Opinion
No. COA15-552
06-07-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: P.R.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Katherine M. McCraw, for the State. Mark Hayes for Juvenile Appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Alamance County, No. 12 JB 154 Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 14 October 2014 by Judge Tom Lambeth in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 October 2015. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Katherine M. McCraw, for the State. Mark Hayes for Juvenile Appellant. INMAN, Judge.
On 25 August 2014, Judge Kathryn Overby entered an order adjudicating the juvenile delinquent for the disorderly conduct offense. On 14 October 2014, Judge Tom Lambeth entered a second order adjudicating the juvenile delinquent for the disorderly conduct offense which was similar to the first order except that it included additional findings of fact and erroneously stated that the adjudication followed a plea rather than a hearing. The juvenile contends that the first order is the proper one because the second order incorrectly stated that the adjudication followed a plea. Regardless which adjudication order is binding, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2602, following the disposition hearing, the juvenile properly gave notice of appeal as to the adjudication for disorderly conduct.
Respondent, Peter, was adjudicated delinquent on the charge of disorderly conduct pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6), which prohibits, inter alia, disorderly conduct on or around school grounds. On appeal, Peter argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Because the State presented substantial evidence that Peter intentionally caused a disturbance at school, we reject Peter's argument and affirm the decision of the trial court.
We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the juvenile.
Factual & Procedural History
The State presented the following evidence:
On 24 February 2014, Peter, an eighth grade student at Turrentine Middle School, was eating lunch in the school cafeteria when he was approached by a fellow student, Walt. Without exchanging any words, Walt hit Peter twice in the face with a closed fist. David Swajkoski ("Mr. Swajkoski"), a teacher on lunch duty, observed Walt hit Peter, but his view was obstructed when approximately thirty students in the cafeteria stood up to watch. Mr. Swajkoski described the onlooking students as "being very obnoxious and not helping the situation." Some students were "cheering on the fight" and Mr. Swajkoski testified that the fight "definitely changed the atmosphere" in the cafeteria.
Kevin McGee ("Mr. McGee"), another teacher on lunch duty, approached the two boys, who were grappling "chest-to-chest." Mr. McGee observed Peter "spitting tobacco to [Walt]." Mr. McGee forcibly pulled Peter away from the altercation, and each boy disengaged from contact with the other. Subsequently, Peter asked Mr. McGee, "Why did he jump me?"
Officer Chad Laws ("Officer Laws"), the school resource officer, conducted an investigation following the altercation. Peter told Officer Laws that after Walt hit him twice in the head, Peter "stood up and grabbed [Walt] by his shirt and pushed him back."
On 7 April 2014, Peter was charged with disorderly conduct in a school pursuant to N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6). On 25 August 2014, following a hearing, Judge Overby entered an order adjudicating Peter delinquent for the disorderly conduct offense. On 27 June 2014, Peter was charged with assault inflicting serious injury. On 30 July 2014, the State filed a motion for review of Peter's probation from prior delinquent adjudications on 17 January 2013 and 26 April 2013.
Walt was also charged with disorderly conduct in a school.
On 14 October 2014, Judge Lambeth, following a second hearing, entered four orders: (1) a second order adjudicating Peter delinquent on the charge of disorderly conduct; (2) an order adjudicating Peter delinquent on the charge of assault inflicting serious injury; (3) an order establishing that Peter violated his probation related to his prior delinquent adjudications; and (4) a disposition order based upon Peter's adjudication on the charges of disorderly conduct and assault inflicting serious injury, extending Peter's probation by twelve months. Peter timely appealed.
Analysis
Peter argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of disorderly conduct at school. We disagree.
"[I]n order to withstand a motion to dismiss the charges contained in a juvenile petition, there must be substantial evidence of each of the material elements of the offense charged." In re Bass, 77 N.C. App. 110, 115, 334 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985). "The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference of fact which may be drawn from the evidence." Id.
Section 14-288.4(a)(6) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that:
(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who does any of the following:N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2014). Our Supreme Court has described disorderly conduct as "a substantial interference with, disruption of and confusion of the operation of the school in its program of instruction and training of students there enrolled." State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 154, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028, 20 L.Ed.2d 285 (1968).
. . . .
(6) Disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.
Peter contends that the State failed to present evidence that he caused a disturbance in the cafeteria that substantially interfered with school activities. Peter cites In re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 718, 417 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1992), for guidance in identifying behavior that rises to the level of a "substantial interference" with school activities.
In Eller, our Supreme Court held that the State did not produce substantial evidence that the behavior of two juveniles, who were adjudicated delinquent on charges of disorderly conduct stemming from two separate incidents, constituted a "substantial interference." Id. The first incident involved one of the juveniles making a move toward another student with a carpenter's nail in her hand. Id. at 715, 417 S.E.2d at 480. The second incident involved both juveniles striking the radiator in their classroom of four students "more than two or three times" making a "rattling, metallic noise" and causing the other students in the class to look. Id. at 715-16, 417 S.E.2d at 480-81. In holding that the juveniles' behavior did not constitute a substantial interference, our Supreme Court noted that the radiator incident "merited no intervention by the instructor other than glares of disapproval for a total of at most sixty seconds during the entire class period." Id. at 718, 417 S.E.2d at 482. Additionally, the Court explained that the juvenile "willingly and without delay forfeited the nail, and the other students were only modestly interrupted from their work and returned to their lesson upon being instructed to do so by their teacher." Id.
