Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP013876, Dennis J. Keough, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minor.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Tammy B., the mother of Paige B., appeals from an order continuing family maintenance services at a status review hearing in this juvenile dependency case. The child, Paige, is 16 years old, and in addition to being subject to this dependency action, has also appeared before the delinquency court (described by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) as a special “truancy” court) in connection with behavior suggesting she also falls within the scope of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(a). Section 601, subdivision (a) pertains to children who “habitually” fail to obey their parents. However, no section 601 petition has ever been filed, and Paige has thus never officially been adjudged a ward of the delinquency court.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Tammy argues that since Paige appears to meet the criteria for delinquency jurisdiction under section 601, subdivision (a), and was ordered by the dependency court to appear there, the court should have acknowledged that Paige was subject to dual dependency/delinquency jurisdiction, and ordered an assessment report pursuant to section 241.1 before continuing the dependency case.
Section 241.1, subdivision (a) provides that “[w]henever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol described in subdivision (b), initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor. Any other juvenile court having jurisdiction over the minor shall receive notice from the court, within five calendar days, of the presentation of the recommendations of the departments. The notice shall include the name of the judge to whom, or the courtroom to which, the recommendations were presented.”
However, during the pendency of this appeal, the dependency case was terminated, and SSA contends the appeal is consequently moot. We agree, and conclude the case must be dismissed on that ground. Because no dependency case is currently pending, we cannot provide any relief in this appeal. Tammy’s assertion that the case “may not be” moot, because a reversal “may possibly” entitle her to avoid liability for certain costs associated with the dependency proceeding, is insufficient to convince us otherwise.
And Tammy’s contention we should exercise our discretion to retain jurisdiction and decide the case – because otherwise the important issue raised herein will evade resolution – is likewise unpersuasive. Her argument is undermined by her explanation of why the issue raised is of such significance. According to Tammy, the Orange County juvenile court routinely refuses to recognize the application of section 601, subdivision (a) to dependency cases, and thus routinely avoids the requirements of section 241.1. If that is true, we can presume the issue will arise again in a case where dependency jurisdiction has not been terminated. The appeal is dismissed.
FACTS
This case began in August of 2006, when Paige (then age 14) and her older sister were taken into protective custody based upon allegations of physical abuse. Tammy reported that Paige was defiant and uncontrollable, and had previously been sent to live with her grandparents in Arizona. Paige had been prescribed, but refused to take antidepressant medication.
The juvenile court ordered Paige detained, but her sister was returned to parental custody on the condition the parents refrain from physical discipline and participate in counseling. Paige’s father pleaded no contest to the jurisdictional petition, and Tammy submitted on the amended petition.
SSA recommended Paige be returned to the home with family preservation services, and in October of 2006, the court issued that dispositional order. Both parents participated in anger management, as well as other services.
The following two and one-half years were tumultuous, to say the least, and the record suggests that much of the tumult involved Paige’s own behavior, as opposed to that of her parents. Paige was reported to be truant from school, possibly using drugs and alcohol, and uncooperative in therapy. In October of 2007, the court ordered Paige to attend and observe a session of juvenile drug court.
Moreover, because of Paige’s “school attendance issues,” her counsel reported the county counsel had arranged for her to have a “meet and confer” with Judge Robert Hutson of the “truancy” court. Following that initial “meet and confer” session, the dependency court ordered Paige to meet with Judge Hutson again in two months for a “progress review.”
In preparation for the status review hearing in March of 2009, SSA reported Paige was still living at home with her parents, and both Tammy and Paige’s father had successfully participated in wraparound services. SSA noted that “[t]he family has shown progress... [and t]he reason that this case necessitated dependency, physical abuse to the child by the father, has been resolved.” SSA also noted that Paige herself had “made good progress as evidenced by her participation in school and earning credits as well as staying home to visit with her friends.” Based upon this progress, SSA recommended the dependency case be terminated.
