In re Q.D.G

6 Citing cases

  1. Crocker v. United States

    No. 17-CF-685 (D.C. Jul. 1, 2021)   Cited 4 times
    Concluding the police violated their Rule 16 obligations to preserve evidence they collected because "the police ... reasonably should have expected from the outset that appellants’ counsel would want to inspect" items seized from the alleged crime scene

    Photographs obviously could not indicate the absence of fingerprints and DNA. See In re Q.D.G., 706 A.2d 36, 38 & n.6 (D.C. 1998). Appellants may be unable to demonstrate exactly what inspection of the car would have revealed, but that does not mean they failed to carry their burden of showing materiality.

  2. Weems v. United States

    191 A.3d 296 (D.C. 2018)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the police's return of stolen watches to the store before they could be inspected to see if they could all fit in defendant's pocket was negligent at best, even though deliberate, and since the defense could have "obtain[ed] the same model watches to use in the proposed demonstration"

    Custody , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).See, e.g. , In re Q.D.G. , 706 A.2d 36, 38 n.5 (D.C. 1998) (motor vehicle allegedly driven by respondent without owner's consent and towed to police impoundment lot held subject to discovery under Rule 16 as a tangible item "in the custody or control" of the District). Last but not least is the term "control."

  3. Featherson v. Diagnostic Ins

    933 A.2d 335 (D.C. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    For example, in In re Q.D.G., this court held that the trial court abused its discretion when the trial court declined to sanction a party for failure to produce a discoverable piece of evidence for inspection because the trial court's denial was based on flawed legal reasoning. 706 A.2d 36, 38 (D.C. 1998). In that case, appellant was charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle and the testimony elicited by the government was that the vehicle driven by appellant had a "punched out" steering column, which indicates that a vehicle is stolen.

  4. Ferguson v. U.S.

    866 A.2d 54 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding the trial court erred in finding no Rule 16 violation in part because the government "failed to comply with [ Rule 16 ] in a timely manner" regarding the expected testimony of one of its witnesses and was instead "silent about its Rule 16 obligations" during the first four days of trial

    Generally, in reviewing a denial of a request for sanctions, we must ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Phelan v. City of Mt. Rainier, 805 A.2d 930, 942 (D.C. 2002) (citing Kay v. Pick, 711 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 1998) (citing In re Q.D.G., 706 A.2d 36 (D.C. 1998)) ("We review the trial court's denial of discovery orders for an abuse of discretion."); see also United States v. Curtis, 755 A.2d 1011, 1014 (D.C. 2000) ("This court reviews a trial court's Rule 16 discovery determination for abuse of discretion.") (citations omitted). The correct interpretation and application of Rule 16, however, is a legal question which we review de novo since "[j]udicial discretion must . . . be founded upon correct legal principles. . . ."

  5. Phelan v. City of Mount Rainier

    805 A.2d 930 (D.C. 2002)   Cited 70 times
    Concluding that the trial court did not err when it granted a protective order because the opposing party established that although the request was relevant and necessary, the discovery requested was also privileged and overly broad

    The motions judge denied the request to produce the police complaint log book "because not warranted by facts and circumstances of this incident, i.e., irrelevant." We review the trial court's denial of discovery orders for an abuse of discretion. Kay v. Pick, 711 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 1998) (citing In re Q.D.G., 706 A.2d 36 (D.C. 1998)) (other citation omitted). "The trial court has broad discretion to weigh the factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled."

  6. Kay v. Pick

    711 A.2d 1251 (D.C. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    The standard for review of a trial court discovery order is that the order will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion. In re Q.D.G., 706 A.2d 36 (D.C. 1998); Cotton v. United States, 388 A.2d 865, 869-70 (D.C. 1978). This occurs "if [the trial court's] actions are clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful."