1979); State v. Dakota, 300 Minn. 12, 217 N.W.2d 748 (1974); State v. Raymond, 305 Minn. 160, 170, 232 N.W.2d 879, 886 (1975) (noting common thread in line of cases holding prejudicial coercion not present "just because [defendant] had made an earlier confession which `let the cat out of the bag'"); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 580-582, 459 A.2d 311, 316 (1983) ("After being given his Miranda warnings it is clear [defendant] maintained his intention to provide his questioners with Page 311 his version of the incident"). But see In re Pablo A.C., 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 181 Cal.Rptr. 468 (1982); State v. Hibdon, 57 Or. App. 509, 645 P.2d 580 (1982); State v. Lavaris, 99 Wn.2d 851, 857-860, 664 P.2d 1234, 1237-1239 (1983). The Oregon court nevertheless identified a subtle form of lingering compulsion, the psychological impact of the suspect's conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag and, in so doing, has sealed his own fate.
People v. Ceccone (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 886, 892 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 499], stated that a person is in custody when: `[A]s a reasonable person he is led to believe that he is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' (Accord, People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 873, 446 P.2d 993]; People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 306 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 641]; In re James M. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 133, 136 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 902]; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) The United States Supreme Court has recently given unequivocal approval to the objective test of custody, stating: `[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. [Fn. omitted.]' ( Berkemer [v. McCarty (1984)], supra, U.S. [420, 442] [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3152].)
Thus, the foregoing presumption is rebuttable, with the prosecution bearing the burden of establishing a break in the causative chain between the first confession and the subsequent confession. ( Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 547-548; In rePablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) "A subsequent confession is not the tainted product of the first merely because, `but for' the improper police conduct, the subsequent confession would not have been obtained.
Thus, the foregoing presumption is rebuttable, with the prosecution bearing the burden of establishing a break in the causative chain between the first confession and the subsequent confession. ( Johnson, supra, 70 Cal. 2d at pp. 547-548; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) A subsequent confession is not the tainted product of the first merely because, "but for" the improper police conduct, the subsequent confession would not have been obtained.
However, he insists Miranda warnings should have preceded the officer's questions since, at the time they were asked, he was in custody — because Officer Tavenner had focused suspicion on him. To support his argument, Joseph cites In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984. The Pablo C. court reversed an order declaring a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court because Miranda warnings were not read to him when he was detained on a bridge for questioning after a motorist reported someone had been dropping pieces of concrete on passing cars.
[Citation.]" ( People v. Carter (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 127, 131 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 304]; see also People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 679-680; People v. Taylor (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 217, 225 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 638]; People v. Salinas (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 925, 935-936 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 683]; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 988 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) Victor's contention that his temporary detention raises a right to Miranda warnings is not supported by the law.
We assume for purposes of argument a presumption exists under decisions of the California Supreme Court, that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda taints any subsequent confession, even if the subsequent confession is noncoercive and follows a proper Miranda advisement. (See People v. Spencer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 158, 167 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715]; People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 547 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865, 43 A.L.R.3d 366], disapproved on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 899, fn. 8 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872]; see also In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 989 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468]; People v. Celaya (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 665, 673 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 489]; People v. Underwood (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1233 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 840] .) Upon arresting defendant, Deputy Baker failed to advise him of his Miranda rights.
(5) As a general rule, "where an accused makes one confession and at a later time again confesses, it is presumed the second confession is a product of the first. . . ." ( In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 989 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) This presumption stems from the notion that "`after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.
People v. Ceccone (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 886, 892 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 499], stated that a person is in custody when: "[A]s a reasonable person he is led to believe that he is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Accord, People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 873, 446 P.2d 993]; People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 306 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 641]; In re James M. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 133, 136 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 902]; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) The United States Supreme Court has recently given unequivocal approval to the objective test of custody, stating: "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. [Fn. omitted.]" ( Berkemer, supra, ___ U.S. ___, ___ [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3152].)