Opinion
June 14, 2001.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.), entered January 5, 2001, which, inter alia, granted petitioner's application to compel arbitration of respondent's claims and enjoined respondent from proceeding with an action against petitioner in the State of California, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Stephen L. Sheinfeld, for an Order, etc., for petitioner-respondent.
David Blasband, for respondent-appellant.
Before: Williams, J.P., Mazzarelli, Andrias, Lerner, Saxe, JJ.
The court properly found that respondent's claims are subject to the broad and unambiguous arbitration provision contained in the parties' Partners and Principals Agreement (see, Matter of Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 85 N.Y.2d 173, 182; Matter of Cowen Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318). Even if the arbitration provision were ambiguous in scope, in view of the circumstance that its construction is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, which strongly favors arbitration, any ambiguities as to the scope of the provision would be properly resolved in favor of arbitration (see, Matter of Smith Barney Harris Upham Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 201, cert denied sub nom Manhard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 516 U.S. 811;Volt Information Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476).
Contrary to respondent's contention, her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are arbitrable (see, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1313, citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26; see also, Desiderio v. Natl. Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206, cert denied 531 U.S. 1069, 121 S.Ct. 756; Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody Co., 81 N.Y.2d 623, 633-635, cert denied 510 U.S. 993).
Respondent has not shown that the subject arbitration provision is either substantively or procedurally unconscionable (see, Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1, 10; Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 138).