In re Patterson

15 Citing cases

  1. In re Linville

    446 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    Special circumstances is a fact-specific consideration made on a case by case basis.See, In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 504 (Bankr.S.D.Fl.2008)(explaining the substantive requirements that debtor (1) demonstrate special circumstances justifying additional expense or income adjustment and (2) demonstrate that there is no reasonable alternative to making the additional expense or income adjustment); In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591, at *2 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio, 2007)(finding special circumstance “is one that is out of the ordinary for an average family and leaves the debtor with no reasonable alternative but to incur the expense”); In re Knight, 370 B.R. 429, 437–438 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2007)(where the Court explains that special circumstance “is one that if the debtor is not permitted to adjust her income or expenses accordingly, results in a demonstrable economic unfairness prejudicial to the debtor.”) Courts are given broad discretion in making the determination of whether special circumstances exist.

  2. In re Hammock

    436 B.R. 343 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that the debtor was "attempting to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code and free up funds to pay the non-dischargeable unsecured school debt, with interest, to the detriment of her other similarly situated unsecured creditors"

    In re Fonash, 401 B.R. 143, 147 (Bank. M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008)); See alsoIn re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. D.Del. 2007). The Fonash Court recognized that to satisfy the procedural requirements of Section 707(b)(2)(B)(ii), a debtor must provide documentation for the expense or adjustment and a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make the adjustments to income necessary and reasonable. 401 B.R. at 147.

  3. In re Fonash

    401 B.R. 143 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008)   Cited 22 times
    Finding that the "burden to establish special circumstances was not set particularly high, making the presumption truly rebuttable. The standard ... is special, not extraordinary"

    Under § 707(b)(2)(B), a debtor seeking to show special circumstances bears both a procedural and a substantive burden. In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 503 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2008), citing In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr.D.Del.2007) ("For a debtor to successfully demonstrate a special circumstance, he must fulfill both the procedural and substantive requirements of section 707(b)(2)(B).") To satisfy the procedural requirements of the statute a debtor is required to "itemize each additional expense or adjustment of income and . . . provide . . . (I) documentation for such expense or adjustment to income; and (II) a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expenses or adjustment to income necessary and reasonable." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii).

  4. Kolba v. Henderson (In re Henderson)

    No. 23-50381-BEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2024)

    Knight, 370 B.R. at 437-38. See also Chambers, 2022 WL 828301, at *4 (the amount of rent paid which exceeds the IRS standard and monthly pet expenses qualify as special circumstances); Walker, 2019 WL 5866154, at *3 (debtor's desire to eventually retire does not constitute a special circumstance); In re Anderson, 444 B.R. 505, 508 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011) (age by itself and the "mere desire for retirement" is not a special circumstance); In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 327-330 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (repayment of 401(k) loan was a special circumstance due to the reasons for taking the loan); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 524, 527-28 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (Antenuptial Agreement between husband and wife, which they did not adhere to and which resulted in the expending of all of debtor's monthly income, is not a special circumstance); In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 504 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (expenses for a storage unit, unreimbursed expenses for food while debtor's husband is traveling for work, living expenses of debtor's adult daughter living away at college, and student loan payments, all do not qualify as special circumstances); In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279, at *5 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio Dec. 1, 2008) (voluntary lifestyle changes of postpetition marriage and decrease in work hours are not special circumstances).

  5. In re Henderson

    No. 23-50381-BEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sep. 27, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Knight, 370 B.R. at 437-38. See also Chambers, 2022 WL 828301, at *4 (the amount of rent paid which exceeds the IRS standard and monthly pet expenses qualify as special circumstances); Walker, 2019 WL 5866154, at *3 (debtor's desire to eventually retire does not constitute a special circumstance); In re Anderson, 444 B.R. 505, 508 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011) (age by itself and the "mere desire for retirement" is not a special circumstance); In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 327-330 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (repayment of 401(k) loan was a special circumstance due to the reasons for taking the loan); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 524, 527-28 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (Antenuptial Agreement between husband and wife, which they did not adhere to and which resulted in the expending of all of debtor's monthly income, is not a special circumstance); In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 504 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (expenses for a storage unit, unreimbursed expenses for food while debtor's husband is traveling for work, living expenses of debtor's adult daughter living away at college, and student loan payments, all do not qualify as special circumstances); In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279, at *5 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio Dec. 1, 2008) (voluntary lifestyle changes of postpetition marriage and decrease in work hours are not special circumstances).

