People v. A.V.

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Babcock

    535 P.3d 981 (Colo. App. 2023)   Cited 9 times

    The rules of evidence are not applicable at restitution hearings, and the court is permitted to rely on hearsay and documentary evidence. People v. Vasseur , 2016 COA 107, ¶¶ 20–21, 409 P.3d 524 ; see alsoPeople in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 35, 446 P.3d 887 ("[T]he prosecution may rely solely on documentary evidence to meet its burden."). And Babcock never objected to the prosecutor proceeding this way.

  2. People v. Quillen

    530 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    On this record, we conclude that Quillen waived her right to appellate review of this issue, and, therefore, we won't consider the merits of her contention. See Carter , ¶¶ 30–33 ; People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 17, 446 P.3d 887 (holding that waiver occurred when defense counsel responded affirmatively to the prosecution's clarification of its understanding of the defendant's stipulation on causation); People v. Kessler , 2018 COA 60, ¶ 36, 436 P.3d 550 (determining that defense counsel waived challenge to results of breathalyzer test by agreeing that the results were admissible and that the delay in conducting the test affected only the weight of the evidence). ¶ 54

  3. People v. Rodriguez-Morelos

    522 P.3d 213 (Colo. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    ¶ 91 Last, a limitation such as defendant proposes does not exist, as section 18-1.3-603(2)(a), C.R.S. 2021, requires the court to "base its order for restitution upon information presented to the court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall compile such information through victim impact statements or other means to determine the amount of restitution and the identities of the victims." Because the court acts as the fact finder during a restitution hearing, it has the authority "to determine the weight of the evidence [and] the witnesses' credibility." People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 29, 446 P.3d 887 ; cfPeople v. Duncan , 109 P.3d 1044, 1046 (Colo. App. 2004) (resolving inconsistent testimony is solely within the province of the finder of fact). And, to the extent that defendant asserts that the court could not rely on the victim impact statements in crafting its restitution order, he is mistaken.

  4. People v. Dyson

    492 P.3d 1070 (Colo. App. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    ¶ 14 "More than speculation is required for a defendant to bear responsibility for a victim's loss[,] [b]ut the prosecution is not required to prove restitution by the same quality of evidence required in a trial on the merits of the case." People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24, 446 P.3d 887 (citations omitted). The preponderance of evidence standard only requires proof that "the existence of a contested fact is ‘more probable than its nonexistence.’ "

  5. People v. Rice

    478 P.3d 1276 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 5 times

    ¶ 20 From these acknowledgments alone, we do not view Rice to have waived the right to challenge causation of the victim's damages for restitution purposes. See People In Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 16, 446 P.3d 887 (noting that "simply stipulating to a factual basis may be insufficient to waive causation where the issue of causation is not specifically identified or discussed"). The general acknowledgments contained in Rice's plea agreement and sentencing statements differ considerably from the specific types of admissions that have characterized scenarios where a court found such a waiver.

  6. People v. Manzanares

    490 P.3d 919 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 2 times
    Defining the word "another," in the context of the statute proscribing the solicitation of another person, as " different or distinct from the one first considered; some other; or being one more in addition to one or more of the same kind"

    The division in Tee explained that, while defense counsel's approval of the jury instructions in Rediger could have resulted from inadvertence, Tee's counsel — like "everyone involved" — had recognized the "specter of predeliberation." Id. at ¶¶ 30-31 ; see also People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 17, 446 P.3d 887 (waiver occurred when defense counsel responded affirmatively to the prosecution's clarification of its understanding of the defendant's stipulation on causation). 3. Analysis

  7. Bernache v. Brown

    471 P.3d 1234 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 15 times
    Noting that a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege

    People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39, 416 P.3d 893 (quoting Dep't of Health v. Donahue , 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984) ). To hold a party waived objection to an error, a court must find some record evidence that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right, Rediger , ¶ 39, indulging "every reasonable presumption against waiver" and examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding a party's conduct (or lack thereof), People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 13, 446 P.3d 887 (quoting Rediger , ¶ 39 ). ¶ 11 The doctrine of invited error prevents a party from complaining on appeal of an error that he or she has invited or injected into the case.

  8. People v. Stone

    471 P.3d 1159 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that although a court generally reviews a court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion, when the issue is whether sufficient evidence justified the order, the court reviews the order de novo

    But, when the issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the order, we apply de novo review, evaluating "whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss." People v. Barbre , 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25, 429 P.3d 95 ; see also People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 32, 446 P.3d 887. ¶8 This appeal also requires us to interpret statutes.

  9. People v. Sosa

    487 P.3d 1203 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 15 times
    In Sosa, the defendant was charged with accessory to first or second degree murder based on a drive-by shooting in which two men were injured and another killed. ¶¶ 2-5, 487 P.3d at 1205.

    See People v. Borquez , 814 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Colo. 1991) (approving restitution order based on uncharged offenses because "Borquez acknowledged her criminal conduct and the resulting pecuniary loss incurred by [the victim] in several written statements and defense counsel tacitly admitted that the plea agreement was based upon a series of thefts"); People in Interest ofA.V. , 2018 COA 138M, 446 P.3d 887 (affirming restitution order based on dismissed counts where defendant "and his attorney signed the written plea agreement in which he stipulated to a factual basis and agreed to pay restitution to the victims of the dismissed counts"). ¶30 We recognize that a defendant may receive the benefit of avoiding trial, pleading guilty to fewer or different offenses, and receiving a reduced sentence in exchange for making full restitution to those harmed by her conduct. Both sides ought to be free to leverage restitution as part of a fair disposition of the case.

  10. People v. D.L.C.

    461 P.3d 588 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 8 When the court finds that a juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent has damaged a victim’s real or personal property, has lost a victim’s personal property, or causes a victim personal injury, the court "shall enter a sentencing order requiring the juvenile to make restitution as required by [the adult criminal restitution statutes]." § 19-2-918(1) ; People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 22, 446 P.3d 887. ¶ 9 The adult criminal restitution statutes require offenders to pay "full restitution" to victims harmed by their misconduct.