If it is found that the legacy is demonstrative rather than specific, it will not be adeemed. In re Preston's Estate, 1937, 157 Or. 631, 73 P.2d 369. In this case the bequest must be considered a specific one. It does not follow, however, that the bequest must be adeemed.

It is important to note the provision of the will under which Mr. Fisher claims the stock of the United States Steel Corporation is a specific bequest. Noon's Estate, 49 Or. 286, 293, 88 P. 673, 90 P. 673; In re Banfield's Estate, 137 Or. 256, 284, 299 P. 323, 3 P.2d 116; In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 635, 73 P.2d 369; Fidelity Title Trust Co. v. Young, 101 Conn. 359, 125 A. 871 (1924); Chase National Bank v. Deichmiller, 107 N.J. Eq. 379, 152 A. 697, 699 (1930); 57 Am Jur 942, Wills § 1409. On that point the parties are in accord.

Legacies are usually classified as general, specific or demonstrative. In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 73 P.2d 369, includes an informative discussion of the elements of specific and demonstrative legacies and a definition of each, as follows: "A demonstrative legacy is a "gift of money or other property charged on a particular fund in such way as not to amount to a gift of the corpus of the fund, or to evidence an intent to relieve the general estate from liability in case the fund fails ["]: Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464 (85 P. 846, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 592, 118 Am. St. Rep. 113, 10 Ann. Cas. 1134), cited with approval in 28 R.C.L. 292.

The general rule is that the intention of the testator may be gathered only from the will ifself, and evidence of a different intention than is to be gathered from the language which the testator used in the will is not admissible. This court, in a long line of decisions, has followed that rule. Hartman v. Pendleton, 96 Or. 503, 507, 186 P. 572, 190 P. 339; In re Johnson's Estate, 100 Or. 142, 157, 196 P. 385, 1115; Gildersleeve v. Lee, 100 Or. 578, 585, 198 P. 246; Soules v. Silver, 118 Or. 96, 104, 245 P. 1069; Holohan v. McCarthy, 130 Or. 577, 584, 281 P. 178; Hansen v. Oregon Humane Society, 142 Or. 104, 118, 18 P.2d 1036; In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 649, 73 P.2d 369; Miller v. Smith, 179 Or. 214, 219, 170 P.2d 583; In re Holland's Estate, 180 Or. 1, 20, 175 P.2d 156. The plain meaning of the language used by the testator herein is that he intended the increased monthly allowance to his widow to be a charge upon his whole estate.

Included among these would be the right to take property from the kindred of the parent by adoption "by right of representation", which "takes place when the lineal descendant of any deceased heir takes the same share or portion of the estate of an intestate that the parent of such descendant would have taken if living." § 16-402, O.C.L.A. See In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 651, 73 P.2d 369. The meaning and effect of the exceptions are clearly explained in Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, supra, 39 R.I. 61, where the court said: "In order to have the effect claimed by appellant's counsel the exception must be such as to justify the implication that the right of inheritance from the kindred of the adopting parent was in the statute before the exception.

The intention of the testator can only be determined from the will itself. In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 73 P.2d 369; Hansen v. Oregon Humane Soc., 142 Or. 104, 18 P.2d 1036; Holohan v. McCarthy, 130 Or. 577, 281 P. 178; Soules v. Silver, 118 Or. 96, 245 P. 1069. Any other rule would tend to destroy the certainty and stability of wills. It would open the door to fraud.