Although neither the Trustee nor any other party has objected to confirmation, the presence of divergent reported decisions in this judicial district, and alleged differences in interpretation of § 1322(c) by the judges in this division, suggest the importance of a written decision on the issues raised by the parties. See, Matter of Davis, 68 B.R. 205 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1986) (per Waldron, J.); In re Festa, 65 B.R. 85 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1986) (per Sellers, J.); In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980). II. JURISDICTION
"Cause" under section 1322(c) is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code: Congress left it to the courts to determine its dimensions in the light of experience and in the context of particular cases. In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1980). Case law has not developed a comprehensive definition of "cause" under section 1322(c), and perhaps none should be expected.
"Cause" under section 1322(c) is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code: Congress left it to the courts to determine its dimensions in the light of experience and in the context of particular cases. In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1980). Case law has not developed a comprehensive definition of "cause" under section 1322(c), and perhaps none should be expected.
This has become the closest thing there is to involuntary servitude. . . . H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 1978, 6078, quoted in In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, E.D. 1980); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 1322.01, at 1322-18 (15th ed. 1983).
By leaving the "for cause" provision undefined and unillustrated, Congress intended that the parameters for cause to extend a plan beyond three years would be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1980). This statutory provision should be interpreted in light of the policies behind Chapter 13 relief and the limitation on the length of Chapter 13 plans. Bankruptcy Judge Leif M. Clark analyzed these policies in In re Baker, 129 B.R. 127 (Bkrtcy.
Cause is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1329(c), and courts have found the legislative use of such a broad, open term indicates that cause "is left to judicial discretion, to be decided on a case-by-case basis." In re Poff , 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) ; accordIn re Frank , 69 B.R. 129, 133 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) ; In re Greer , 60 B.R. 547, 555 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) ; cf. alsoFreeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc. , 566 U.S. 624, 132 S.Ct. 2034, 2042, 182 L.Ed.2d 955 (2012) ("[I]t is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs our interpretation of texts."). The Chapter 13 case law therefore shapes the inquiry into cause.
As the Bankruptcy Code fails to define "cause," courts have had to develop the parameters of "cause" on a case-by-case basis. See In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980). In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, Bankruptcy Judge Thomas L. Perkins found that Debtor had not established cause under § 1322(d) to receive an extended plan term and thus refused to confirm Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan. As correctly noted by Judge Perkins, the congressional intent of § 1322(d) was to avoid imposition on debtors of long term repayment plans and prevent "involuntary servitude."
And, without more, the fact that the Debtor disposed of the collateral prepetition does not violate the "good faith" standard prescribed by § 1325(a)(3). In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980)(finding no grounds to deny confirmation where a debtor sold a piano prior the filing of the petition and failed to apply proceeds of sale to secured creditor).
It also noted that "[c]ause is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code . . ., and courts have found the legislative use of such a broad, open term indicates that cause 'is left to judicial discretion, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.'" Id. at 393 (quoting In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980)). The district court placed significant weight on the fact that the debtor had previously elected to perform under a sixty-month plan in order to retain her vehicle, and while the original plan length did not "render unnecessary a showing of cause" in order for the modified plan to last beyond the debtor's applicable commitment period, it did "ameliorate concerns expressed in the jurisprudence and commentary that Chapter 13 debtors should not be forced into plans of extended length."
1983); In re Price, 20 B.R. 253 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1981); Triplett v. Arndt (In re Aalto), 8 B.R. 157 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1981); In re McClaflin, 13 B.R. 530 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1981); In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1980). However, none of these courts was actually interpreting the section in a Chapter 7 case in which this issue had arisen.