Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK75677 Steven R. Klaif, Juvenile Court Referee.
Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
M.G. (mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to Olivia J. (Olivia). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Detention
Mother has three children: Olivia (born 2006), Carlos Jr. (born 2002), and A. (born 1999). Geoffrey J. (father) is Olivia’s father; Carlos B. (Carlos Sr.) is A.’s and Carlos Jr.’s father.
The family was referred to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in August 2008. At that time, mother and father were in divorce proceedings and were fighting for custody of Olivia. DCFS opened a voluntary maintenance plan, which required mother to participate in a substance abuse program and to drug test. Mother tested positive for marijuana six times in October and November, and then dropped out of the substance abuse program after refusing to drug test on November 24. DCFS detained all three children on December 12, 2008, placing Olivia with her paternal grandmother, Michelle (paternal grandmother), and placing A. and Carlos Jr. with their paternal grandmother, Valerie (Valerie).
DCFS filed a dependency petition on December 17, 2008, alleging that A., Carlos Jr., and Olivia were within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). Paragraph (a) of the petition alleged that the children were at risk of serious physical harm because mother and father had a history of domestic violence and father had broken mother’s ankle in 2008. Paragraph (b) alleged that mother and father had failed to protect the children due to their history of domestic violence and because mother had a history of substance abuse and was currently abusing marijuana.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court held a detention hearing on December 17, 2008. It found a prima facie case for detaining the minors under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for the children’s removal from the home. The three children were ordered detained with their paternal grandmothers. Mother and father were granted monitored visits with the children at least three times per week; Carlos Sr. was granted unmonitored visits. Family reunification services were ordered for mother and father.
II. Jurisdiction and Disposition
The court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to Olivia on February 18, 2009. Mother and father waived their rights to a trial. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that counts (a)(1), (b)(1), and (b)(2) were true and that juvenile court jurisdiction was appropriate. It ordered that DCFS provide reunification services to mother and father; that mother attend drug rehabilitation with random testing, parenting classes, and individual counseling to address case issues, including domestic violence; and that father attend a 52-week domestic violence program and parenting class. Both parents were granted monitored visits with Olivia.
On March 6, 2009, the court conducted a disposition hearing as to A. and Carlos Jr., ordering that the children be placed with Carlos Sr. under court jurisdiction.
III. Six-Month Review
On August 18, 2009, DCFS advised the court that Olivia was doing well in the home of paternal grandmother, who was reported to have been “supportive in providing [Olivia] with a nurturing and safe home environment.” Mother had enrolled in drug rehabilitation, was participating in parenting, domestic violence, and relapse prevention classes, and was attending a 12-step program. She drug tested negative on eight occasions between December 2008 and April 2009, but she failed to show up for testing on three occasions in late May and early June. On May 19, 2009, mother was arrested for failing to pay a ticket for driving with a suspended license; she was sentenced to pay a fine and to perform eight days of work for Caltrans.
Mother had visits with her children monitored by paternal grandmother and Valerie at DCFS’s office from December 2008 to May 29, 2009. According to Valerie, the visits went well for the most part and mother interacted appropriately with the children. Paternal grandmother “had some concerns that [mother] would sometimes ignore [Olivia], but for the most part the visits went well.”
Mother had unmonitored visits with the children from June through August 2009. The social worker occasionally dropped by unannounced to observe the interaction between mother and Olivia; she reported that mother interacted appropriately during the visits. However, paternal grandmother advised that mother missed her last four visits with Olivia, on July 18, July 25, August 1, and August 8. A. and Carlos Jr. both told the social worker that they wanted to live with mother; Olivia was “too young to make a meaningful statement.”
DCFS advised the court that it was not in the children’s best interests to be returned to mother and that family reunification services should be continued for another six months. Further, an adoption home study of the home of paternal grandmother was completed on August 10, 2009, and DCFS determined that there were no concerns that would delay Olivia’s adoption by paternal grandmother and her husband.
DCFS recommended as follows: “[Paternal grandmother] has provided an[] appropriate living environment, with no child safety concerns. The caregiver has taken the child to her regular medical, dental appointment. Caregiver has been cooperative with all the court ordered services for the child, [Olivia]. CSW has observed the child to be clean and neat during each visit. [¶] Mother has been in compliance with the court ordered programs of parenting, individual counseling to address case issues, Domestic Violence, substance abuse counseling, random drug testing. Mother has been consistent in attending her programs at CHOICES. Mother seems dedicated in regaining custody of her children. Although mother’s progress is good, she still needs to further concentrate on maintaining stability. [¶]... [¶] Based on the above information the Department is recommending six more months of Family Reunification services for mother.... Mother has not started overnight visits with her children and she has not completed her programs.”
At the six-month review hearing, Olivia’s counsel questioned whether mother had demonstrated a substantial probability that Olivia would be returned to her within six months and requested a contested hearing on that issue. Counsel also objected to mother’s request for additional visitation and questioned why mother had been granted unmonitored visits. The court ordered DCFS to complete a supplemental report and continued the matter for a contested hearing on November 6.
In the supplemental report, dated October 2, 2009, DCFS stated that social workers had observed five visits between mother and Olivia in June and July 2009. On each occasion, mother appropriately supervised Olivia and was affectionate and loving with her. The report described the visits as follows:
“On 6/6/09, CSW Cortez met [mother] and [Olivia] at the Community Center in Pasadena where mother’s fiancé’s sister was having a baby shower. CSW observe[d] mother to be appropriate with child. CSW observe[d] mother and child to wash strawberries together. Mother gave child some strawberries with whip[ped] cream to eat. Mother was affectionate toward child and would give her hugs and kisses. CSW observed mother help[] the child play the baby shower games as well as give the child a balloon. No problems or concerns were noted.
