Id. at 865, 357 N.E.2d at 943. Further, the Court of Appeals of Ohio discussed whether child support payments had terminated for a child who had social and learning disabilities in In re Owens, 96 Ohio App.3d 429, 645 N.E.2d 130 (1994). In Owens, the child was enrolled in the Federal Job Corps, and while that federal program provided him with room and board, his mother continued to give him money, clothing, and other necessities.

Emancipation is not susceptible of a finite definition; however, it generally refers to ‘the freeing of a (* * *) child from parental control.’ In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429, 432, 645 N.E.2d 130 * * *; Siefker v. Siefker (Oct. 23, 1997), 3d Dist. No. 12-97-09, 1997 WL 658995, at *2. * * * Emancipation generally discharges a parent's duty to pay child support. See Townsen v. Townsen (1954), 101 Ohio App. 85, 88, 137 N.E.2d 789 * * *; Price v. Price (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 42, 43, 465 N.E.2d 922 * * *; Pelchat v. Pelchat (Sept. 5, 1986), 6th Dist. No. L-86-074, 1986 WL 9581, at *4 ; Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.) 539. ‘(T)he question as to when a child is emancipated so as to relieve a parent from the obligation of support depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.’

Emancipation is not susceptible of a finite definition; however, it generally refers to "the freeing of a * * * child from parental control." In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429, 432, 645 N.E.2d 130; Sieflcer v. Sieflcer (Oct. 23, 1997), 3d Dist. No. 12-97-09, 1997 WL 658995, at *2. Black's Law Dictionary defines emancipation as:

Id. at headnote 9. Other cases on such issue, had it been raised by appropriate motion, are Price v. Price (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 42 and In Re: Owens (also a 2nd Dist. Case) 96 Ohio App.3d 429 , Howard v. Howard (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 832. Also, the plain general language of support obligations as raised in Assignment Four was not raised at the hearing.

The issue presented is whether the court erred in refusing to terminate the obligation for the one year prior to that, after James had attained age eighteen. The trial court's "emancipation" rationale is consistent with the decision of this court in In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429. In that case, we held that an eighteen year old "child" who had enrolled in the Job Corps was not emancipated because his mother, the residential parent, continued to provide him some incidence of support.

Whether a child is emancipated, so as to relieve a parent from the obligation of support, depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429. The rules of law governing emancipation do not point to specific facts or a bright-line standard.

We have examined the cases cited by appellant in support of the contention that the facts of this case render Jason unemancipated, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the child is emancipated, notwithstanding emotional problems and lack of continuous employment. See, In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429, where this court affirmed a judgment suspending child support for a period of time that the child was ordered out of the home of the custodial parent and enrolled in the Job Corps., and reinstating support upon his discharge. Additionally, we conclude that the decision to terminate support for the period after which Jason quit school and before he left home is not an abuse of discretion.

Id.; In re Owens (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 429, 645 N.E.2d 130. The party seeking relief from a support order bears the burden of proving that the child is emancipated.

Other states have, even more to the point, expressly held that a troubled minor's removal from his parents' home to a public or private institutional alternative or even to the home of friends or relatives does not relieve the parents of their support obligation during minority provided the child is not entirely self-supporting. See In re Marriage of Donahoe, 114 Ill.App.3d 470, 70 Ill.Dec. 152, 155, 448 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (1983); Quillen v. Quillen, 659 N.E.2d 566, 576 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), vacated in part, adopted in part, 671 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1996); Bopp v. Bopp., 671 S.W.2d 348, 350-351 (Mo.Ct.App. 1984); In re Marriage of Bordner, 220 Mont. 339, 715 P.2d 436, 439 (1986); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 239 Neb. 605, 477 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1991); In re Owens, 96 Ohio App.3d 429, 645 N.E.2d 130, 132 (1994); Trosky v. Mann, 398 Pa. Super. 369, 581 A.2d 177, 178 (1990). We agree.