The facts of the present case are distinguishable from Eller, which involved minor disturbances in classrooms of four and five students. Id. at 715, 416-17 S.E.2d at 480. Here, the physical altercation between Peter and Walt occurred in a cafeteria occupied by approximately 200 students. Thirty students stood up to watch and cheer on the fight, blocking the view of faculty who could help stop the fight. Whereas the incident in Eller "merited no intervention by the instructor other than glares of disapproval," here, the fight took teachers away from their assigned duties in order to disengage Walt and Peter.
In In re Pineault, 152 N.C. App. 196, 199, 566 S.E.2d 854, 857 (2002), this Court held that there was sufficient evidence that the juvenile substantially interfered with the operation of the school where the juvenile angrily told another student "[f]—k you" while the teacher was teaching her class. As a result of the juvenile's outburst, the teacher escorted the juvenile to the principal's office. Id. at 197, 566 S.E.2d at 856. This Court held that "given the severity and nature of [the juvenile's] language, coupled with the fact that [the teacher] was required to stop teaching her class for at least several minutes, . . . [the juvenile's] actions substantially interfered with the operation of [the teacher's] classroom[.]" Id. at 199, 566 S.E.2d at 857.
In In re M.G., 156 N.C. App. 414, 415, 576 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2003), this Court used similar reasoning in affirming the disorderly conduct adjudication of a juvenile. In M.G., a teacher, on his way to the cafeteria to complete lunch duty, heard a juvenile yell "shut the f—k up" to a group of students in the hallway. The teacher escorted the juvenile to the school detention center where he explained to the school's resource officer and the dean of students what had transpired. Id. at 417, 576 S.E.2d at 401. The teacher then returned to his assigned lunch duty. Id. Noting that "[a]s in Pineault, this evidence indicates that [the teacher] was away from his assigned duties for at least several minutes[,]" this Court held that that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the juvenile's conduct "substantially interfered with the operation of the school." Id.
The disturbance in this case is more akin to the disturbances in Pineault and M.G. than it is to the disturbance in Eller. Here, the physical altercation diverted the attention of the teachers assigned to observe approximately 200 students in the cafeteria. The fact that the disruption did not take the teachers away from instructional classroom time is not dispositive because, as this Court noted in M.G., evidence is sufficient to establish a substantial interference when a teacher was "away from his assigned duties for a least several minutes." Id. at 417, 576 S.E.2d at 401. Here, Mr. McGee, Mr. Swajkoski, and Mr. Kaffenburger, another teacher on lunch duty, were forced to leave their positions in the cafeteria to physically break up the fight between Peter and Walt, taking their attention away from the other students. Moreover, the teachers were called away from their assigned duties again to speak with Officer Laws about the incident. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence that the disruption in the cafeteria substantially interfered with the operation of the school.
Peter argues that the State presented no evidence that he intended to disrupt school, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6). Additionally, Peter contends that even assuming that the incident in total amounted to a substantial disruption, this Court must look to whether Peter's contribution, if any, constituted a substantial interference with the operation of the school. We are unpersuaded by Peter's arguments.
Section 14-288.4(a)(6) defines disorderly conduct as a public disturbance "intentionally caused" by a person who either "[d]isrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students . . . or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (emphasis added). Although Peter did not initiate the altercation, the State presented evidence establishing that instead of walking away from the fight, Peter "grabbed [Walt] by his shirt and pushed him back." Additionally, the State presented evidence that Peter engaged in intentional conduct that disturbed the peace by "spitting tobacco to [Walt]" and grappling "chest-to-chest" with Walt. Thus, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, established that Peter's intentional actions substantially interfered with the operation of the school.
Finally, Peter contends that even assuming that he caused a substantial disruption, he was nonetheless justified in acting in self-defense. This Court has held:
Self-defense, when asserted in a criminal or a juvenile delinquency case, cannot serve as a basis for dismissing the case. . . . Evidence in support of the defense is to be considered, along with the other evidence in the case, to determine whether there is substantial evidence of each of the elements of the crime or delinquent act. If there is substantial evidence of each of the elements, the motion to dismiss is properly denied. . . . If the case does not involve a jury, as in a delinquency case, the trial court is to consider the evidence of self-defense and, if it finds the evidence persuasive, enter a finding that the allegations of the petition are 'not proved.'In re Wilson, 153 N.C. App. 196, 198, 568 S.E.2d 862, 863 (2002) (internal citations omitted). "Therefore, to prevail on a self-defense claim, juvenile must show that he was without fault in provoking, engaging in, or continuing a difficulty with another." In re Pope, 151 N.C. App. 117, 120, 564 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Peter continued the fight with Walt by grabbing him by the collar. Peter argues that the trial "court appears to have rejected self-defense as an affirmative defense of disorderly conduct[.]" Assuming, arguendo, that North Carolina were to recognize self-defense as an affirmative defense to a disorderly conduct charge, as discussed above, the State still presented substantial evidence of each element of the disorderly conduct charge. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Peter's motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MCGEE and Judge ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).