Opinion
2014-01-22
In the Matter of ORLANDO G. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and John A. Newbery of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Michael J. Pastor of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and John A. Newbery of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Michael J. Pastor of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Orlando G. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated November 28, 2012, which, upon an order of fact-finding of the same court dated October 24, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of obstruction of governmental administration in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services for a period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the order of fact-finding dated October 24, 2012.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired ( see Matter of Stanley F., 76 A.D.3d 1067, 1068, 907 N.Y.S.2d 882).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, he was not deprived of a speedy fact-finding hearing, as required by Family Court Act § 340.1(1). The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in finding “good cause” to justify the initial adjournment of the fact-finding hearing (Family Ct. Act § 340.1 [4][a]; see Matter of Randy K., 77 N.Y.2d 398, 400, 568 N.Y.S.2d 562, 570 N.E.2d 210; Matter of Jamell H., 219 A.D.2d 531, 631 N.Y.S.2d 680). Although it is unpreserved for appellate review, we reach, in the interest of justice, the appellant's challenge to the Family Court's second adjournment of the fact-finding hearing, which was for one day ( cf.CPL 470.05[2]; 470.15[1], [6][a] ). Contrary to the appellant's contention, special circumstances existed to warrant the Family Court's second adjournment of the fact-finding hearing ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 340.1[6]; Matter of Jamel C., 302 A.D.2d 457, 458, 755 N.Y.S.2d 97; cf. Matter of Nakia L., 81 N.Y.2d 898, 901, 597 N.Y.S.2d 638, 613 N.E.2d 544; Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408, 414–415, 522 N.Y.S.2d 89, 516 N.E.2d 1203; Matter of Paul W., 96 A.D.3d 426, 427, 945 N.Y.S.2d 684). These circumstances included the failure of the appellant's mother to appear in court, a fact of which the Family Court was not timely notified, the resulting need to appoint a guardian ad litem for the appellant, and the guardian ad litem's scheduling conflicts that prevented him from being present for a fact-finding hearing on the first adjourned date. RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and ROMAN, JJ., concur.