[Id. (emphasis added).] See also In re Slum Clearance, 332 Mich 485, 497; 52 NW2d 195 (1952) quoting In re Park Site on Private Claim 16, Detroit, 247 Mich 1, 3; 225 NW 498 (1929) (stating that "the owner of property taken may recover for interruption of business"); Moesta, 91 Mich at 154 (stating that in condemnation cases the remedy afforded is similar to an action in tort "in which property rights have been interfered with without the owner's assent" and that "[i]n such cases damages for the interruption of the owner's business are allowed"). The Court then reversed the jury's verdict because it failed to adequately compensate for business damages; addressing the claims of one of the appellants, the Court stated
We note, however, that where a business is transferable, the business owner may recover for certain business interruption expenses. See In re Park Site on Private Claim 16, 247 Mich. 1; 225 N.W. 498 (1929). It should be clear that recovery for business interruption damages and recovery for going concern value are mutually exclusive since one assumes the continuation of the business and the other assumes its loss.
See Meck Masten, Railroad Leases and Reorganization, 49 Yale Law Journal 626.Tax Cases: In many tax cases long-term leases have been valued, though frequently without any statement of the evidence or method used. Northern Hotel Co., 3 B.T.A. 1099, 1102; Newman Theatre Co., 4 B.T.A. 390; L.S. Donaldson Co., 12 B.T.A. 271; A.H. Woods Theatre Co., 12 B.T.A. 827; Consolidated Investment Co., 13 B.T.A. 1252; Hotel Wisconsin Realty Co., 16 B.T.A. 334; James Bldg. Co., 22 B.T.A. 658; Martha Realty Co., 22 B.T.A. 342, 344; New York ex rel. Delaware Hudson Canal Co. v. Feitner, 61 A.D. 129; 70 N.Y.S. 500; Appeal Tax Court v. Western Maryland R. Co., 50 Md. 274, 298; Philadelphia, W. B.R. Co. v. Appeal Tax Court, 50 Md. 397; New York ex rel. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 197 A.D. 852; 189 N.Y.S. 241. Eminent Domain Cases: Matter of the City of New York: Beers v. Schlessinger, 120 A.D. 700; 105 N.Y.S. 779; In re Park Site, 247 Mich. 1; 225 N.W. 498. Contract Cases: Bondy v. Harvey, 218 A.D. 126; 217 N.Y.S. 877; Williams v. Burrell, 1 C.B. 402.E.g. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad Company Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 337, 351, 386, 387, 389, 453; In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul Pacific R. Co., 36 F. Supp. 193, 205 et seq.; same, 239 I.C.C. 485, 537, 553; Erie Railroad Company Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 653, 685, 689.
All of these matters go to enhance the value of the lease." Id. (citing In re Park Site on Private Claim 16, City of Detroit, 247 Mich 1, 4; 225 NW 498 (1929)). Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to determine its damages within a reasonable degree of certainty.
They are not substantive damages in condemnation proceedings." In re Park Site on Private Claim 16, City of Detroit, 247 Mich. 1, 4; 225 N.W. 498 (1929). "Damages will not be allowed in condemnation cases unless they can be proven with reasonable certainty."
"We note, however, that where a business is transferable, the business owner may recover for certain business interruption expenses. See In re Park Site onPrivate Claim 16, 247 Mich. 1; 225 N.W. 498 (1929). It should be clear that recovery for business interruption damages and recovery for going concern value are mutually exclusive since one assumes the continuation of the business and the other assumes its loss.
It has long been held that damages resulting from business interruption are compensable in condemnation cases provided the damages can be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. Grand Rapids I R Co v. Weiden, 70 Mich. 390, 395; 38 N.W. 294 (1888); In re Park Site, 247 Mich. 1, 3; 225 N.W. 498 (1929); In re Grand Haven Highway, supra. We disagree with plaintiff's contention that the proofs introduced to support defendant's claim for business interruption damages were too speculative and conjectural.
Further, loss of future profits has been held not to be a separately compensable item of damages. In re Park Site on Private Claim 16, Detroit, 247 Mich. 1, 4; 225 N.W. 498 (1929). This case is remanded for recomputation of interest consistent with the dictates of this opinion.
Appellant contends that: "In the fairly recent cases of In re Park Site, City of Detroit, 247 Mich. 1, 3, 4; In re Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638; In re Slum Clearance. 332 Mich. 485, 496: and In re Condemnation for Battle Creek Park, 341 Mich. 412, 422, the Supreme Court repudiated the tort theory set forth in the Weiden Case and in the Moesta Case, and denied recovery of losses due to interruption of business." An examination of the 4 above cases cited by appellant discloses that this Court held that the property owner could not recover loss of profits because of damages caused by business interruption, but did not repudiate Moesta or Weiden in regards to expenses incurred by business interruption.
plaintiff, it being clear from the evidence and from the admission of the defendant, City of Meridian, that Hamilton Road between Twenty-second Avenue and Tom Bailey Drive, including where it touched the property of plaintiff could not be reached and was not accessible from any street or avenue in the city of Meridian." XVI. The right of the owner abutting the street or road to have direct access to that street or road and this Court has repeatedly held that such right shall not be destroyed or impaired by public authorities without the payment of due compensation to the abutting owner of the property right. Carney v. Miss. State Highway Comm., supra; B. M. RR. Co. v. Reinackle, 15 Neb. 279; City of Laurel v. Rowell, supra; Crawford v. The Village of Deleware, 7 Ohio St., 460; Curry v. Railroad Co., 87 W. Va. 548, 105 S.E. 780, 22 A.L.R. 138; Collins v. Miss. State Highway Comm., 232 Miss. 474, 102 So.2d 678; Hamilton v. Miss. State Highway Comm., supra; Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; In re Park Site, 247 Mich. 1, 225 N.W. 498; Joe Duck Kwong v. Miss. Levee Comrs., 164 Miss. 250, 144 So. 693; Lahr v. Va. Met. RR. Co., 104 N.Y. 268; Minsk v. Fulton County, 83 Ga. App. 520, 64 S.E. 336; Miss. State Highway Comm. v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565; Miss. State Highway Comm. v. Spencer, 232 Miss. 155, 101 So.2d 449; Miss. State Highway Comm. v. Williamson, 181 Miss. 399, 179 So. 736; Morris v. Covington County, 118 Miss. 875, 80 So. 337; Parker v. Miss. State Highway Comm., 173 Miss. 213, 162 So. 162; Pause v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 105, 26 S.E. 489; Smith v. Miss. State Highway Comm., 183 Miss. 741,184 So. 814; State Highway Comm. v. Corley, 186 Miss. 437, 191 So. 119; Theobold v. Louisville, N.O. T. RR. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 6 So. 230; Town of Clinton v. Turner, supra; Sec. 3374-126, Code 1942. Ethridge, Minniece Bourdeaux, Meridian, for appellee.