assume a responsible position in the life of her child and establish a parental bond has become most unlikely.
Rachel is now approaching three years of age. She does not regard Monique as her primary caregiver and has no memory of Monique serving in that role. She has thrived in the care of her maternal aunt and uncle. She regards them both as her parents. They have offered themselves as an adoptive resource. The court is persuaded that Rachel’s best interests will be served by freeing her from the legal relationship with her biological parents so that she can have the love, care and permanency she requires.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, having considered all of the evidence and statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights of the respondent father, John Doe, and the respondent mother, Monique G., and also having found, by clear and convincing evidence upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child’s best interests to terminate the parental rights of the respondents, the court hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondents, John Doe and Monique G., to the child, Rachel G. It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for the child.