Opinion
No. COA13–188.
2013-08-6
In the Matter of Q.H.
Mercedes O. Chut, for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Social Services. Mark L. Hayes, for respondent-appellant mother.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 30 November 2012 by Judge Teresa H. Vincent in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 July 2013. Mercedes O. Chut, for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Social Services. Mark L. Hayes, for respondent-appellant mother.
Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by Margaret Rowlett, for guardian ad litem.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Mother appeals from an order concluding that her son, Q.H., was dependent. After careful review, we reverse.
In August 2012, the Guilford County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) took Q.H., who was two days old, into nonsecure custody and filed a juvenile petition alleging that he was neglected and dependent. The petition alleged that mother had a history of involvement with DSS, relinquished her parental rights to two older children, lacked stable housing, and had a history of substance abuse and mental health issues. The petition also alleged that Q.H.'s father was unknown. Although mother identified a putative father, it was physically impossible for him to be Q.H.'s biological father, because he had been incarcerated at the time Q.H. was conceived.
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 30 November 2012 concluding that Q.H. was a dependent juvenile within the definition of N.C.G.S. § 7B–101(9). The trial court dismissed the allegation of neglect. In the dispositional portion of the order, the trial court maintained custody of Q.H. with DSS. Mother timely appealed.
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On appeal, mother challenges the trial court's adjudication of dependency. “The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court's adjudication ... is to determine (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact[.]” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C.App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “If such evidence exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support a finding to the contrary .” Id.
Mother first argues that many of the findings of fact do not support an adjudication of dependency because they merely restate allegations contained in the juvenile petition or in the Child Protective Services (“CPS”) reports. We agree.
“[T]he trial court's findings must consist of more than a recitation of the allegations.” In re O.W., 164 N.C.App. 699, 702, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004). “Thus, the trial court must, through ‘processes of logical reasoning,’ based on the evidentiary facts before it, ‘find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law.’ “ Id. (quoting In re Harton, 156 N.C.App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003)). The findings “must be the ‘specific ultimate facts ... sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.’ “ In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (omission in original) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C.App. 154, 156–57, 231 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1977)).
Here, several of the findings of fact restate allegations from the juvenile petition, from the CPS report leading to the current petition, and from previous CPS reports. While these findings may help establish the history and context of the case, they do not constitute ultimate findings of fact and therefore are not sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication of dependency. See O.W., 164 N.C.App. at 702–04, 596 S.E.2d at 854. Accordingly, we disregard portions of findings of fact 6 and 9 from our determination of whether the findings of fact support the trial court's adjudication of dependency.
Next, mother challenges the following findings of fact, which relate to substance abuse, mental health, and housing:
6. ... The mother tested negative at the hospital [for illegal drugs] and the results for the newborn had not yet been returned.... She is diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Bipolar Disorder and Personality Disorder.
7. On August 22, 2012, Social Worker Jerry Ufot met with [mother] at Women's Hospital and the mother stated that she had been clean from drugs since March 16, 2012. The mother further stated that she would be discharged from Room at the Inn where she had been staying within two weeks. [Mother] also said that once she leaves Room at the Inn, she would either stay in a shelter or stay with her Godmother .... Prior to the juvenile's birth, [mother] stated to Social Worker Sandra Hurley that she intended to return to live in High Pont [sic] when she was discharged from her temporary shelter at Room at the Inn.
8. A Team Decision Meeting (TDM) was held at Women's Hospital on August 22, 2012. During that meeting, [mother] indicated that she did not have a permanent residence but that she had applied for housing. It was discussed with the mother that there were concerns that she was not following through with recommendations for residential mental health and substance abuse treatment. The mother stated that she was attending outpatient substance abuse services at the Ringer Center but did not feel that she needed to do an inpatient treatment program as had been recommended by her mental health counselor....
....
10. Based on the mother's own admission whereby she indicated that she last used illegal substances on March 16, 2012, it is clear to the Court that the mother used drugs while she was pregnant with the juvenile.
Mother contends that these findings are either unsupported by the evidence or do not support the trial court's determination of dependency, or both. Specifically, mother contends that the portion of finding of fact 6 which enumerates her psychiatric diagnoses is not supported by any evidence in the record. We agree.
The adjudication hearing was comprised of testimony from two social workers: Sandra Hurley and Jerry Ufot. Neither Ms. Hurley nor Mr. Ufot offered any testimony at the adjudicatory hearing to support this finding of fact, and none appears in the record. Additionally, the finding that “the results for the newborn [Q.H.] had not yet been returned” is not supported by the evidence. It appears that this finding was also copied from DSS's juvenile petition. Although the test results were not back at the time the petition was filed, both social workers testified that Q.H. did not test positive for any drugs. Therefore, these portions of finding of fact 6 are not supported by the evidence.
