Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County, No. JJD062713, Hugo J. Loza, Commissioner.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J., and Franson, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Paul N., contends the juvenile court erred in committing him to a local youth facility rather than to a drug treatment program. We disagree and will affirm the juvenile court’s commitment order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Current Petition
On December 1, 2010, appellant waived his rights and admitted allegations in a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that he resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), count one) and gave false information to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a), count two). Appellant also admitted he violated his probation by absconding from his court-ordered placement in a foster home.
Except as otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On December 15, 2010, the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of the court, reinstated probation, and committed appellant to the Tulare County Youth Facility (youth facility) for 365 days. The court found that appellant had a long history of being before the court. At one time, his family moved out of state and came back. Appellant has had a very serious problem with drugs. He had been placed in a group home and sought services for him to deal with mental health issues and his continuing substance abuse. The court noted that within two days of his placement, however, appellant ran away from his group home.
The juvenile court further found appellant’s situation at home was not good and a short-term program was insufficient to deal with his needs. The court found every other option had been tried. The court believed appellant needed a significant period of time to get clean and to receive mental health services. The court observed appellant was bright, and could do well in school, but had significant needs that would best be addressed in the youth facility.
Previous Proceedings
Prior to the instant proceedings, appellant had prior adjudications dating back to 2007 for vandalism under $400, possession of marijuana on school grounds, two second degree burglaries, two adjudications for public intoxication, possession of an alcoholic beverage by a minor, delay of a peace officer, trespassing, inhaling an intoxicating substance, and three violations of probation. Referrals to child welfare services had been made 10 times on appellant’s behalf between 1997 and 2008, but each one was found to be inconclusive or unfounded.
In October 2008, appellant was ordered to enroll at Turning Point with referrals for drug/alcohol counseling and individual counseling with a psychologist. On December 5, 2008, appellant was not accepted into Drug Court. He was again ordered to enroll and complete the program at Turning Point. On December 17, 2008, the court found appellant violated an order of the court by failing to obtain substance abuse counseling.
Appellant reoffended in January 2009, admitting he committed two second degree burglaries. On January 9, 2009, appellant was placed on probation upon various terms and conditions including that he not use or possess narcotics or related paraphernalia, not use alcohol, and enter into alcohol and drug counseling.
At the same hearing, appellant admitted a new allegation that he committed misdemeanor vandalism.
A new petition was filed alleging that appellant was publicly intoxicated. In February 2009, appellant reported that he had replaced “huffing” glue with drinking alcohol. Appellant’s mother would not enroll him in school. Appellant’s mother also refused to attend probation appointments and to follow the terms and conditions of appellant’s probation. Appellant was not accepted to the Drug Court program, failed to enroll in substance abuse counseling, and failed to abstain from drug and alcohol use.
On February 9, 2009, the juvenile court found appellant in violation of his probation and ordered that he be evaluated by a psychiatrist. On February 25, 2009, appellant was committed to the youth facility for a short-term program. Appellant was again ordered not to use controlled substances and to enter into a drug and alcohol counseling program as a term of probation.
On April 3, 2009, appellant admitted allegations that he possessed toluene glue and an alcoholic beverage. The court ordered appellant on the same terms of probation that were instituted on February 25, 2009, including that he obtain drug and alcohol counseling. Appellant failed to report to the Turning Point program on multiple occasions. The probation officer reported that on April 10, 2009, appellant was released into an aftercare program, but failed to attend substance abuse counseling and tested positive for using marijuana. He also failed to enroll in school. Appellant failed to comply with the rules of the aftercare program and to meet with his probation officer. After appellant’s release from the youth center treatment program into the aftercare program, appellant was never in compliance with the terms of his probation.
On May 12, 2009, the probation officer filed a notice that appellant was in violation of the terms of his probation for testing positive for marijuana use. Appellant waived his rights and admitted the allegations that he violated the terms of his probation. The probation officer recommended appellant’s commitment to the youth center program. Appellant admitted that he failed to enroll in school, but did not admit that he failed to go to an intake appointment for the Turning Point program.
On June 18, 2009, appellant admitted a new allegation that he resisted arrest. The court also conducted a disposition hearing on previous allegations. The court designated appellant’s vandalism adjudication as a misdemeanor. The court found appellant was at risk of entering foster care and readjudged him a ward. The court ordered appellant’s commitment to the short-term program at the youth center.
Appellant completed the youth center program on August 3, 2009, and was released to his mother’s custody in an aftercare program. Later in August 2009, appellant and his mother moved to Southern California and failed to stay in contact with the probation department. The probation department filed a notice that appellant was in violation of the terms of his probation.
On October 1, 2009, appellant waived his rights and admitted he violated the terms of his probation. On October 15, 2009, the court readjudged appellant a ward, removed him from his mother’s custody, and temporarily detained him in juvenile hall pending suitable placement with a relative, foster home, or group home. The terms and conditions of appellant’s probation, including that he obtain substance abuse counseling, remained in effect.
