Quinn v. Gardner (C.C.A.) 32 F.2d 772, 773; Hobbs Tie Timber Co. v. Isaacs (C.C.A.) 61 F.2d 1006; Powers v. Johnson (C.C.A.) 71 F.2d 48, 55; Kimmel v. Crocker (C.C.A.) 72 F.2d 599, 601; In re Kirk (D.C.) 4 F. Supp. 328; First National Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 25 S.Ct. 206, 49 L.Ed. 408; In re Coney Island Hotel Corp. (C.C.A.) 76 F.2d 126; In re Civic Center Realty Co. (D.C.) 26 F.2d 825; In re Schulte-United, Inc., (D.C.) 50 F.2d 243, 244; In re Olivit Bros. Inc., (D.C.) 57 F.2d 718; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854, 79 L. Ed. 1593, 97 A.L.R. 1106; Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston (C.C.A.) 78 F.2d 517. On the threshold, we are met by the contention of the appellee that regardless of whether the rule above stated has been modified or abrogated by the provisions of section 77B, supra, under which the proceeding at bar is being administered, appellant yet had no right to intervene or to demand an order permitting it to foreclose.
Where the bankruptcy court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction by reason of its custody of the res, it may grant permission to the owner of a claim or lien to institute an action or proceeding in a state court to establish or enforce his claim or lien against the property in possession of the bankruptcy court, and the action or proceeding may be so brought only with such permission. 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy ยง 261(3) b, p. 333; In re Olivit Bros., Inc., 57 F.2d 718 (S.D. New York, 1932); In re Mill Iron Const. Co., 56 F.2d 248 (N.D. New York, 1932). In Viersen v. Boettcher, Okla., 387 P.2d 133, 135, we stated as follows: