Yet under the construction the minor urges, the three-year period would in effect be reduced to something indeterminate and much less, i.e., that period of time following the effective date of the amendment in which any particular conviction that occurred could become final before expiration of the three years. (See In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718] [a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed].) The validity, moreover, of any conclusions to be drawn from an experimental study of the deterrent effect of enhanced penalties could be weakened by the underinclusiveness of a sampling of offenders comprised only of those whose convictions happened to become final before the sunset date of the increased penalties.

For purposes of determining retroactivity, a judgment becomes final at "that point at which the courts can no longer provide a remedy on direct review." ( In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718].) It has long been the rule in federal and California courts that a case is not final for purposes of determining the retroactivity and application of a new decision addressing a federal constitutional right until direct appeal is no longer available in the state courts, and the time for seeking a writ of certiorari has lapsed or a timely filed petition for that writ has been denied.

"In Pedro T. we cited with approval a case holding that, for the purpose of determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed. ( Inre Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1046 [136 Cal.Rptr. 74, 884 P.2d 1022], citing In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718]; see also Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 822, 84 S.Ct. 1814] [`The rule applies to any such [criminal] proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it'].)" ( People v.Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 910 P.2d 1380].)

" ‘[F]or the purpose of determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed. (In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1046 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 884 P.2d 1022], citing In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 ; see also Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230 [84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822] ["The rule applies to any such [criminal] proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it"].)’ " (People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 306, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990, quoting People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 910 P.2d 1380.)

For purposes of determining retroactivity, a judgment becomes final “at that point at which the courts can no longer provide a remedy on direct review.” (In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595, 136 Cal.Rptr. 718.) It has long been the rule in federal and California courts that a case is not final for purposes of determining the retroactivity and application of a new decision addressing a federal constitutional right until direct appeal is no longer available in the state courts, and the time for seeking a writ of certiorari has lapsed or a timely filed petition for that writ has been denied.

For purposes of determining retroactivity, a judgment becomes final "at that point at which the courts can no longer provide a remedy on direct review." (Inre Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595.)

For purposes of this rule, a case is "final" when the judgment is immune from direct review. ( In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595-596 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718].) Therefore, "[a]bsent a savings clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law that occurs during the pendency of his or her appeal."

(1) A judgment does not become final so long as the action in which it is entered remains pending and an action remains pending until final determination on appeal. ( Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Nakano (1939) 12 Cal.2d 711, 714 [ 87 P.2d 700, 121 A.L.R. 417]; Rich v. Siegel (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 665] ; In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1049) (2) Where an appeal has been taken, a judgment is final upon the issuance of the remittitur. ( Hoover v. Galbraith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 519, 526 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 733, 498 P.2d 981]; Turner v. Donovan (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 236, 240 [ 126 P.2d 187].)

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1021) (4) [¶] A judgment does not become final so long as the action in which it is entered remains pending ( Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Nakano (1939) 12 Cal.2d 711, 714 [ 87 P.2d 700, 121 A.L.R. 417]; Rich v. Siegel (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 465, 469 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 665]), and an action remains pending until final determination on appeal. ( Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Nakano, supra; Estate of Molera (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 993, 998 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 696]; In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 595 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1049) Even if we assume the Supreme Court decision in South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon, supra, constituted a final judgment — which it did not — the decision was filed 6 January 1977, subsequent to the repeal of section 27428. Any statutory right the commission may have had to apply for attorneys fees under the 1972 Act never matured or vested prior to repeal.

Although defendant's conviction of the marijuana offense has become final, and defendant has in fact served his prison sentence therefor, defendant argues that to the extent his new sentence may be enhanced by his 1966 conviction, the effect of the conviction is not final, and in fact, is reviewable on appeal. In In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 718], the court stated that for purposes of retroactivity of an ameliorative statute, the judgment becomes final at that point at which the court can no longer provide a remedy on direct review. ( Id., at p. 595.)