Opinion
2021 CA 1461
11-04-2022
In the MATTER OF the SUCCESSION OF Lucile Watts PATIN
Rita L. Patin, Lafayette, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellant/ Plaintiff—Pro Se John Wayne Jewell, New Roads, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellees/ Defendants—Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, Charleen Patin Taylor and Rebel Kelley Caplinger
Rita L. Patin, Lafayette, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellant/ Plaintiff—Pro Se
John Wayne Jewell, New Roads, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellees/ Defendants—Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, Charleen Patin Taylor and Rebel Kelley Caplinger
Before: Welch, Penzato, and Lanier, JJ.
WELCH, J.
In this succession proceeding, Rita Lucile Patin, an adult child of the decedent, Lucile Watts Patin, appeals a judgment dismissing, with prejudice, her Petition to Reduce Excessive Donation, which was based on Rita's claim that she was a forced heir and entitled to the forced portion of her mother's estate. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lucile Patin was married to Charles Milton Patin, who predeceased her, and together they had three children: Rita, Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, and Charleen Patin Taylor. Lucile died testate on March 13, 2012, and, at that time, all of her children were over the age of 23. Her last will and testament in notarial form, dated May 2, 2003 ("the will"), was admitted to probate and ordered executed on June 27, 2012. In the will, Lucile Patin bequeathed the assets of her estate, in specific portions, to Pamela, Charleen, and Rita's four children. The will provided that it was her "specific intention to not leave anything to Rita," and further, that Rita was disinherited for "reasons and just causes" specifically set forth therein, which included a physical attack, cruel treatment, and failure to communicate, without just cause, for a period in excess of two years. See La. C.C. art. 1621,
Louisiana Civil Code article 1621 provides:
A. A parent has just cause to disinherit a child if:
(1) The child has raised his hand to strike a parent, or has actually struck a parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient.
(2) The child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruel treatment, crime, or grievous injury.
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(8) The child, after attaining the age of majority and knowing how to contact the parent, has failed to communicate with the parent without just cause for a period of two years, unless the child was on active duty in any of the military forces of the United States at the time.
B. For a disinherison to be valid, the cause must have occurred prior to the execution of the instrument that disinherits the heir.
On June 16, 2017, almost five years after the will was admitted to probate and ordered executed, Rita filed a Petition to Reduce Excessive Donation. Therein, she alleged that she "suffered from a number of physical infirmities[,] which have rendered her incapable of tak[ing] care of her person or being gainfully employed for years[,]" and that these physical ailments existed prior to Lucile's death and have continued to the present. Therefore, Rita claimed that, in accordance with La. C.C. art. 1493(A), she qualified as a forced heir at the time of her mother's death and that she was entitled to her forced portion of her mother's estate. Therefore, she sought a reduction of the donations mortis causa that were set forth in the will.
In response, the independent co-executrixes of the succession filed an answer generally denying the allegations of Rita's petition and a reconventional demand, alternatively seeking confirmation from the court, that in the event Rita was determined to be a forced heir of Lucile, that Lucile disinherited Rita for the reasons expressed in the will.
After numerous status conferences and trial continuances over approximately four years, a trial on the merits of Rita's petition was scheduled for April 1, 2021. On the date of trial, Rita sought another continuance, which the trial court considered and denied in open court. Thereafter, evidence was offered, and the matter was submitted. In oral reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Rita failed to prove she was a forced heir at the time of her mother's death in 2012. A judgment denying Rita's motion to continue and dismissing her Petition to Reduce Excessive Donation, with prejudice, was signed by the trial court on April 1, 2021, and it is from this judgment that Rita appeals.
Prior to the start of trial, the trial court inquired as to whether there were any motions that needed to be heard prior to trial or taking testimony. Thereafter, Rita stated that she had sent a motion to continue to the clerk of court and to the trial court; however, that written motion is not contained in the record before us. Nevertheless, a motion to continue trial may be made orally or in writing. See La. C.C.P. arts. 961 and 1603.
