We held the information sufficient under the rule which governs in habeas corpus proceedings, and also expressed the opinion, which was perhaps obiter dictum there, that it would also be sufficient under the somewhat more liberal rule as to the scrutiny of defects which prevails on appeal. ( In re Parker, (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 134 P.2d 302]. The difference in name is due to the fact that defendant was first prosecuted under the name of Parker, but later stated her true name to be Weiskopf.
Section 470 of our Penal Code, which defines forgery, lists as the subjects of forgery "almost every conceivable kind and character of writing." ( People v. Munroe (1893), 100 Cal. 664, 665 [35 P. 326, 38 Am.St.Rep. 323, 24 L.R.A. 33]; see, also, People v. Turner (1896), 113 Cal. 278, 280 [45 P. 331]; People v. McKenna (1938), 11 Cal.2d 327, 332-333 [ 79 P.2d 1065]; People v. Di Ryana (1908), 8 Cal.App. 333, 336 [ 96 P. 919]; In re Parker (1943), 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [ 134 P.2d 302].) In addition to more particularly designated instruments the section lists such general descriptions as "any transfer or assurance of money, . . . power to receive money, . . . writing obligatory, . . . or other contract for money. . . ."
However, a writing not within those listed may fall under the part of section 470 covering a person who "counterfeits or forges the . . . handwriting of another" if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud anyone. ( People v. Vincent (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 696, 700 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 714] [forged bank signature card]; People v. Russel (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 445, 452 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 562] [forged request for college transcripts]; In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391 [ 134 P.2d 302] [forged certificate of birth]; People v. Turner (1896) 113 Cal. 278, 281 [45 P. 331] [forged certificate of recordation on back of deed]; Ex Parte Finley (1884) 66 Cal. 262 [5 P. 222] [forged divorce decree]; and see Witkin Epstein, op. cit. supra, § 704, p. 799.) The false writing must be something which will have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.
The argument rests ultimately on the misconception that Wong Sam is an anomaly, and not part of a consistent and well-founded view, derived from the common law. In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 815] was a habeas corpus action in which the defendant collaterally attacked a conviction for forgery. The defendant was charged with forging affidavits of birth with the intent to "cheat and defraud" a corporation and an individual.
It is not difficult to speculate on its possible wrongful use. In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 134 P.2d 302], mentions the securing of employment under false pretenses as an example. [5] It is also urged that section 470 of the Penal Code does not specify the request or receipt herein as being the kind of writing necessary to constitute a crime of forgery.
[3] Where the writing alleged to have been forged shows on its face that it might be the means of fraud, no averments of extrinsic facts to show how this could be are necessary. ( In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391-392 [ 134 P.2d 302].) As was said in People v. McKenna, 11 Cal.2d 327, 332 [ 79 P.2d 1065]:
It is also common knowledge that hundreds of thousands of men and women were there engaged in such work. In the case of In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [ 134 P.2d 302], Division Three of this court said: ". . . We also take judicial notice of the facts that at these times there were in Los Angeles County . . . a large number of factories engaged in making for the United States and other governments a variety of articles used or useful for war and defense purposes, that these factories employed many thousands of men in their work and were rapidly increasing the number of their employees, that they demanded of all applicants for employment proof of United States citizenship. . . .
That there are writings which could not possibly operate to defraud anyone and thus do not come within the purview of forgery statutes is recognized in California and the appropriate distinction is made. In re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 134 P.2d 302 (1943) involved an attack on a forgery conviction on habeas corpus. In treating this matter, the court said:
It need not create a valid, legally enforceable obligation. (In re Parker (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 391.) However, “[u]nless the consequential harm of the fabrication is a loss, damage, or prejudice of a legal right, generally a pecuniary or property right, there is no harm of the kind to which the statute is directed and hence no forgery.”
Consistent with Gordon, the Arkansas Court held that it is not necessary that the forged writing "create a valid and legally enforceable obligation in order to constitute the making of it a forgery. . . . It is sufficient that it might possibly deceive another and was prepared with intent to deceive and defraud another." Id. at 295, 571 S.W.2d at 427 (quoting In Re Parker, 57 Cal.App.2d 388, 134 P.2d 302 (1943) (emphasis added). In State v. Morse, 38 Wn.2d 927, 234 P.2d 478 (1951), the defendant alleged that he could not be convicted of forgery because the instrument he presented for payment lacked "the personal signature of any drawer.