Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0035
07-14-2023
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to K.S.,
Nacomi R., Tucson In propria persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety Pima County Office of Children's Counsel By David Miller, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 602(i)(17).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20210092 The Honorable Peter W. Hochuli, Judge.
COUNSEL
Nacomi R., Tucson In propria persona
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Pima County Office of Children's Counsel By David Miller, Tucson Counsel for Minor
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, Judge:
¶1 Nacomi R. appeals the juvenile court's February 2023 ruling, in which it terminated her parental rights to her daughter, K.S., born in October 2020, based on length of time in court-ordered care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the juvenile court's ruling. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, ¶ 13 (App. 2011). During a pediatric well check in February 2021, K.S. had bruises on her face and abdomen. Her father, Shaden S., admitted that he had "squeezed" her torso "to get her to stop crying" and later "slapped her because he wanted her to be quiet." During the investigation that followed, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) also became concerned about Nacomi's ability to parent based on her cognitive delays and mental health issues, her failure to protect K.S. from Shaden, and the condition of the family home. DCS removed K.S. and placed her with family friends, who are also the adoptive parents of Nacomi's oldest son.
The juvenile court also terminated Shaden's parental rights. He is not a party to this appeal.
Nacomi reportedly asked the family friends to adopt her oldest son. The adoption occurred in Idaho before K.S. was born. The son is not a party to this appeal.
¶3 The following month, Nacomi pled no contest, and the juvenile court adjudicated K.S. dependent as to her. The court set a case plan goal of family reunification and ordered DCS to make reasonable efforts to provide services to accomplish that goal. In the months that followed, DCS offered-and Nacomi participated in-supervised visitation, neuropsychological evaluation, parenting classes, parent aide services, individual therapy, healthy relationships classes, parent-child relationship assessment, and drug testing.
¶4 In January 2022, Nacomi stopped participating in therapy. She also started a relationship with Frederick L., a registered sex offender who, per the terms of his probation, could not have contact with children. In February 2022, Nacomi was transported to a crisis center due to self-harm. She reported that she was upset because she had been asked by DCS and family members to end her relationship with Frederick. A few months later, Nacomi informed DCS that she was pregnant and was not taking her antidepressant medication. She later admitted to smoking marijuana.
¶5 In June 2022, the juvenile court found Nacomi to be in partial compliance with the case plan and questioned whether the services were benefitting her. At that time, it changed the case plan goal to a concurrent plan of family reunification and severance and adoption. Throughout that summer, DCS caseworkers visited the family home on multiple occasions and repeatedly found it hazardous to K.S. Among other things, they found trash, dirty clothes, cat food, an open inhaler, and clutter scattered on the floor, marijuana on the dining room table, and a box of sparklers with K.S.'s toys.
¶6 In October 2022, Nacomi gave birth to a son, B.R., who was born substance exposed to methamphetamine and who was later determined to be Frederick's child. DCS removed B.R. from their care, and he was placed with the same family friends as K.S.
There was a separate dependency proceeding concerning B.R. He is not a party to this appeal.
¶7 In September 2022, DCS filed a motion for termination of the parent-child relationship between Nacomi and K.S., alleging neglect and length of time in court-ordered care as the grounds. See § 8-533(B)(2), (8)(c). The juvenile court held a six-part severance hearing from November 2022 through January 2023. At the hearing, Nacomi testified that she was then living with Shaden and admitted that they were arguing about "twice a week." Shaden testified that, when they fought, Nacomi was "not interested in deescalating," that on occasion the fights became physical, and that, during a recent incident, he had pushed Nacomi to the ground. Nacomi recognized that she was not yet ready for K.S. to return to her care and testified that she needed to "get . . . more involved with [her] therapy" to be "in a better place with [her]self."
¶8 In February 2023, the juvenile court issued its under-advisement ruling, granting the motion for termination based on § 8-533(B)(8)(c). It found that K.S. had been in an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months, that DCS had made "more than diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services," that Nacomi had failed to make progress in remedying the circumstances that led to K.S.'s removal, and that Nacomi would "not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future." The court also determined that termination was in K.S.'s best interests based, in part, on Nacomi's failure to fully acknowledge her "problematic behaviors and the impact they have on [K.S.]"; "ongoing domestic violence in the home," which Nacomi struggled to keep sanitary and safe; and the "nurturing, safe, stable, and appropriate home environment" provided by K.S.'s placement family, which was fostering "a sibling bond" and was willing to adopt K.S. This appeal followed.
Having found a sufficient basis to terminate Nacomi's parental rights based on § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the juvenile court declined to address neglect under § 8-533(B)(2).
DISCUSSION
¶9 In a pro se brief, filed pursuant to Rule 607(e)(1)(B), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., Nacomi asserts that she is a "good mother," that she is "trying constantly to be better," and that all the "bad influences in [her] life are gone." She asks this court "for a chance to keep fighting" for K.S.
¶10 The juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); see also Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, ¶ 12 (2020). We defer to the juvenile court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will affirm a severance order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings upon which the order is based and it is not clearly erroneous. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).
¶11 Nacomi's brief fails to comply in any meaningful way with the applicable rules. An opening brief must contain a statement of the issues and an argument that includes citations to legal authorities and appropriate references to the record. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a); see also Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from juvenile court). Nacomi has not cited any relevant legal authority or the record, nor has she explained how the juvenile court erred in severing her parental rights. As DCS correctly asserts, unrepresented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. See Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017). By failing to comply with Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., a party may be deemed to have waived his or her arguments on appeal. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). We can summarily reject an appellant's claims based on "lack of proper and meaningful argument alone," see Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and we do so here.
¶12 Even assuming Nacomi's arguments were not waived, however, we have no basis to disturb the juvenile court's ruling. Nacomi asserts she has made progress and has remedied several of the circumstances that were at issue throughout this case, including that Shaden has now moved out of the family home. But we are generally concerned with the "circumstances existing at the time of the severance." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, n.14 (App. 2009). In addition, Nacomi ignores contrary evidence cited by the court in its ruling, including her own testimony that she was not yet ready to parent K.S. Nacomi appears to be asking us to reweigh the evidence. This we will not do. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12. Instead, because the court's ruling is supported by reasonable evidence, we must affirm. See id. ¶ 4.
DISPOSITION
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's ruling terminating Nacomi's parental rights to K.S.