Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Sullivan), 674 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2012); see Rifken v. CapitalSource Fin., LLC (In re Felt Mfg. Co., Inc.), 402 B.R. 502, 523 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009); In re Porter, 399 B.R. 113, 117 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008). The lodestar method involves multiplying the number of hours productively spent by the attorney (excluding hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary or spent on overworked tasks) by a reasonable hourly rate (which is benchmarked to the prevailing rates in the community for lawyers with like qualifications, experience, and competence).
When determining a fee award under a federal statute or claim, courts employ the "lodestar" method. See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Sullivan), 674 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying lodestar method to fees sought under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)); In re Little, 484 B.R. 506, 510 (B.A.P. 1st 2013) (lodestar is the appropriate approach in determining reasonable attorney fees under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)); Northeast Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n v. Northern States Pallet Co.,Inc., 2011 WL 320619 at *8 (D.N.H. January 31, 2011) (utilizing the lodestar method in awarding fees under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (b)); Robbins v. Walter E. Jock Oil Co., Inc. (In re Robbins), 2017 WL 946282 at *3 (March 9, 2017) (using the lodestar method to analyze fee award relating to a discharge injunction violation); In re Porter, 399 B.R. 113, 117 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008) (applying the lodestar method to creditor's claim for attorney fees in a reaffirmation agreement); In re Chase, 2003 WL 22056652 at *2 (Bankr. D.N.H. August 25, 2003) (employing a lodestar analysis in a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)).
Rather, they are activities that any creditor should engage in upon receipt of a Notice of Bankruptcy Filing as part of the ordinary administration of a loan. See, In re Porter, 399 B.R. 113 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008). GMAC's claim provides no explanation of how this case was extraordinary or different that it could not have conducted such a routine review of its lending relationship without lawyer input.
Rather, they are activities that any creditor should engage in upon receipt of a Notice of Bankruptcy Filing as part of the ordinary administration of a loan. See, In re Porter, 399 B.R. 113 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008). GMAC's claim provides no explanation of how this case was extraordinary or different that it could not have conducted such a routine review of its lending relationship without lawyer input.
At issue is whether consumer debtors are required to pay secured creditors for filing bankruptcy proofs of claim and, predictably, there are differing views on the subject. Compare In re Porter, 399 B.R. 113 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008) (affirmative), with In re Rangel, 408 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Tex. 2009) (negative). This Court prefers a middle approach, to address such issues fact specifically, and to consider whether the preparation and filing of the proof of claim was "a ministerial act," or whether special skills and professional services were required to get the proof of claim filed.