Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ12964A, Harry M. Elias, Judge.
NARES, Acting P. J.
Mary R. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son, Patrick C. She contends the order must be reversed because she was not provided with reasonable reunification services; and the finding that Patrick is generally adoptable was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mary gave birth to Patrick in November 2000 and to his sister, Makayla C., in February 2002. In March 2003 after there had been several referrals of neglect and possible physical abuse of the children, the San Bernardino County social services agency offered the family voluntary family maintenance services. On July 15, 2004, the San Bernardino County social worker filed a petition on Patrick's behalf under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), alleging Mary had a history of substance abuse; Patrick had been found wandering alone on the street on more than one occasion; the children's father, Jason C., had failed to protect him; and Makayla was suffering from severe neglect.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
A petition was filed on Makayla's behalf as well. On July 7, 2005, Jason was awarded custody of her and the court terminated jurisdiction in her case. Makayla is not a subject of this appeal.
Patrick is deaf. The doctor who examined him stated he had extremely limited language skills and showed very primitive behavior. The social worker said the children climbed on tables, ran into the street and were very aggressive toward each other. Earlier, Mary had said she would obtain services and medical appointments for Patrick and Makayla, but did not follow through. Jason was stationed with the United States Marine Corps in Oceanside, California. He said he had not known of any problems with Mary's care of the children until the social worker contacted him.
The San Bernardino County Juvenile Court detained Patrick, appointed counsel for the parents and ordered supervised visitation. It subsequently declared Patrick to be a dependent child, placed him with Jason and ordered the parents to participate in services. Mary's service plan included counseling, parenting education, outpatient substance abuse treatment and drug testing.
On October 15, 2004, new petitions on behalf of the children were filed in San Bernardino County, alleging Jason had struck Patrick and Makayla with a boat oar and Jason admitted the allegations.
The social worker reported by January 2005, Mary had attended parenting classes and had some visits with the children, but she had not started substance abuse treatment or counseling. Her drug test on January 6 was positive for methamphetamine use. The San Bernardino County social services agency recommended terminating her services due to her drug use and lack of progress.
On April 28, 2005, the San Bernardino County Juvenile Court ordered the case transferred to San Diego County because Jason was living there and the San Bernardino County social services agency was no longer providing services to Mary. The San Diego County Juvenile Court set a hearing on the matter and sent notice to Mary by mail and attempted to telephone her, but the telephone number she had provided was not working.
The social worker reported Patrick was doing well in his foster home in San Diego County, where he was placed in the fall of 2005. His foster mother reported he displayed positive coping skills and was able to interact with others, but he also hit his head on walls, bit himself, spit on people, defecated in the back yard and urinated around the toilet. Patrick's therapist reported when she first met Patrick his language ability was extremely delayed for a four-year-old deaf child, and his signing vocabulary was severely limited. He was aggressive and could not express himself. He showed great improvement after he was placed with his foster mother.
The social worker said Mary contacted the Agency once in May 2005 after the case was transferred to San Diego County. But as of September 2005, her whereabouts were unknown. In October 2005 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) located her at a Rancho Cucamonga, California detention facility, and the social worker mailed her notification of an October 24 review hearing. Mary was released before the hearing, but did not attend it and did not inform the social worker of her whereabouts. The court found reasonable efforts had been made to locate her and continued Jason's services.
On December 9, 2005, the court ordered Patrick moved to a foster home with foster parents who were fluent in American Sign Language (ASL). This move was accomplished. The social worker reported Patrick made good progress in learning to communicate both at school and in his new foster home where he was provided the attention he required to address his language, emotional and behavioral needs.
The social worker recommended terminating Jason's services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Jason resented being forced to learn ASL and was unwilling to make accommodations in his home for Patrick's special needs. He subsequently took a civilian job in Iraq.
Mary attended an 18-month review hearing on April 27, 2006. The hearing was continued and, on May 2, a copy of the order from the hearing, including notice that it had been continued to June 8, was sent to her at the Rancho Cucamonga detention center. On June 8 the hearing was continued again. Notice of the new hearing date was sent to the address on file for Mary in Twentynine Palms, California, but she was living at a treatment center in Norco, California.