Next, mother challenges the portion of finding of fact 8 that states she “did not feel that she needed to do an inpatient treatment program as had been recommended by her mental health counselor.” This finding is based on the testimony of Mr. Ufot; while his testimony is confusing, it appears that he did not recall actually hearing mother make the statement in question. However, we decline to address mother's specific evidentiary challenge to this finding because, as explained below, we agree that this finding does not lend support to the adjudication of dependency.
Mother next argues that several findings of fact do not support the conclusion that Q.H. was dependent. Our juvenile code defines a dependent juvenile as “[a] juvenile in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B101(9) (2011). In determining whether a juvenile is dependent, the trial court is required to “address both[:] (1) the parent's ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.” In re P.M., 169 N.C.App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). “Findings of fact addressing both prongs must be made before a juvenile may be adjudicated as dependent, and the court's failure to make these findings will result in reversal of the court.” In re B.M., 183 N.C.App. 84, 90, 643 S.E.2d 644, 648 (2007).
The trial court's adjudication of dependency is based on mother's history of mental illness, history of drug use, unstable housing, and past involvement with DSS. First, we address the findings related to mother's history of mental illness and substance abuse.
Mother argues: (1) that the adjudication of dependency must focus on her present ability to care for Q.H., (2) that her past substance abuse does not automatically render her unable to presently care for Q.H., and (3) that the order fails to link past substance abuse to current inability. As further proof of the order's deficiency, mother submits that there is no evidence of any relapse on her part. We agree.
After excluding the unsupported portion of finding of fact number 6, the trial court's findings show that mother stopped using drugs halfway through her pregnancy, that her drug test at the time of Q.H .'s birth was negative, and that she was attending outpatient treatment. The findings also show that at some unspecified time for an unspecified reason, inpatient treatment had been recommended by a counselor, but rejected by mother. Although substance abuse and mental illness may support an adjudication of dependency, seeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(6) (2011), there is no evidence of current substance abuse by mother. Furthermore, the trial court's finding that mother rejected inpatient treatment is too vague to support an adjudication of dependency, for it is not clear when this recommendation was made or in what context. Instead, the evidence shows that mother was attending outpatient treatment, and DSS failed to show that outpatient treatment was inadequate. In light of mother's apparent sobriety and the fact that Q.H. was never in her care, some sort of link between the particulars of mother's condition, the threat of relapse, and the inadequacy of outpatient treatment was necessary to show that she was unable to provide care.
Next, we address the findings related to mother's unstable housing. Mother argues that they do not support an adjudication of dependency because: (1) mother had housing options, (2) the trial court did not find her housing options incompatible with caring for a child, and (3) the trial court did not connect her housing issues to dependency. We again agree with mother.
The findings show that mother was staying at a shelter but had to find new housing within two weeks after Q.H. was born. However, the findings also show that she had applied for housing and had a couple of resources for temporary housing. As mother points out, the trial court made no findings that her housing options were unsuitable for a child. Without more, the trial court's findings do not show that mother was rendered unable to care for Q.H. by virtue of her housing situation.
Finally, we address the trial court's findings regarding mother's prior DSS involvement. Excluding the portions of these which amount to CPS report allegations, these findings demonstrate that on two separate occasions, DSS took custody of mother's older children, and that she relinquished her parental rights to each child after unsuccessfully working on her case plan in each instance for over a year. The findings also demonstrate that DSS became involved with mother a third time after she suffered a miscarriage in April 2011. Without more detail, prior DSS involvement does not demonstrate that mother was unable to care for Q.H. at the time the petition was filed.
Finding of fact 9(c) describes the miscarriage in detail. DSS presumably presented the evidence to show that her handling of the miscarriage supported an adjudication of neglect and/or dependency. However, there is no evidence that mother caused the miscarriage. Regardless of her handling of the prior miscarriage, without more, it does not support the conclusion that mother was currently unable to care for Q.H.
In total, the findings show that mother had an unspecified history of mental illness and substance abuse, with no acute issues at the time the petition was filed; that she did not have permanent housing; that she had been a prostitute in the past; and that she had prior involvement with DSS. While mother previously had issues that may have rendered her children dependent in the past, the findings do not show that any of these issues were present at the time Q.H. was removed from her custody. Indeed, Q.H. was removed from mother's custody before she left the hospital. The purpose of the adjudication hearing, however, is to adjudicate “the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” N .C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–802 (2011). Without more, the findings do not link mother's past conditions to current inability to provide care for Q.H. Moreover, the trial court failed to specifically find or conclude that mother was unable to provide care for Q.H. The trial court's findings are therefore insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the definition of dependency. See B.M., 183 N.C.App. at 90, 643 S.E.2d at 648. As this issue is dispositive, we decline to address mother's arguments concerning the second prong of the dependency test.
Because we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact do not support the adjudication of dependency, we reverse the order of the trial court.
Reversed. Judges STEELMAN and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).