Opinion
2 CA-JV 2024-0005
05-24-2024
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to L.S.-M., N.S.-M., and A.M.,
Carmen S., Tucson In Propria Persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By Jordan Paul Counsel for Minor
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20210138 The Honorable Cathleen Linn, Judge Pro Tempore
Carmen S., Tucson In Propria Persona
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By Jordan Paul Counsel for Minor
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Brearcliffe and Judge Kelly concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶ 1 Carmen S. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her sons L.S.-M., born August 2018, and N.S.-M., born January 2020, and daughter A.M., born May 2022. As grounds for that order, the court determined that Carmen had neglected the children and that, as a result, they had been residing in court-ordered, out-of-home placement for fifteen months or more. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (8)(c). We affirm.
¶ 2 Before it may terminate a parent's rights, a juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground for severance exists and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005). We will affirm an order terminating parental rights unless no reasonable person could find those essential elements proven by the applicable evidentiary standard. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10 (App. 2009).
¶ 3 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007). In March 2021, L.S.-M. and N.S.-M. were removed from Carmen's care after the children had witnessed their father assault Carmen's boyfriend. The children were "filthy" and had visible injuries and "extremely full diapers." Although Carmen tested negative for any substances, the children's hair tested positive for methamphetamine. The children were adjudicated dependent as to Carmen in June 2021. The children were returned to Carmen's care in October 2021, but were removed the next month after Carmen tested positive for methamphetamine and the home was found to be "in disarray" during an unannounced home visit.
¶ 4 In June 2022, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed a dependency petition as to A.M., who had been born the previous month and taken into custody based on an allegation of neglect due to domestic violence and substance abuse. She was adjudicated dependent as to Carmen in September 2022. In November, Carmen's referral to the Nurturing Parenting Program was closed due to lack of engagement, but Carmen continued to engage in supervised visitation. The case plan changed from family reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and severance and adoption in April 2023. That same month, DCS commended Carmen "for maintaining a level of partial engagement over the past two years" but was concerned that she had not received "more than minimal benefit from her services."
¶ 5 In July 2023, DCS moved to terminate Carmen's parental rights as to the three children based on neglect and length of time in care. Following a three-part contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated Carmen's parental rights, finding DCS had proven both statutory grounds. Specifically, the court found that L.S.-M. and N.S.-M. had been in out-of-home care for approximately thirty months and A.M. had been in out-of-home care for over sixteen months. The court further noted that despite Carmen's participation "in a great many services," her behavior remained a barrier to her ability to benefit from those services. This appeal followed.
L.S.-M. and N.S.-M.'s father's parental rights were also terminated. A.M.'s father was unknown. In any event, the children's fathers are not parties to this appeal.
¶ 6 In a pro se brief filed pursuant to Rule 607(e)(1)(B), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., Carmen generally asserts there was insufficient evidence to warrant termination of her parental rights. However, Carmen has failed to provide citations to the record or to legal authorities to support her argument. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b). We must hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys, see Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017), and we can summarily reject an appellant's claims based on "lack of proper and meaningful argument alone," Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). We do so here. See Melissa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (arguments waived for failing to support them "with citation to relevant authority"); Crystal E. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).
Carmen attached to her opening brief a "character letter" from her recovery coach dated February 7, 2024. It is not part of the record on appeal, see Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 604(a), and we therefore disregard it.
¶ 7 Even assuming Carmen's arguments were not waived, however, she has provided no basis to disturb the juvenile court's ruling. Carmen contends that she has benefitted from the classes she has taken but asserts she was never given an opportunity to demonstrate how she had changed. And she maintains she "was never given an opportunity to bring [her] children home." Those arguments are belied by the record. As the juvenile court noted, Carmen had more than two years to engage in the plethora of services offered to her and demonstrate that she had benefitted from them, but she failed to consistently do so. Moreover, L.S.-M. and N.S.-M. were returned to her care early in the dependency in 2021 but had to be removed again a month later.
¶ 8 To the extent Carmen's testimony regarding her benefit from services conflicts with that of other witnesses-who testified that services had been closed due to Carmen's lack of engagement and that Carmen had been "unable to benefit from services she has engaged in"-resolution of such conflicting evidence is "uniquely the province of the juvenile court." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer to the juvenile court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). The record before us supports the juvenile court's findings that: (1) Carmen had been unable to remedy the circumstances leading the children to have been in out-of-home care for more than fifteen months, (2) there was a substantial likelihood that Carmen would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future, and (3) severance was in the children's best interests. See § 8-533(B)(8)(c).
Because sufficient evidence supports the length of time-in-care ground for termination, we need not address the neglect ground. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 3.
¶ 9 Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Carmen's parental rights to L.S.-M., N.S.-M., and A.M.