Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J517702, Ana L. Espana, Judge.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
A.B. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter P.B. She contends the court erred by terminating parental rights because she established the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights and adoption of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm the order.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.B.'s first two children died as infants while they were in her care. The cause of death of both children was determined to be asphyxiation. A.B. pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter in Illinois for both deaths. Her next three children were removed from her care at birth. She subsequently moved to San Diego. P.B., her sixth child, was born in September 2009.
In January 2010 A.B. brought P.B. to a hospital. She said P.B. was listless and having difficulty breathing, the same symptoms as those of her two children who had died. A hospital hold was placed on P.B. Her test results were normal, there was no sign of trauma and no specific diagnosis explained her symptoms. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on P.B.'s behalf under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (f), alleging she was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The court ordered her detained in foster care.
The social worker reported A.B. had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, personality disorder with histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial and borderline features, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and alcohol and other substance abuse. A.B. said she had been abused as a child and at one time had attempted to kill her sister. Mental health professionals who had worked with A.B. said she lacked insight and judgment, was impulsive and likely to be overly dramatic, seductive and an exhibitionist, and she denied responsibility for the deaths of her children. She had been in relationships that included domestic violence, and she did not have a stable residence.
On May 12, 2010, the court sustained the petition, declared P.B. a dependent child of the court, removed her from parental custody and ordered her placed in foster care. The court denied A.B. reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4), and set a section 366.26 hearing.
The social worker assessed P.B. as an adoptable child. P.B. was sweet, happy, healthy, curious, playful and calm. She had met all of her developmental milestones and was mentally and emotionally stable. Her current caregivers wanted to adopt her and numerous other approved adoptive families were interested in adopting a child with her characteristics. A.B. had appropriate, supervised visits with P.B., but she often missed visits or was late. The social worker said that during visits P.B. appeared to engage with the social worker as much as she did with A.B., and at the end of visits separated easily from A.B. and reached for her foster parent. The social worker opined the benefits of P.B.'s relationship with A.B. did not outweigh the benefits she would receive from being adopted into a stable, secure home.
At the section 366.26 hearing in February 2011, A.B. testified she had continued to visit P.B. and during visits they talked and played together and she would feed P.B. and change her diapers if needed. She said she loved P.B. and believed P.B. loved her as well and would be damaged if she did not see her anymore.
After considering the evidence and argument by counsel, the court found it was likely P.B. would be adopted if parental rights were terminated and no statutory exceptions were present to preclude termination of parental rights and adoption. It terminated parental rights and referred P.B. for adoption.
DISCUSSION
A.B. contends substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) to termination of parental rights and adoption does not apply to prevent terminating her parental rights. She argues she had regular visits with P.B., and she and P.B. consistently interacted during their times together.
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is adoptable, it becomes the parent's burden to show termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because a specified statutory exception exists. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574.) Under the exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the parent is required to show termination would be detrimental in that "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." In In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534, the court noted "[c]ourts have required more than just 'frequent and loving contact' to establish the requisite benefit for [the] exception." In interpreting the meaning of "benefit" in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), this court stated in Autumn H., at page 575: "In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the 'benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship' exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents."
In reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
The record does not show that A.B. had consistent visitation and contact with P.B. She missed many of the visits that were scheduled and did not call the foster mother to monitor P.B.'s well-being between visits. P.B.'s foster mother offered to accommodate A.B.'s schedule and was very flexible, but A.B. was not able to maintain a regular visitation schedule. In November 2010 she did not visit at all.
Moreover, even were we to deem A.B.'s record of visits as consistent visitation and contact within the meaning of the statute, A.B. did not show that she and P.B. shared a parental bond or that she fulfilled a parental role in P.B.'s life. The social worker said P.B. acted toward her (the social worker) in the same way that she acted toward A.B. P.B. sought out her foster parents for comfort and did not want them to leave when they brought her to visits. Although P.B. had pleasant visits with A.B., she always left A.B. easily at the end of visits and happily returned to her foster parents.
By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, P.B. was 16 months old. She had lived with A.B. for only four months of her life and with her foster parents since the time she was removed from A.B.'s care. All of P.B.'s visits with A.B. were highly supervised and there was no evidence to show that A.B. could be a safe parent to P.B. in an unsupervised setting, and no evidence to show P.B. would be greatly harmed by termination of parental rights.
A.B. misplaces reliance on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289. In S.B., this court reversed the trial court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply after concluding the child would be greatly harmed by loss of the significant positive relationship she shared with her father. The father had complied with every aspect of his case plan, frequently visited his daughter and was devoted to her. She loved him and wanted to live with him. (Id. at pp. 294-295.) A.B. did not make such a showing. Further, while factual comparisons between cases provide insight, these comparisons are not dispositive. The determination on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We conclude that on the facts of this case, the court's findings are fully supported.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE, J., IRION, J.