On appeal, Rita essentially claims that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance and in failing to find she was a forced heir because she is incapable of taking care of herself.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Motion to Continue
The trial court may grant a continuance on peremptory or discretionary grounds. La. C.C.P. arts. 1601 and 1602. There are only two peremptory grounds: (1) the party seeking the continuance, despite due diligence, has been unable to obtain material evidence; or (2) a material witness is absent without the contrivance of the party applying for the continuance. La. C.C.P. art. 1602. Absent peremptory grounds, a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. St. Tammany Parish Hospital v. Burris, 2000-2639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 960, 963. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1601 provides for a continuance "if there is good ground therefor." The trial court must consider the particular facts of a case when deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance. St. Tammany Parish Hospital, 804 So.2d at 963. The trial court should consider the diligence and good faith of the party seeking the continuance and other reasonable grounds. Id. The trial court may also weigh the condition of the court docket, fairness to the parties and other litigants before the court, and the need for orderly and prompt administration of justice. Id. The trial court has great discretion in granting or denying a continuance under La. C.C.P. art. 1601, and its ruling should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
Although the grounds for Rita's request for a continuance are not clear, it appears from the colloquies between Rita and the trial court prior to and during trial that she was seeking a continuance in order to obtain new counsel. The record reflects that this matter was filed in June 2017 and that her first counsel of record withdrew from this case in November 2018. Rita's second counsel of record notified Rita of his intent to withdraw as her attorney of record in December 2020, and thereafter filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court served Rita with notice, via certified mail, of the trial scheduled for April 1, 2021, and her second counsel of record also mailed her notice of the trial. Rita appeared at trial pro se.
The record before us does not reveal that there were any peremptory grounds for a continuance in this case. Therefore, a continuance rested within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court, in denying Rita's request for a continuance, noted that this matter had been pending for several years and that the case had been set for status conference seven times and set for trial six times. The trial court further noted that, after Rita's second counsel of record notified her of his intent to withdraw from the matter, Rita had well over three months’ notice of the trial date. Therefore, due to the length of time the succession had been pending, the trial court denied the continuance. Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of the trial court's vast discretion.
Status as a Forced Heir
Louisiana Civil Code article 1493 provides:
A. Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent.
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E. For purposes of this Article "permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent" shall include descendants who, at the time of death of the decedent, have, according to medical documentation, an inherited, incurable disease or condition that may render them incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates in the future.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, in order for Rita to qualify as a forced heir of her mother, Rita had the burden of establishing that, at the time of Lucile's death on March 13, 2012, she (Rita) was permanently incapable of taking care of her person or administering her estate due to either mental incapacity or physical infirmity. In this regard, Rita offered her own testimony and the testimony of her friend, Jeanie Rice.
According to Ms. Rice, Rita was "bad off’ and "has not been well" since early 2000. Ms. Rice testified that in 2013, Rita "was barely able to take care of herself." Ms. Rice also testified that she has taken Rita to get groceries, and that Rita's yard was "totally unkept" and neglected. Ms. Rice admitted that Rita does not have anyone living with her to provide assistance and that Rita is able to tend to personal care, like going to the bathroom, by herself.
According to Rita, she previously had a concussion and a head injury ; however, she admitted that both of those incidents occurred after her mother's death. She testified that she should be a forced heir because she cannot care for herself and that she could not care for herself at the time her mother made the will. Rita maintained that she suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome ("PTSD") due to abuse during her childhood and later in life. For instance, she claimed that in 2013, she went to a dentist and he "drugged," "assaulted," "poisoned," and "maimed" her. She testified that two years after that incident, she went to a doctor in Alexandria and, after she "thwarted his sexual advances," he "shocked [her] on the right carotid artery," which "shut down her fight or flight system" and led her to have "a heart attack and a stroke."
After hearing all of this evidence, the trial court found that Rita failed to meet her burden of proving that she was a forced heir at the time of her mother's death in 2012. The trial court noted that all of the testimony Rita offered concerning her conditions occurred after her mother's death, and further, that Rita's evidence failed to establish the level of her disability or duration of her disability. Based on our review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's factual finding in this regard. While it is apparent from the record, that at the time of the hearing, Rita had unresolved mental health and physical problems, there was no evidence presented that, at the time of Lucile's death, Rita was permanently incapable of taking care of her person or administering her estate due to either mental incapacity or physical infirmity. As such, Rita failed to demonstrate that she was a forced heir of her mother entitled to the forced portion of her mother's estate.
Under the manifest error standard of review, a factual finding cannot be set aside unless the appellate court finds that it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. To reverse a fact finder's determination, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and further, determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong, Fabre v. Manton, 2021-1418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/28/22), 343 So.3d 821, 827.
We note that Rita improperly attached letters, which were not part of the record, to her appellate brief and that she argues in her brief that the dates provided at trial for the "dental and doctor assaults" were incorrect, as those instances occurred prior to her mother's death. However, this Court's appellate review is limited to the evidence that was in the record at the time the trial court rendered its judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 2164. An appellate court cannot review evidence that is not in the record on appeal and cannot receive new evidence. Bourque v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2016-1342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 1041, 1044.
Having found no manifest error in the trial court's determination that Rita was not a forced heir of her mother's estate, Rita was not entitled to the relief requested in her Petition to Reduce Excessive Donation. Therefore, the trial court correctly rendered judgment dismissing that petition.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the April 1, 2021 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff/appellant, Rita Lucile Patin.