Opinion
DRB 21-259
06-03-2022
In the Matter of George N. Pappas An Attorney at Law
Hillary K. Horton appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Respondent appeared pro se.
Argued: February 17, 2022
District Docket No. XIV-2017-0554E
Hillary K. Horton appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.
Respondent appeared pro se.
DECISION
Hon. Maurice J. Gallipoli, A.J.S.C. (Ret.), Chair.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
This matter was before us on a recommendation for a reprimand filed by the District VI Ethics Committee (the DEC). The formal ethics complaint charged respondent with having violated RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities).
For the reasons set forth below, we determine to impose a reprimand, with conditions.
Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1967 and has no prior discipline. Until September 30, 2017, he maintained a practice of law in Hoboken, New Jersey. Thereafter, he continued his practice of law from his home address.
Effective February 20, 2018, the Court temporarily suspended respondent for his failure to comply with a District VI Fee Arbitration Committee (the FAC) determination, which, as detailed below, ordered him to refund $3,000 in fees for services rendered in connection with his alleged unauthorized practice of law, in Nassau County, New York. In re Pappas, 231 N.J. 470 (2018). He remains temporarily suspended.
The facts of this matter are largely undisputed, although respondent denied having violated RPC 8.1(b).
On June 17, 2014, Chrysostomos Arachovitis retained respondent in connection with his desire to lease a gas station in Irvington, New Jersey. In April 2015, however, Arachovitis decided not to lease the gas station and, instead, requested respondent's assistance to lease a different gas station, in Nassau County, New York. Although respondent was not admitted to the New York bar, he agreed to represent Arachovitis in connection with the transaction.
On April 30, 2015, respondent deposited in his attorney trust account (ATA) $11,000 he received from Arachovitis, which amount represented Arachovitis's first month's rent and required security and equipment deposits. That same day, Arachovitis and the gas station landlord executed a two-year lease agreement, which required respondent to "immediately pay" to the landlord $5,500 of Arachovitis's $11,000 deposit "[t]o facilitate an immediate closing" of the agreement. Following the execution of the agreement, respondent issued a $5,500 check from his ATA to the landlord.
On May 5, 2015, however, Arachovitis decided to cancel the lease because of undisclosed title issues, which prompted respondent to immediately return to Arachovitis the $5,500 portion of the deposit remaining in his ATA. On May 11, 2015, the gas station landlord agreed to cancel the lease and notified respondent, via e-mail, that he would refund Arachovitis's $5,500 deposit. However, despite respondent's multiple attempts to compel the landlord to return Arachovitis's $5,500 deposit, the landlord failed to do so. Consequently, Arachovitis urged respondent to file a small claims action, in Nassau County, New York, to recover his $5,500 deposit from the landlord. However, because respondent was not admitted to the New York bar, he advised Arachovitis that he could only appear in court, on his behalf, as a witness, rather than as his attorney.
On October 17, 2015, Arachovitis filed a pro se lawsuit against the landlord, for $5,000, in the Nassau County Small Claims Court. Thereafter, on December 15, 2015, respondent and Arachovitis appeared in small claims court, where respondent allegedly advised the court that he was there only as a witness and that he was not admitted to the New York bar. Because of Arachovitis's limitations with the English language, the court questioned respondent regarding the circumstances of the failed lease. Following the landlord's failure to appear, the court issued a $5,000 judgment in favor of Arachovitis, plus court fees and costs. In February 2016, respondent forwarded the judgment to the landlord, but the landlord failed to satisfy the judgment.
In New York, the jurisdictional limit in a small claims action is $5,000. N.Y. C.L.S. U.D.C.A. § 1801.
Thereafter, Arachovitis sought respondent's assistance regarding the purchase of a third gas station, in South River, New Jersey. Nevertheless, Arachovitis, again, decided to cancel the contract, at closing, because he no longer believed it to be a profitable venture.