The probation department reported that appellant was placed out of town in a group home. Appellant absconded from the program in November 2009. In early December 2009, the probation department received a telephone call from appellant’s mother who explained that she and appellant were residing out of state with appellant’s grandfather. The mother was informed that a warrant had been issued for appellant’s arrest. In January 2010, the probation department learned from the probation department in the county where appellant was allegedly residing that it was unable to perform a home assessment. Appellant had been recently arrested in that county for sniffing glue and was placed into his mother’s custody.
By February 2010, appellant was placed on probation in the out-of-state county where he was residing. The warrant for appellant’s arrest was recalled and quashed. The probation department was ordered to determine appellant’s probation status. In July 2010, appellant’s grandfather reported that appellant was in a treatment facility in a third state and he was unaware of the whereabouts of appellant’s mother.
In September 2010, appellant came before the juvenile court in San Diego County. Appellant admitted being intoxicated in public. The juvenile court found appellant’s residence was Tulare County and ordered the transfer of appellant’s case to Tulare County. On October 15, 2010, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing for the prior adjudication that appellant was intoxicated in public. The court placed appellant on probation in his mother’s custody. Appellant was ordered not to use or to be under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, or other drugs without a prescription. Appellant was ordered to enroll and complete individual, group, and family counseling as well as drug and alcohol counseling. The court set the matter for a review date so appellant could be assessed by a psychiatrist.
On November 8, 2010, the juvenile court ordered placement of appellant into a foster home. On November 16, 2010, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation because appellant absconded from his foster home on or about November 10, 2010. The probation department filed a report recommending appellant’s placement into the Tulare County Juvenile Detention Facility pending further proceedings. The mother reported to the probation officer that appellant suffered from Bipolar Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. The mother also told the probation officer that appellant attended an inpatient treatment program for four months, but did not complete the program for financial reasons.
On November 30, 2010, the probation department filed a petition alleging appellant resisted arrested and gave false information to a peace officer. As noted above, after admitting the allegations, the juvenile court ordered appellant’s long-term commitment to the youth facility.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in committing him to the youth facility without considering less restrictive alternatives and for not considering the extent of his addiction and substance abuse.
An appellate court may reverse a juvenile court’s commitment order only upon a showing that the juvenile court abused its discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330 (Robert H.).) As long as the evidence demonstrates that the minor will benefit from the commitment and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective, a particular commitment order does not constitute an abuse of discretion. (See In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.) Moreover, the juvenile court has full discretion in evaluating the credibility of the minor, probation officer recommendations, and other information presented during the proceedings. (Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) Thus, while the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, no absolute rule requires that the juvenile court attempt a less restrictive placement before ordering a particular commitment. (§ 202, subd. (e); In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577 (Teofilio A.).)
When reviewing the record, the appellate court grants all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s decision and does not disturb findings supported by substantial evidence. (Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) To determine if substantial evidence exists, the appellate court examines the record in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law, which include protecting the public and minor, preserving the minor’s family ties, and removing the minor from his family only when necessary for his welfare or the public’s safety. (§ 202, subd. (a); In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.)
In addition, section 202 provides that minors in delinquency proceedings shall receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interests, holds them accountable for their behavior, and is appropriate given the circumstances. (§ 202, subd. (b).) Thus, the statute recognizes both punishment and rehabilitation as important tools and objectives. (Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)
In ordering disposition, the juvenile court must broadly consider the minor’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the minor’s delinquent history, and any other relevant information. (§ 725.5; Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) The juvenile court need not specifically discuss each factor during the proceedings, and a record that indicates the court merely considered each factor is sufficient. (In re John F. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185.)
Appellant had a long history of appearances before the juvenile court. Appellant was consistently ordered to obtain counseling for alcohol and substance abuse, and completely failed to comply with the juvenile court’s orders. Appellant absconded from detention, a group home, and more recently, from the home of his foster parents. The juvenile court had tried short-term commitments to the youth facility twice in the past but these did not help appellant overcome his addictions. Appellant and his mother left California for another jurisdiction. Appellant’s mother and grandfather reported that he obtained treatment out of state. Appellant’s mother conceded, however, that appellant did not complete that treatment program. It is clear that this program did not help appellant overcome his addictions.
The juvenile court had unsuccessfully attempted less restrictive alternatives to a long-term commitment. The court specifically considered less restrictive alternatives and rejected them as not sufficient to meet appellant’s mental health needs and to overcome his addictions. As long as the record shows that less restrictive placements were considered, the fact that the court does not expressly state reasons for rejecting those alternatives does not warrant reversal. (Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) The juvenile court did not err in ordering appellant’s commitment to the youth facility for a long term.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s commitment order is affirmed.