Where the statute of limitations for a particular claim has not expired, laches may only bar a claim upon a defendant's showing of "gross laches." In re Pac. E. Corp., 223 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Sutton v. Davis, 916 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)); see also Finova Capital Corp. v. Kegel, 195 slw.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ("The doctrine of laches generally applies to actions that are not governed by a statute of limitations, but it may be applied within a statutory limitations period in the case of gross laches."). For claims brought within the statutory limitations period, a defendant may not prevail on a laches defense "based solely on an undue delay in filing the action."
These arguments are unavailing. Under Tennessee law, "laches will bar a claim filed within the limitations period if there is an unreasonable and inexcusable delay combined with loss of evidence that prejudices the defendant." Pac. E. Corp. v. Gulf Life Holding Co. (In re Pac. E. Corp.), 223 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998); see also Dennis Joslin Co., LLC v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that laches "requires an unreasonable delay that prejudices the party seeking to employ laches as a defense"). Cincinnati states that it has been prejudiced by the "enormous attorney's fees" that Forrest has incurred, and it complains that, "[d]espite . . . the Supreme Court's ruling in [ Moore], . . . [Forrest] did absolutely nothing to request that Cincinnati reconsider coverage."
Gross laches requires "(1) unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing the action; (2) loss of evidence; and (3) prejudice to the defendant." Pac. E. Corp. v. Gulf Life Holding Co., 223 B.R. 523, 526 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). After stating that demand was made by the Shearers within the six-year statute of limitations, the trial court gave the following analysis regarding laches:
Gross laches "requires (1) unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing the action; (2) loss of evidence; and (3) prejudice to the defendant." In re Pac. E. Corp., 223 B.R. 523, 526 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). Curtis asserted her right under the MDA as to both children when each went to college.