Sometime in 2017, Arachovitis questioned respondent's legal fee in connection with the failed gas station transactions and filed for fee arbitration. On June 20, 2017, following respondent's failure to appear at the fee arbitration hearing, the FAC determined that respondent owed $3,000 to Arachovitis, which sum represented respondent's entire legal fee arising out of the failed New York gas station lease. In its decision, the FAC explained that, because respondent was not authorized to practice law in New York, he should not have charged legal fees in connection with that failed transaction. In that vein, the FAC referred respondent to the Office of Attorney Ethics (the OAE) for an investigation into his potential misconduct. Respondent did not appeal the FAC's determination.
Although the FAC provided respondent adequate notice of the hearing, respondent admitted that he failed to properly calendar the hearing date.
On October 6, 2017, the OAE sent respondent a letter, enclosing the FAC's determination and requiring that he reply, in writing, by October 20, 2017, to the FAC's allegations that he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in New York. On October 24, 2017, following respondent's failure to reply, the OAE sent respondent a second letter, reminding him of his obligation to cooperate and requiring that he reply, in writing, to the FAC's allegations by November 3, 2017.
In an October 25, 2017 letter to the OAE, respondent explained the scope of his representation in Arachovitis's failed New York gas station lease; stressed that he only appeared as a witness in Arachovitis's Nassau County small claims court action; and, purportedly relying on RPC 5.5(b)(3)(v), alleged that his conduct did not violate RPC 5.5(a)(1) (unauthorized practice of law) because his limited representation in New York arose out of his existing New Jersey attorney-client relationship with Arachovitis, who would have faced substantial inconvenience had respondent disengaged from the representation.
RPC 5.5(b)(3)(v) permits an out-of-state lawyer to practice law in New Jersey when "the practice activity arises directly out of the lawyer's representation [. . .] of an existing client in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice, provided that such practice in [New Jersey] is occasional and is undertaken only when the lawyer's disengagement would result in substantial inefficiency, impracticality[,] or detriment to the client." RPC 5.5(b)(3)(v) does not, however, apply to legal services that occur outside of New Jersey. Nevertheless, 22 NYCRR § 523.2(a)(3)(iv) permits an out-of-state lawyer to temporarily practice law in New York if such temporary legal services "arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted or authorized to practice."
On January 9, 2018, following its review of respondent's October 2017 correspondence, the OAE notified respondent, via letter, of his obligation to appear for a demand interview at the OAE.
On January 30, 2018, respondent appeared for the demand interview, provided the OAE with Arachovitis's original file regarding the New York gas station lease, and discussed his involvement in that transaction. Additionally, the OAE queried respondent, via a disciplinary audit questionnaire, regarding his general legal practice from June 2014 through January 2018. Although respondent cooperated with the OAE and answered many of its questions, respondent failed to provide the OAE with his ATA or attorney business account (ABA) numbers; could not recall whether he was an authorized signatory of any estate accounts; and was unaware of whether he had power of attorney for anyone, including non-clients. Further, although respondent noted that he had served as trustee of a trust for two children, he failed to provide the OAE any information regarding that trust. Moreover, respondent described approximately $1,200 in unclaimed trust funds, which he had received in connection with his representation of an attorney's estate, and which funds had languished in his ATA for "years" because he could not identify the beneficiary. Finally, respondent noted that he maintained "un-appraised" "costume jewelry" in a safe deposit box as "part of the dissolution of an estate."
At oral argument before us, respondent claimed that he "never had access to" the safe deposit box.
On March 6, 2018, following the demand interview, the OAE sent respondent a letter, requesting his ATA and ABA account numbers; that he describe any instance where he served as an authorized signatory of an estate account, or held power of attorney, between 2014 and March 2018; and that he provide documentation regarding not only his involvement as trustee of the trust for two children, but also any unclaimed trust account funds and the jewelry that he maintained in his safe deposit box. The OAE required respondent to provide this information by March 23, 2018.
On March 25, 2018, respondent replied to the OAE, via letter, in which he provided his ATA and ABA account numbers, noted that he served as trustee of the trust for two children for "many years" and that documentation regarding the trust was "voluminous[,]" and claimed that exactly $1,345.11 in trust account funds remained, unclaimed, in his ATA since 2000, which funds he had received in connection with his representation of an attorney's estate. Respondent, however, alleged that he could not disburse the unclaimed trust account funds because he could not identify the beneficiary, despite contacting the attorney's widow and son for information. Respondent, moreover, failed to provide any documentation in his letter to the OAE, to explain whether he held power of attorney or was an authorized signatory of any estate accounts, or to offer any information regarding the jewelry that he maintained in his safe deposit box. Additionally, because respondent had closed his Hoboken law office and recently moved his legal files to his personal residence, he requested a seven-day extension to fully reply to the OAE's March 6 correspondence. Finally, respondent requested that the OAE provide an update regarding its investigation of his alleged unauthorized practice of law in New York.