At the 18-month review hearing on July 7, 2006, the court continued Patrick as a dependent in foster care, terminated Jason's services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
The psychologist who evaluated Patrick reported that during the testing, Patrick had great difficulty in maintaining concentration, responded impulsively and, when he wanted to stop the tests, became belligerent. The psychologist's diagnosis included reactive attachment disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and profound hearing loss. He noted Patrick had made rapid progress in language ability after being placed with his current foster parents, who were fluent in ASL, and opined he would flourish if he were placed in a permanent home where he could form long-lasting bonds with caring adults.
The social worker assessed Patrick as adoptable. She said he was increasing his language ability and was bonded to his foster parents, with whom he had lived for 10 months. They had an approved home study and wanted to adopt him. In addition, five other adoptive families were willing to adopt a child like Patrick.
Mary was appointed counsel for the section 366.26 hearing and was present at the hearing. She did not cross-examine the social worker or offer affirmative evidence. After receiving evidence and hearing argument, the court terminated parental rights and referred Patrick for adoption.
DISCUSSION
I: Reunification Services:
Mary contends she was not provided with reasonable reunification services. She argues at the time the case was transferred to San Diego County, the orders from the San Bernardino County court were for both parents to continue to participate in services. She complains she was never provided services or visits in San Diego County and the Agency made only perfunctory attempts to locate her. She asserts this court must entertain her contention she was not provided reasonable services because she was not provided with notice of her right to petition for review of the order terminating services.
A. Rule:
"A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) "[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] . . . [¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted.) Forfeiture applies to claims of statutory error and to claims of violations of fundamental constitutional rights. (In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198.)
B. Analysis:
Mary did not claim at the section 366.26 hearing that she did not receive adequate services. Although she was not provided with sufficient notice of the section 366.26 hearing because notice was sent to her former address, rather than to the detention facility where she was living, and she was not informed of her right to petition for review of the orders from the 18-month hearing, she was provided with notice of the earlier scheduled section 366.26 hearing. The Agency attempted to locate her throughout the dependency period.
The difficulty was not that the Agency ignored Mary, but that she did not keep in contact with the Agency. The case was transferred to San Diego County in May 2005, and Mary was well aware that the dependency proceedings were ongoing. She had appeared in the San Bernardino County Juvenile Court, where she was ordered to keep the social worker advised of her whereabouts. She knew the case had been transferred to San Diego County. She contacted the Agency in May 2005, but did not leave any contact information. A parent search was done at that time. After the Agency located her at a detention facility in Rancho Cucamonga in October 2005, notification was sent by certified mail of the upcoming hearing. Mary left the social worker a voice mail message again in late October, but did not provide contact information and did not appear for the October 27 hearing. She did not keep in contact with the Agency, she never asked for services and did not complain of a lack of notice or services at the section 366.26 hearing. She has forfeited her argument that the Agency did not provide reasonable services.
II. The Finding Patrick is Likely to be Adopted:
Mary asserts the finding Patrick is generally adoptable was not supported by substantial evidence. She argues because he is a deaf child with special needs and multiple behavioral problems, he is not generally adoptable.
A. Rule:
Before a court frees a child for adoption, it must determine by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd.(c)(1); In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223.) "In resolving this issue, the court focuses on the child─whether his age, physical condition and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt him." (In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378.) Whether there is a prospective adoptive family is a factor for the court to consider, but is not determinative by itself. (Ibid.)
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '. . . view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
B. Analysis:
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding Patrick was likely to be adopted. He was progressing very well with language skills. The psychologist who evaluated him stated that in less than one year, Patrick had made up a four-and-one-half-year language deficit. He had lived for 10 months with foster parents who were fluent in ASL. They had an approved adoptive home study and wanted to adopt him. The social worker had discussed the legal and financial rights and responsibilities of adoption with them. The social worker stated Patrick's foster parents love him and provide for his daily and special needs, and he has made great educational, behavioral and communicative progress while in their care. The court was entitled to rely on the social worker's opinion. (See In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1420-1421.) No evidence was presented to show the foster parents would not be able to adopt Patrick. The fact that he was in a home with foster parents who wanted to adopt him, further strengthens the finding he is generally adoptable. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.) The social worker said five other adoptive families with approved home studies would be willing to adopt a child with Patrick's qualities and characteristics. Substantial evidence supports a finding that Patrick is generally and specifically adoptable.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. AARON, J.