disbursements. "The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court" ( Matter of Kraus v Kraus, 26 AD3d 494, 495; see Matter of Lallmohamed v Lallmohamed, 23 AD3d 562; Matter of King v Flowers, 13 AD3d 629), and its determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal ( see Matter of Topper v Topper, 271 AD2d 613; Matter of Hallissey v Hallissey, 261 AD2d 544; Matter of Dendy v Bonelli, 260 AD2d 633). Contrary to the wife's contention, there was legally sufficient proof that she committed acts constituting the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and disorderly conduct, and those offenses were also proved by a preponderance of the evidence ( see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Penal Law §§ 240.20, 240.26; Matter of Fleming v Fleming, 52 AD3d 600; Matter of Rankoth v Sloan, 44 AD3d 863; Matter of Bhanote v Bhanote, 22 AD3d 490; Matter of Sarmuksnis v Priest, 21 AD3d 381, 383; Matter of Platsky v Platsky, 237 AD2d 610).
proved by a preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 832; Matter of Phillips v Laland, 4 AD3d 529, 530) that the appellant committed acts constituting the family offense of disorderly conduct, warranting the issuance of an order of protection. The testimony and evidence demonstrates that while the appellant was clearly upset with the petitioner during and after the event celebrating their daughter's college graduation, and demonstrated poor judgment in confronting the petitioner in the upstairs of the marital home and in arguing with her and three others in the kitchen, he barely raised his voice, he did not threaten the petitioner, and his conduct did not cause those involved in the argument to leave the home (see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Penal Law § 240.20; cf. Matter of Rankoth v Sloan, 44 AD3d 863; Matter of Bonsignore v Bonsignore, 37 AD3d 602; Matter of Kraus v Kraus, 26 AD3d 494; Matter of Sarmuksnis v Priest, 21 AD3d 381, 383; Matter of Clarke v Clarke, 8 AD3d 375; Matter of Platsky v Platsky, 237 AD2d 610).
Ordered that the orders are modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof pertaining to the parties' son; as so modified, the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Although the orders of protection have now expired by their terms, the appeals from the Family Court's determination that the appellant committed a family offense are not academic in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from such an adjudication ( see Matter of Cardarelli v. Cardarelli, 277 AD2d 225; Matter of Whittemore v. Lloyd, 266 AD2d 305; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 AD2d 610; Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 AD2d 767). In this case, the Family Court abused its discretion in allowing the son to testify in camera outside the presence of the mother or her counsel ( see Matter of Rockland County Dept. of Social Servs. [Joseph Z.], 186 AD2d 136). Since there is insufficient admissible evidence to establish the facts that were alleged in the petition with respect to the son without that testimony, the orders of protection must be modified with respect to the parties' son ( see Family Ct Act § 834; Whittemore v. Lloyd, supra).
The fact that there was a paternity proceeding simultaneously pending did not divest the Family Court of jurisdiction ( see Matter of Jerri D. v. Jarrett H., 299 A.D.2d 863, 864; Matter of Lydia B. v. Pedro G., 152 Misc.2d 272, 273). The evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing proved by the requisite preponderance of the evidence ( see Matter of Charlene J.R. v. Walter A.M., 307 A.D.2d 1038) that the appellantcommitted acts constituting disorderly conduct which were directed at the petitioner ( see Penal Law § 240.20; Matter of Hopkins v. Federico, 252 A.D.2d 502; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610) . The Family Court was confronted with issues of credibility as to whether the appellant committed the acts alleged in the petition. The Family Court's credibility determination is entitled to great weight and we find no reason to disturb that determination (see Matter of Smith v. Antonio, 239 A.D.2d 509).
The appeal from the decretal provisions of the order of protection has been rendered academic by the passing of the time limit contained therein. Moreover, the expiration of the order of protection renders academic the appellant's challenge to the dispositional proceedings (see, Matter of Alice C. v. Joseph C., 212 A.D.2d 698; Matter of Campbell v. Desir, 251 A.D.2d 402; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610). However, "in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from an adjudication that a party has committed a family offense ", the appeal from so much of the order as made that adjudication is not academic (see, Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767, 768).
The appeal from the decretal provisions of the order of protection has been rendered academic by the passing of the time limit contained therein. Moreover, the expiration of the order of protection renders academic the appellant's challenge to the dispositional proceedings (see, Matter of Alice C. v. Joseph C., 212 A.D.2d 698; Matter of Campbell v. Desir, 251 A.D.2d 402; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610). However, "in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from an adjudication that a party has committed a family offense", the appeal from so much of the order as made that adjudication is not academic (Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767, 768). Review of the record reveals no basis to disturb the Family Court's resolution of disputed issues of fact and credibility made after a hearing on the question of whether the appellant committed a family offense (see, Matter of Campbell v. Desir, supra; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, supra; Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767).
The Family Court properly dismissed the petition for an order of protection upon its determination that the petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent committed acts constituting a cognizable family offense (see, Family Ct Act § 812, 832 Fam. Ct. Act; Matter of Ross v. Ross, 152 A.D.2d 580). The determination of whether the respondent committed such acts was a disputed factual issue for the Family Court to resolve. As the trier of fact, its determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to great weight (see, Matter of Campbell v. Desir, 251 A.D.2d 402; Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610). The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the proceeding is dismissed. Although the order of protection expired on February 13, 1999, the appeal from the Family Court's determination that the appellant committed a family offense is not academic in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from such an adjudication (see, Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610;Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767). The Family Court erred when it found that the appellant committed acts that constituted aggravated harassment in the second degree.
As the trier of fact, its determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to great weight ( see, Matter of Strully v. Schwartz, 253 A.D.2d 593 [ 255 A.D.2d 593]; Matter of Campbell v. Desir, 251 A.D.2d 402; Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767). A review of the record reveals that its determination was supported by the evidence. Although the Family Court's determination that the appellant committed a felony offense is not academic ( see, Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, supra), the expiration of the order of protection renders academic the appellant's contention that the Family Court erred by not holding a dispositional hearing ( see, Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610). Although the appellant was properly ordered to pay an attorney's fee ( see, Family Ct Act § 842 [f]), there was no testimony establishing that Kelly Ann Hallissey incurred an attorney's fee in the amount awarded by the court.
However, we find no basis to disturb the Family Court's determinations. The question of whether it was the appellant or Marvin Dendy and Zina Melendez-Dendy who committed the acts of harassment was a disputed factual issue for the court to resolve (see, Matter of Campbell v. Desir, 251 A.D.2d 402;. Matter of Platsky v. Platsky, 237 A.D.2d 610, 611). As the trier of fact, the Family Court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight (see, Matter of F.B. v. W.B., 248 A.D.2d 119; Matter of Cutrone v. Cutrone, 225 A.D.2d 767).