In a conflicting statement at oral argument before us, respondent claimed that "about 3,000 and some dollars has remained[,]" unclaimed, in his ATA "for the last almost [sic] five years." Respondent failed to provide an explanation for the conflicting amounts and timeframes.
Three days later, on March 28, 2018, the OAE sent respondent a letter granting his seven-day extension request and requiring him to produce the requested documents by April 4, 2018. Additionally, the OAE emphasized respondent's duty to cooperate and reiterated that its investigation remained ongoing.
On April 18, 2018, following respondent's failure to reply to the OAE's March 28 correspondence, the OAE sent respondent another letter, informing him that unless he provided the requested documents by May 1, 2018, the OAE would file an ethics complaint for his failure to cooperate, in violation of RPC 8.1(b). Respondent again failed to reply. Consequently, the OAE could not complete its investigation of (1) respondent's unclaimed trust account funds; (2) the jewelry he maintained in his safe deposit box; (3) his estate accounts; (4) his powers of attorney; and (5) his involvement in the trust for two children.
In his answer to the formal ethics complaint, respondent admitted the facts underlying his failure to cooperate, however, he denied that his conduct violated RPC 8.1(b). Nevertheless, rather than attempt to assert a meritorious defense to his misconduct, respondent attacked the FAC's determination that he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; alleged that the formal ethics complaint did not support the theory that he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, despite the complaint's sole RPC 8.1(b) charge for unrelated misconduct; criticized the OAE's procedures for seeking his temporary suspension; complained that the OAE did not provide him with formal updates regarding its investigation, which was not completed within the aspirational time goals prescribed by R. 1:20-8(a); and rationalized that his "delay" in replying to the OAE's document requests "was justified" because the OAE sought privileged information.
R. 1:20-8 provides that the "disciplinary system shall endeavor to complete all investigations [. . .] of complex matters within nine months" of the docketing of the ethics grievance.
Although respondent characterized his failure to cooperate as a "delay[,]" the record is clear that respondent altogether failed to provide the OAE any documents following the demand interview.
Contrary to respondent's argument, "confidentiality or privilege may not be asserted in [attorney disciplinary] matters." In re Vincenti, 152 N.J. 253, 276 (1998) (citing comment to R. 1:20-3(g)(3)).
Significantly, because of his disagreement with the FAC's unrelated determination regarding his involvement in Arachovitis's failed New York gas station lease, respondent admitted, in his testimony at the ethics hearing, that he intentionally ignored the OAE's document requests regarding his recordkeeping and trust account issues "to force the [OAE]" to provide him written notice that he did not "engage in the unauthorized practice of law." Specifically, respondent expressed his belief that his willful failure to cooperate was "the only leverage [that he] had" to force the OAE to end its unrelated investigation and that, if the OAE had provided him written notice that he did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, he would have complied with their document requests.
In its summation brief to the DEC and at oral argument before us, the OAE urged the imposition of a reprimand and asserted, as aggravation, respondent's persistent failure to remediate his non-cooperation; his disrespect towards the disciplinary process; his improper attempt to leverage his non-cooperation to force the OAE to resolve the unrelated investigation to his satisfaction; and the unclaimed estate funds and jewelry, which have languished in his possession. The OAE also emphasized that respondent's misconduct is likely to recur because of his willful failure to remediate his non-cooperation, express any remorse, or appreciate the seriousness of his misconduct. Additionally, the OAE urged, as conditions, that respondent be required to submit to a demand audit within sixty days of the Court's disciplinary Order in this matter, at which audit he must provide: (1) all documents the OAE requested in its March 6, 2018 letter and (2) documentary proof of the release of the unclaimed estate funds and jewelry to their beneficiaries, or to the Superior Court Trust Fund, as R. 1:21-6(j) requires.
