Opinion
2013-06-5
In the Matter of PAUL T. (Anonymous), appellant.
Alan S. Cabelly, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner and Ronald E. Sternberg of counsel), for respondent.
Alan S. Cabelly, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant.Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner and Ronald E. Sternberg of counsel), for respondent.
, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Paul T. appeals from (1) an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated April 2, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated December 8, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree, and after a dispositional hearing, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months for placement with a residential treatment facility, with credit for time spent in detention pending disposition, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court, also dated April 2, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that he violated conditions of a term of probation previously imposed by the same court in an order dated February 3, 2011, vacated the order dated February 3, 2011, and thereupon placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months for placement with a residential treatment facility.
ORDERED that the orders of disposition are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Friday M., 94 A.D.3d 1120, 1121, 942 N.Y.S.2d 813;cf.CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Jamel C., 92 A.D.3d 782, 782–783, 938 N.Y.S.2d 456;cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Danasia Mc., 94 A.D.3d 1122, 1124, 943 N.Y.S.2d 549;cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 141; Matter of Donovan E., 92 A.D.3d 881, 882, 939 N.Y.S.2d 515;Matter of Natasha G., 91 A.D.3d 948, 937 N.Y.S.2d 616), and its determination is accorded great deference ( see Matter of Justin A., 82 A.D.3d 1219, 1220, 919 N.Y.S.2d 858;Matter of Leonard J., 67 A.D.3d 911, 912, 888 N.Y.S.2d 424). Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing the appellant in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months for placement with a residential treatment facility. The record establishes that the disposition was the least restrictive alternative consistent with the best interests of the appellant and the needs of the community ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 352.2[2][a] ), particularly in light of, inter alia, his previous juvenile delinquency adjudication, the violation of the conditions of his probation, his record of truancy, the findings in the mental health services report, and the recommendationin the probation report ( see Matter of Donovan E., 92 A.D.3d at 882, 939 N.Y.S.2d 515;Matter of Day–Shaun A.E., 89 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 933 N.Y.S.2d 588;Matter of Anthony G., 82 A.D.3d 1235, 1235, 919 N.Y.S.2d 367;Matter of Justin A., 82 A.D.3d at 1220, 919 N.Y.S.2d 858).
The appellant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.