Unfortunately, on March 2, 2009, SSA filed an addendum report containing additional information which cast doubt on the extent of progress it had so recently reported. SSA disclosed that Paige had been the subject of a child abuse referral, when she showed up at Canyon Acres for a horse therapy session with two recent black eyes. According to Canyon Acres personnel, Paige refused to explain how she got them. Paige disputed that assertion, claiming no one from Canyon Acres had asked her where she got the black eyes, and she later explained they were the result of an incident in which other girls had “ganged up on her.” She expressly denied that the black eyes had been caused by her parents. SSA also disclosed Tammy had recently reported to police that Paige was missing, after she had disappeared from the home for several days without explanation or permission, later surfacing in Las Vegas.
Based upon the new information contained in its addendum report, SSA recommended the court retain jurisdiction in the case, continue family maintenance services, and schedule the case for an additional six-month review.
On March 2, 2009, the court adopted SSA’s recommendation.
I
The sole issue raised in Tammy’s appeal is whether the court erred by continuing the dependency case for an additional six months, without first ordering an assessment pursuant to section 241.1 to determine whether dependency or delinquency jurisdiction would best serve Paige’s interests. Tammy requests that we reverse the order and remand the case to the dependency court with directions to prepare a report.
In its respondent’s brief, SSA points out that (1) section 241.1 applies only to children who have actually been adjudged to fall within the jurisdiction of both courts, which Paige has not; (2) it is not the role of the dependency court to encourage the commencement of a delinquency petition against a child within its jurisdiction; and (3) in any event, the supposed need for a section 241.1 report was never raised in the juvenile court, and thus the issue was waived.
While this case was pending on appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Paige, and SSA filed (1) a request that we take judicial notice of the termination order, and (2) a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot in light of that order. Tammy did not oppose the request for judicial notice, acknowledging that the dependency case had been dismissed, but did oppose the motion to dismiss.
We begin with the proposition that “[a]n appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. [Citation.]” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.) While the general rule is that an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot (see In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330), the court must nonetheless assess the issue on a case-by-case basis to determine whether its decision “would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” (In re Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)
Clearly, this case is moot in the sense that we cannot grant the relief requested in this appeal. Ordering a section 241.1 assessment would make no sense – the dependency jurisdiction has been terminated, and jurisdiction under section 601 was never established. At this point, neither part of the juvenile court is claiming jurisdiction over Paige, and no one is arguing that it would be appropriate for both to do so.
Tammy claims we should nonetheless decide the issue presented in this case, because a reversal of the dependency court’s March 2, 2009 order to continue jurisdiction might affect the parents’ potential liability for costs associated with the dependency proceeding. In support of this assertion, Tammy points to an order issued in December of 2008, three months prior to the order at issue in this appeal. That order reflects that both Tammy and Paige’s father had defaulted in connection with a financial responsibility hearing, and finds that each is liable to the county in a specific sum.
However, Tammy has not explained how an opinion issued by this court, concluding the dependency court had erred in ordering a continuation of jurisdiction three months after assessing her liability in a related default proceeding, would have any impact on that liability. Nor has she offered any evidence she has been subjected to any additional liability that might be affected by such a reversal. Consequently, we conclude there is no evidence a ruling on this appeal would affect the outcome of any subsequent proceeding. The appeal is moot.
In the alternative, Tammy argues that even if the appeal is moot, we should nonetheless exercise our discretion to decide it, because otherwise the important issue presented is likely to evade review. (In re Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33, 38, fn. 4.) However, according to Tammy, the very significance of the issue presented here is due to the fact the Orange County juvenile court habitually ignores the possibility of finding jurisdiction under section 601, and thus that it habitually avoids its obligation to order assessment reports pursuant to section 241.1. She contends that the court’s unstated policy of refusing to utilize these provisions undermines the overall intent of the statutory scheme. In other words, Tammy contends it is the allegedly chronic nature of the error committed in this case that makes the issue presented here so significant.
But if Tammy’s contention regarding the juvenile court’s general practice is correct, then clearly the issue presented here is likely to reoccur – including in cases where dependency jurisdiction is not then immediately terminated. There is consequently no compelling reason to review the issue in this case, where no relief could possibly be granted.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the appeal is moot, and it is therefore dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J., IKOLA, J.