R. 1:21-6(j) provides that funds that remain unclaimed for more than two years must be specifically designated as such in an attorney's trust account. Thereafter, an attorney must conduct a reasonable search to determine the beneficial owner of the unclaimed trust funds. If the beneficial owner cannot be located after one year of diligent investigation, the funds may be paid to the Clerk of the Superior Court for deposit with the Superior Court Trust Fund.
The DEC found that respondent violated RPC 8.1(b) by knowingly withholding the requested documents from the OAE in an attempt to compel them to act on its unrelated investigation of his alleged unauthorized practice of law in New York. The DEC emphasized that, although respondent understood the OAE's document requests, he refused to provide the material to seek to force the OAE to either end their unrelated investigation or, at the very least, respond to his questions regarding whether he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
In recommending a reprimand, the DEC weighed, as aggravation, respondent's failure to remediate his non-cooperation and his tactic to ignore the OAE's document requests to compel them to resolve the unrelated investigation to his satisfaction. Additionally, the DEC found that respondent's misconduct was likely to recur based on his inability or refusal to understand his duty to cooperate with disciplinary authorities.
The DEC weighed, in mitigation, respondent's unblemished fifty-five-year career at the bar, the isolated nature of the incident, and his lack of financial gain from his misconduct.
The DEC, however, did not reconcile its findings that respondent's misconduct both amounted to an isolated incident and was likely to recur.
At oral argument before us, respondent, again, admitted to the facts underlying his failure to cooperate, but denied that he had acted unethically. Just as he did before the DEC, respondent failed to assert a defense to his misconduct and, instead, criticized the DEC's decision for not squarely addressing the validity of the FAC's unrelated decision, the OAE's procedures for seeking his temporary suspension, and, in his view, the OAE's failure to provide him written notice that it had closed its unrelated investigation of his alleged unauthorized practice of law.
Despite respondent's disagreement with the circumstances underlying his temporary suspension, respondent neither filed a reply to the OAE's motion for temporary suspension nor appeared at oral argument before us, despite having received proper notice. See In the Matter of George N. Pappas, DRB 17-401 (November 28, 2017).
Additionally, when asked whether he had intentionally refused to supply the OAE with its requested information, respondent claimed that he "initially" cooperated by providing some of the information, however, he "subsequently" refused further cooperation in order to force the OAE to provide him written notice that he did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. Respondent attempted to justify his improper tactic by claiming that he had planned to provide the Court with the written notice in order to compel it to set aside its temporary suspension Order, which, as noted above, was premised on his failure to comply with the FAC's decision. Despite his disagreement with the FAC's decision, respondent explained that he declined to pursue an appeal of the decision because, in his view, he had no avenue to do so under R. 1:20A-3(c).
Respondent characterized the Court's temporary suspension Order as a "default [O]rder" because it did not address the merits of his temporary suspension. Contrary to respondent's unsupported view, the OAE correctly followed the procedures set forth in R. 1:20-11 and R. 1:20-3(g)(3) when it sought his temporary suspension for his failure to cooperate.
In its letter to respondent transmitting its decision, the FAC explained the bases of appeal set forth in R. 1:20A-3(c), including that an appeal could be taken if the FAC's decision resulted in a "palpable mistake of law" that "led to an unjust result."
Following a de novo review of the record, we are satisfied that the DEC's finding that respondent's conduct was unethical is fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.
R. 1:20-3(g)(3) requires a lawyer to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation and to reply, in writing, within ten days of receipt of a request for information. RPC 8.1(b), in turn, prohibits a lawyer from knowingly failing to reply to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority.
Here, respondent violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to provide the material requested in the OAE's March 6, 2018 correspondence, which sought not only basic information regarding his recordkeeping and estate work, but also specific documentation regarding his role as trustee of the trust for two children, jewelry that he maintained as part of the "dissolution of an estate[,]" and the unclaimed trust account funds, which have languished for more than twenty years. Although respondent sent the OAE a partial reply, in which he provided his ATA and ABA account numbers, noted his role as trustee of the trust for two children, and briefly mentioned the unclaimed trust account funds, he failed to provide to the OAE any documents in connection with his role as trustee, the unclaimed trust funds, and the jewelry in his safe deposit box. Moreover, respondent failed to address the OAE's concerns regarding whether he had served as power of attorney or was an authorized signatory of any estate accounts.