  6. U.S. Tr. v. Kubatka (In re Kubatka)

    605 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2019)   Cited 9 times

    W.D. Tex. 2013) ; see In re Hodge, No. 12-35236, 2014 WL 1419852, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2014) ; In re Linville, 446 B.R. 522, 530 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) ; In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) ; U.S. Trustee v. Harrelson, 323 B.R. 176, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2005) ; In re Shaw, 311 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr.

  7. In re Moss

    591 B.R. 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    The problem with the trustee's position is that the legal principle on which that position is premised – no "double dipping" for above-median chapter 13 debtors – does not exist. Sturm v. U.S. Trustee , 455 B.R. 130, 135 (N.D. Ohio 2011). At times, courts do seem to endorse such a principle. See, e.g.,In re Linville , 446 B.R. 522, 527 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) ; Trimarchi , 421 B.R. at 920 ; In re Zahringer , No. 07-30217, 2008 WL 2245864, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 30, 2008) ; In re Patterson , 392 B.R. 497, 505 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) ; In re Hylton , 374 B.R. 579, 585-86 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). But these courts use the "double dipping" phrase "only to describe legal conclusions reached [on other grounds]," typically conclusions that the Code either allows or does not allow the deduction in question.

  8. In re Martin

    Case No. 08-51226 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sep. 9, 2011)

    Specifically, Chapter 13 allows a debtor with regular income to make payments to a trustee for the benefit of prepetition secured and unsecured creditors pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. Chapter 13 provides a debtor with a fresh start by allowing the debtor to obtain a discharge after successful completion of a Chapter 13 plan. Generally, debtors should avoid incurring additional debts during the life of the plan except for necessities needed to perform under the plan, as post-petition debts have the potential to jeopardize the successful completion of a debtor's plan, thereby depriving the debtor of a fresh start. It is well accepted that "[a]n adult child attending college is not a special circumstance that is out of the ordinary for an average family which leaves the Debtors no reasonable alternative but to incur the expense." In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). See also In re Baker, 400 B.R. 594, 598 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 2009); In re Walker, 383 B.R. 830, 838 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2008) ; In re Saffrin, 380 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2007).

  9. In re Martin

    Case No. 08-51226 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sep. 8, 2011)

    Specifically, Chapter 13 allows a debtor with regular income to make payments to a trustee for the benefit of prepetition secured and unsecured creditors pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. Chapter 13 provides a debtor with a fresh start by allowing the debtor to obtain a discharge after successful completion of a Chapter 13 plan. Generally, debtors should avoid incurring additional debts during the life of the plan except for necessities needed to perform under the plan, as post-petition debts have the potential to jeopardize the successful completion of a debtor's plan, thereby depriving the debtor of a fresh start. It is well accepted that "[a]n adult child attending college is not a special circumstance that is out of the ordinary for an average family which leaves the Debtors no reasonable alternative but to incur the expense." In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.2008). See also In re Baker, 400 B.R. 594, 598 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 2009); In re Walker, 383 B.R. 830, 838 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2008); In re Saffrin, 380 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2007).

  10. In re Wise

    Case No. 10-32441 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May. 27, 2011)

    Post-BAPCPA, the Court is left with virtually no discretion. It is well established that "an adult child attending college is not a special circumstance that is out of the ordinary for an average family which leaves the Debtors no reasonable alternative but to incur this expense." In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). See also In re Saffrin, 380 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Baker, 400 B.R. 594, 598 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009); In re Walker, 383 B.R. 830, 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008).