The issue in this case is whether the guardian of an incompetent, seriously ill patient may exercise a right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration on behalf of his ward and, if so, how this right may be exercised. A number of State courts have addressed the question of whether life-sustaining measures may be withdrawn from incompetent patients: Arizona ( Rasmussen v. Fleming (1987), 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674), California ( Barber v. Superior Court (1983), 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484), Connecticut ( Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital (Super. 1984), 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 482 A.2d 713), Delaware ( Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. (Del.Ch. 1980), 425 A.2d 156), Florida ( John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth (Fla. 1984), 452 So.2d 921), Georgia ( In re L.H.R. (1984), 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716), Louisiana ( In re P.V.W. (La. 1982), 424 So.2d 1015), Maine ( In re Gardner (Me. 1987), 534 A.2d 947), Massachusetts ( Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz (1977), 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417), Minnesota ( In re Torres (Minn. 1984), 357 N.W.2d 332), Missouri ( Cruzan v. Harmon (Mo. 1988), 760 S.W.2d 408), New Jersey ( In re Quinlan (1976), 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647), New York ( In re Storar (1981), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266), Ohio ( Leach v. Akron General Medical Center (1980), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809), and Washington ( In re Hamlin (1984), 102 Wn.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372).

See, e.g.: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (federal constitution); Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, supra (federal and state constitutions and common law); Foody v. Manchester MemorialHosp., 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984) (same); In reSeverns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del.Ch. 1980) (federal constitution); Inre L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (same); In re Estate ofLongeway, supra (common law and statutory provisions); Matterof Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991) (federal and state constitutions and statutory provisions); DeGrella by Parrent v.Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993) (common law); In re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015 (La. 1982) (state statute); Brophy v. NewEngland Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (federal constitution and common law); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993) (common law); In re Guardianship ofCrum, 61 Ohio Misc.2d 596, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Prob. 1991) (federal constitution); Matter of Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis.2d 53, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992); (federal and state constitutions and common law). "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Matter ofGuardianship of L.W., supra at 68, 482 N.W.2d at 65, quoting Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891).

p of Grant, supra; Gray v Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D RI, 1988); Rasmussen v Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207; 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Foody v Manchester Memorial Hosp, 40 Conn Super 127; 482 A.2d 713 (1984); In re AC, 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (DC App, 1990); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla, 1990); John F Kennedy Memorial Hosp v Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla, 1984); Corbett v D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla App, 1986), review den 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla, 1986); Brophy v New England Sinai Hosp, Inc, 398 Mass. 417; 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629; 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394; 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365; 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. 527; 510 A.2d 125 (Ch Div, 1986); In re Colyer, 99 Wn.2d 114; 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Barber v Superior Court, 147 Cal.App.3d 1006; 195 Cal.Rptr. 484 (1983); Severns v Wilmington Medical Center, Inc, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del, 1980); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365 (Fla App, 1984); In re PVW, 424 So.2d 1015 (La, 1982); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697; 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200; 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984), review den 392 Mass. 1102; 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn, 1984); In re Clark, 210 N.J. Super. 548; 510 A.2d 136 (Ch Div, 1986); Leach v Akron Gen Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1; 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Guardianship of Ingram, 102 Wn.2d 827; 689 P.2d 1363 (1984); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, supra; In re Lawrance, supra. The advance directive of a mature minor, stating the desire that life-sustaining treatment be refused, should be taken into consideration or enforced when deciding whether to terminate the minor's life-support treatment or refuse medical treatment.

v. Van de Kamp, 2 Cal.App.4th 1614, 1619-1625, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 59, 61-64 (1992); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 40, n. 4 (Ind. 1991); McKay v. Bergstedt, 106 Nev. 808, 822-823, 801 P.2d 617, 626-627 (1990); In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 710, 553 A.2d 596, 605 (1989); State v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579, 581, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1989); In re Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545, 563, 747 P.2d 445, 454-455 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-956 (Me. 1987); Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349-350, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 218, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127, 1144-1145, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (1982); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 196-197, 209 Cal.Rptr. 220, 225-226 (1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 137, 482 A.2d 713, 720 (1984); In re P. V. W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1022 (La. 1982); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio Comm. Pleas 1980); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 161 (Del.Ch. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162-163 (Fla.App. 1978); Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (CADC), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 439, 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (1986). The British House of Lords has also recognized the distinction.

"[A] person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute." Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, Division of Administration, Office of State Purchasing, 95-2105, p. 7, (La. 3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1191, quoting In Re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1020-21 n. 10 (La. 1982). Prator v. Caddo Parish, 04-0794, pp. 5-9 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 812, 815-817.

"[A] person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute." Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, Division of Administration, Office of State Purchasing, 95-2105, p. 7, (La. 3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1191, quoting In Re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1020-21 n. 10 (La. 1982). CONCLUSION

Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427. See also Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (1987) (en banc); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal.App.3d 185, 245 Cal.Rptr. 840, 855 (1988), abrogated by statute on other grounds as recognized by In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 26 Cal.4th 519, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151, 165 (2001); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 40 Conn.Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713, 718 (1984); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980); John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1019 (La. 1982); In re Martin, 450 Mich. 204, 538 N.W.2d 399, 406 (1995); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664; Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546 (N.Y.App.Div. 1980) ("To deny the exercise because the patient is unconscious is to deny the right."), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-72 (1981); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (1984) (en banc); In re Guardianship of L.W., supra note 10, at 73-74; David W. Meyers, Medico-Legal Implications of Death and Dying § 11.6, at 274 (1981). Courts have identified three methods by which to determine whether an incompetent's right to refuse or terminate artificial life-support systems should be exercised:

See La. Code Civ.Pro. art. 1881. "A person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute." Louisiana Associated Gen. Contrs. v. State, 95-2105, p. 15 (La. 3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1191 (quoting In re: P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1020-21 (La. 1982)). An individual seeking an advisory opinion from the Board of Ethics is not seeking an opinion regarding some future, abstract, or hypothetical situation.

La. Code Civ.Proc. art. 1881. "[A] person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute." In Re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1020-21 n. 10 (La. 1982). Although the codal articles on declaratory judgment are to be "liberally construed and administered," "[t]he court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding;" and, as with any other action, a suit "can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts."

"[A] person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute." In Re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015, 1020-21 n. 10 (La. 1982). Midboe, as a former state agency head within two years following termination of his public service, is faced with an immediate and genuine situation, the applicability of ethics code's rules to his present attorney employment opportunities.