Despite the OAE's grant of an extension to provide the required material, respondent completely ignored the OAE's March 28 and April 18, 2018 letters, which reminded him of his obligation to cooperate and warned him that, unless he provided the required material by May 1, 2018, the OAE would file an ethics complaint charging him with failure to cooperate. However, rather than cooperate with the OAE's legitimate requests for information, respondent attempted to leverage his non-cooperation in a futile and grossly improper attempt to force the OAE's hand in its unrelated investigation of his alleged unauthorized practice of law in New York. Respondent admitted that his illicit tactic was motivated by his desire to compel the OAE to provide him a written, legal basis upon which he would seek to invalidate the FAC's decision and, ultimately, overturn his temporary suspension. Respondent, however, declined to appeal the FAC's decision and, thus, was required, by R. 1:20A-3(b)(4), to comply with its terms, as well as the Court's temporary suspension Order. Regardless of his perceptions of the unrelated investigation, the FAC's decision, or the circumstances underlying his temporary suspension, respondent was obligated to cooperate with the OAE to address his serious recordkeeping and trust account issues. Respondent, however, failed to cooperate by inappropriately attempting to compel the OAE to participate in a grossly improper quid pro quo transaction regarding the unrelated investigation, in violation of RPC 8.1(b).
In sum, we find that respondent violated RPC 8.1(b). The sole issue left for us to determine is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.
Admonitions typically are imposed for failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, if the attorney does not have an ethics history, if the attorney's ethics history is remote, or if compelling mitigation is present. The quantum of discipline is enhanced, however, if the failure to cooperate is with an arm of the disciplinary system, such as the OAE, which uncovers recordkeeping improprieties in a trust account and requests additional documentation. See In re Leven, 245 N.J. 491 (2021) (reprimand for an attorney who, following two OAE random audits uncovering numerous recordkeeping deficiencies, including an unidentified client ledger card that held a negative $50,200.35 balance, repeatedly failed, for more than three months, to comply with the OAE's requests for his law firm's financial records, including trust account reconciliations, client ledger cards, disbursements journals, and two specific client files; thereafter, although the attorney, for more than eight months, repeatedly assured the OAE that he would provide the required records, he failed to do so, despite two Court Orders requiring him to cooperate; the attorney, however, provided some of the required financial records; we found that a censure could have been appropriate for the attorney's persistent failure to address his recordkeeping deficiencies and his prolonged failure cooperate with the OAE; however, we imposed a reprimand in light of the lack of injury to the clients and the attorney's remorse, contrition, and otherwise unblemished forty-seven-year career at the bar).
An attorney's failure to cooperate, however, can result in discipline greater than a reprimand if the attorney intentionally stonewalls a serious ethics investigation or demonstrates a failure to learn from their previous instances of non-cooperation. See In re Huneke, 237 N.J. 432 (2019) (censure, in a default matter, for an attorney who systematically failed to comply with the OAE's extensive attempts to audit his financial records, despite numerous extensions, specific OAE directives, and the threat of suspension; the OAE's unsuccessful audit revealed numerous recordkeeping infractions, which the attorney failed to correct; specifically, in connection with real estate matters spanning four years, the attorney wrote eighty-seven checks for attorney's fees, totaling $64,400.30, but did not negotiate those checks; those attorney's fees, thus, remained in his trust account, along with $6,040.41 of undisbursed client funds and almost $50,000 in unidentified funds, in violation of RPC 1.15(a); additionally, the OAE's investigation uncovered that the attorney withdrew $1,092 from his second trust account and then deposited those funds into a personal bank account; the attorney, however, failed to comply with the OAE's requests for an explanation of his right to those funds, in violation of RPC 1.15(a) (failure to safeguard client funds); in imposing a censure, we noted that, "[a]bsent the default component, the disciplinary precedent for the [attorney's] ethics violations would warrant a reprimand"); In re Diciurcio, 234 N.J. 339 (2018) (censure for an attorney who repeatedly failed to reply to the disciplinary investigator's document requests regarding his alleged practice of law while ineligible; three months after the investigator's initial letter to the attorney, he finally submitted a reply; however, he failed