In re Parker

10 Citing cases

  1. People v. Weiskopf

    60 Cal.App.2d 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)   Cited 14 times

    We held the information sufficient under the rule which governs in habeas corpus proceedings, and also expressed the opinion, which was perhaps obiter dictum there, that it would also be sufficient under the somewhat more liberal rule as to the scrutiny of defects which prevails on appeal. ( In re Parker, (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 134 P.2d 302]. The difference in name is due to the fact that defendant was first prosecuted under the name of Parker, but later stated her true name to be Weiskopf.

  2. In re McVickers

    29 Cal.2d 264 (Cal. 1946)   Cited 135 times

    Section 470 of our Penal Code, which defines forgery, lists as the subjects of forgery "almost every conceivable kind and character of writing." ( People v. Munroe (1893), 100 Cal. 664, 665 [35 P. 326, 38 Am.St.Rep. 323, 24 L.R.A. 33]; see, also, People v. Turner (1896), 113 Cal. 278, 280 [45 P. 331]; People v. McKenna (1938), 11 Cal.2d 327, 332-333 [ 79 P.2d 1065]; People v. Di Ryana (1908), 8 Cal.App. 333, 336 [ 96 P. 919]; In re Parker (1943), 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [ 134 P.2d 302].) In addition to more particularly designated instruments the section lists such general descriptions as "any transfer or assurance of money, . . . power to receive money, . . . writing obligatory, . . . or other contract for money. . . ."

  3. People v. Gaul-Alexander

    32 Cal.App.4th 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 42 times
    Recognizing that intent was an element even where the statute did not refer to intent in the definition

    However, a writing not within those listed may fall under the part of section 470 covering a person who "counterfeits or forges the . . . handwriting of another" if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud anyone. ( People v. Vincent (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 696, 700 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 714] [forged bank signature card]; People v. Russel (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 445, 452 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 562] [forged request for college transcripts]; In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391 [ 134 P.2d 302] [forged certificate of birth]; People v. Turner (1896) 113 Cal. 278, 281 [45 P. 331] [forged certificate of recordation on back of deed]; Ex Parte Finley (1884) 66 Cal. 262 [5 P. 222] [forged divorce decree]; and see Witkin Epstein, op. cit. supra, § 704, p. 799.) The false writing must be something which will have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.

  4. Lewis v. Superior Court

    217 Cal.App.3d 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 37 times
    Discussing common law background and history of forgery statute

    The argument rests ultimately on the misconception that Wong Sam is an anomaly, and not part of a consistent and well-founded view, derived from the common law. In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 815] was a habeas corpus action in which the defendant collaterally attacked a conviction for forgery. The defendant was charged with forging affidavits of birth with the intent to "cheat and defraud" a corporation and an individual.

  5. People v. Russel

    214 Cal.App.2d 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 10 times
    In People v. Russel (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 445, the defendant forged another person's signature to obtain college transcripts.

    It is not difficult to speculate on its possible wrongful use. In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 134 P.2d 302], mentions the securing of employment under false pretenses as an example. [5] It is also urged that section 470 of the Penal Code does not specify the request or receipt herein as being the kind of writing necessary to constitute a crime of forgery.

  6. People v. Brown

    101 Cal.App.2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Brown, 101 Cal.App.2d 740, 226 P.2d 647 (1959), it was said that it is sufficient that the instrument may possibly deceive another and that it was prepared With intent to deceive and defraud another. It is now uniformly recognized in that state that the mere fact that an instrument is legally unenforceable is not a defense so long as upon its face it may have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.

    [3] Where the writing alleged to have been forged shows on its face that it might be the means of fraud, no averments of extrinsic facts to show how this could be are necessary. ( In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391-392 [ 134 P.2d 302].) As was said in People v. McKenna, 11 Cal.2d 327, 332 [ 79 P.2d 1065]:

  7. People v. Mason

    72 Cal.App.2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)   Cited 16 times

    It is also common knowledge that hundreds of thousands of men and women were there engaged in such work. In the case of In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [ 134 P.2d 302], Division Three of this court said: ". . . We also take judicial notice of the facts that at these times there were in Los Angeles County . . . a large number of factories engaged in making for the United States and other governments a variety of articles used or useful for war and defense purposes, that these factories employed many thousands of men in their work and were rapidly increasing the number of their employees, that they demanded of all applicants for employment proof of United States citizenship. . . .

  8. Mayes v. State

    571 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1978)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that possession of a forged instrument by one who offers or seeks to utter it without any reasonable explanation of the manner in which he acquired it warrants an inference that the possessor committed the forgery or was a guilty accessory to its commission

    That there are writings which could not possibly operate to defraud anyone and thus do not come within the purview of forgery statutes is recognized in California and the appropriate distinction is made. In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 134 P.2d 302 (1943) involved an attack on a forgery conviction on habeas corpus. In treating this matter, the court said:

  9. People v. Green

    No. B178945 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2007)

    It need not create a valid, legally enforceable obligation. (In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391.) However, “[u]nless the consequential harm of the fabrication is a loss, damage, or prejudice of a legal right, generally a pecuniary or property right, there is no harm of the kind to which the statute is directed and hence no forgery.”

  10. Muhammad v. Commonwealth

    13 Va. App. 194 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the “bare possibility” of prejudice is sufficient under Code § 18.2–172

    Consistent with Gordon, the Arkansas Court held that it is not necessary that the forged writing "create a valid and legally enforceable obligation in order to constitute the making of it a forgery. . . . It is sufficient that it might possibly deceive another and was prepared with intent to deceive and defraud another." Id. at 295, 571 S.W.2d at 427 (quoting In Re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 134 P.2d 302 (1943) (emphasis added). In State v. Morse, 38 Wn.2d 927, 234 P.2d 478 (1951), the defendant alleged that he could not be convicted of forgery because the instrument he presented for payment lacked "the personal signature of any drawer.