to produce any of the requested documents which would have shed light on his alleged activities during his period of ineligibility; because of the attorney's failure to comply with the investigator's requests, the investigator was forced to contact eighty-one municipal courts and ten county courts to inquire as to whether the attorney had practiced in that jurisdiction during his period of ineligibility; in imposing a censure, we considered that, as of the date of its decision, the attorney had still failed to comply with the investigator's requests for information, which failure resulted in the significant expenditure of the investigator's resources; we also weighed, in aggravation, the attorney's 2012 reprimand for the same misconduct); In re Winters, 228 N.J. 464 (2017) (censure, in a default matter, for an attorney who initially cooperated with the OAE's investigation of his trust account overdraft; however, the attorney, thereafter, "declined" further cooperation and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, noting that, in his twenty-two-year career at the bar, he had never performed the required three-way reconciliations or maintained his books and records, as R. 1:21-6 requires; despite the attorney's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, he offered to produce certain exculpatory records if the OAE first revealed the identities of the individuals whose funds had been taken; the OAE, however, declined and required the attorney to submit all the previously requested information and documentation, which he, thereafter, failed to produce; in imposing a censure, we considered the attorney's failure to cooperate in an OAE investigation of knowing misappropriation and the default status of the matter; the attorney had no prior discipline).
Despite respondent's lack of prior discipline, his non-cooperation has persisted for more than four years since the OAE's initial, March 6, 2018 correspondence, which requested critical information and documentation regarding his recordkeeping and estate work, unclaimed trust account funds, and the jewelry that he maintained in his safe deposit box. Respondent defiantly turned a deaf ear to the disciplinary system and attempted to leverage his non-cooperation in an improper attempt to force the OAE to exonerate him, in writing, in an unrelated ethics investigation. Worse still, respondent intended to use the written exoneration to launch a collateral attack on an unfavorable FAC decision, which he had declined to appeal, and the Court's temporary suspension Order.
Consequently, respondent's misconduct is most similar to the censured attorneys in Diciurcio, Huneke, and Winters. Like the attorney in Winters, who initially signaled his intent to cooperate but later "declined" to do so unless the OAE revealed the identities of the individuals whose funds had been invaded, respondent initially appeared to cooperate by requesting an extension and providing some of the OAE's requested information. However, as in Winters, respondent intentionally refused further cooperation unless the OAE acted on his terms. Ultimately, like the attorney in Huneke, who systemically failed to cooperate with the OAE's dogged attempts to audit his financial records, which revealed large sums of unidentified and undisbursed client funds, and the attorney in Diciurcio, who, at the time of our decision, had merely submitted a partial reply to the disciplinary investigator's document requests, respondent strategically failed to produce any of the OAE's requested documents, which may have shed light on his serious recordkeeping and trust account issues.
However, unlike the attorneys in Winters and Huneke, whose discipline was enhanced because they had allowed their matters to proceed as defaults, and the attorney in Diciurcio, who had received a prior reprimand for the same misconduct, respondent has had an unblemished fifty-five-year career at the bar and filed an answer to the formal ethics complaint.
Thus, balancing respondent's persistent disrespect for the disciplinary process against his long, unblemished career at the bar, we determine that a reprimand is the appropriate quantum of discipline to protect the public and to preserve confidence in the bar.
Additionally, given respondent's prolonged failure to cooperate with the OAE, we further determine to require that respondent submit to a demand audit within sixty days of the Court's disciplinary Order in this matter, at which audit he must provide: (1) all documents that the OAE requested in its March 6, 2018 letter; (2) documentary proof of the release of all unclaimed trust account funds to their intended beneficiaries, or to the Superior Court Trust Fund, as R. 1:21-6(j) requires; and (3) documentary proof of the release of the jewelry to the intended beneficiaries, or, if the jewelry cannot be released, a written explanation to the OAE regarding the status of the jewelry.
Chair Gallipoli voted to impose a censure, with the same conditions.
Member Hoberman was absent.
We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.