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“On 6/20/09, [CSW] arrived at Villa Park to observe [mother’s] interaction with [Olivia]. When [CSW] arrived at the park, mother and child had not arrived. [CSW] observed mother and child walking to the park. CSW observed mother to be appropriate with child, Olivia[, ] and observe[d] mother to interact in a loving manner with child. Mother had art supplies for child, Olivia[, ] to play with. The child seemed happy with mother. Overall, the visit went well.
“On 6/27/09, [CSW] met [mother] and [Olivia] at Chuck E Cheese in Pasadena, CA. CSW observed [mother] to interact appropriately with [Olivia]. [Olivia] was running around trying to play games and mother was appropriately supervising her....
“On 7/11/09, [CSW] met [mother] and [A., Carlos Jr., and Olivia] at Washington Park in Pasadena. CSW observed child, Olivia[, ] to appear much happier around her siblings. The children played on the swings and the jungle gym. Mother was appropriately supervising her children. CSW observed [Olivia] run towards her mother and occasionally give her hugs and kisses. Overall the visit went well.”
Further, DCFS attached a letter from CHOICES, which was providing mother with court-ordered services. It stated that since February, mother had attended 44 outpatient sessions and was weekly participating in parent education, domestic violence education, and relapse prevention. Further, she had randomly drug tested 12 times, with all tests negative for all substances. She had shown proof of attending a 12-step program in the community at least three times per week and had obtained a sponsor.
In an interim review report dated November 6, 2009, DCFS advised the court that mother had continued to attend court-ordered programs regularly and to drug test negative. Mother had visited Olivia three times in October; on two other occasions, Olivia was not made available for scheduled visits. CHOICES staff described mother as “attentive with her children and bonded.” DCFS recommended that mother’s visits be liberalized to unmonitored eight-hour-a-day visits with her three children.
At the November 6, 2009 hearing, Olivia’s counsel objected to further provision of family reunification services to mother, stating that he was concerned about missed visits, mother’s inappropriate conduct during visits, and mother’s hostility towards paternal grandmother as “reported to the social worker by the caretaker for Olivia, paternal grandmother, where the mother got very hostile, lost her temper, cussed her out, and then pushed her.” Counsel urged that although mother “apparently has conquered her drug issue... there is nothing reported to the court or to me that [demonstrates]... that she is actually understanding and integrating what she is being taught.”
The court said that it “share[d] [counsel’s] concerns, ” but did not believe they warranted terminating reunification services. The court noted that mother had completed drug rehabilitation, individual counseling, and classes in parenting, relapse prevention, and domestic violence, but “needs to work on exercising the new skills she’s learned about. Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that mother’s progress has been partial.” It concluded: “[T]here’s a substantial probability that Olivia may be returned to her mother by the 12 month date and may be returned to her father by the 12 month date. The court further finds that each parent has consistently and regularly visited, has made significant progress in resolving the problems that [led] to the child’s removal, and has demonstrated the ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan. The department shall continue to provide and parents shall continue to participate in all services previously ordered.”
At the November 6 hearing, the court closed the case as to A. and Carlos Jr., awarding joint legal custody to mother and Carlos Sr., awarding sole physical custody to Carlos Sr., and granting mother unmonitored visits.
IV. Termination of Family Reunification Services and Parental Rights
In December 2009, mother called her social worker to say that she and father wanted to relinquish their rights to Olivia and wanted paternal grandmother to adopt her. However, she told a social worker on February 3, 2010 that she was no longer interested in relinquishing her rights to Olivia.
In the status review report, dated February 18, 2010, DCFS advised that as of October 30, 2009, mother had stopped attending programs and drug testing, missing the last eight randomly-scheduled drug tests. In December, DCFS reinstituted monitored visits because mother was not complying with her case plan. Mother was appropriate with Olivia during monitored visits in February 2010, and Olivia appeared happy and comfortable with her. Mother told her social worker that she wanted to have Olivia back in her care. DCFS believed that it was not in Olivia’s best interests to be returned to her mother’s care, however, as mother was not in compliance with her court-ordered programs. It recommended that mother’s services be terminated and that Olivia remain with paternal grandmother, who wished to adopt her. Mother contested the recommendation, and the matter was set for a contested hearing.
In a further status review report, dated March 5, 2010, DCFS reported that since the last hearing, mother had consistently seen Olivia for monitored visits, including one on February 26, 2010, during which the social worker reported that mother was appropriate and Olivia appeared “happy and comfortable.” However, mother had not reenrolled in drug treatment or resumed random drug tests. Mother had told her social worker that she was on a waiting list for outpatient substance abuse counseling at Impact in Pasadena, but when the social worker called Impact, she was told that mother was neither enrolled nor on a waiting list. DCFS thus recommended that mother’s reunification services be ended and the matter be set for a hearing to terminate mother’s parental rights.
At the March 5, 2010 hearing, the mother advised the court that she was no longer contesting DCFS’s recommendations, but objected to termination of her services. The court ordered mother’s and father’s reunification services terminated and set a permanent placement hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
DCFS filed a “366.26 WIC Report” on July 2, 2010. It said that Olivia had continued to have monitored visits with mother at DCFS’s office, and that mother brought A. and Carlos Jr. to the visits in February, March, and April so that the children could see one another. DCFS reported that “Mother brings [Olivia] new clothes, shoes, toys, child activities or snacks to eat. Mother interacts with the child appropriately during her visits.” DCFS also reported that Olivia was thriving in the home of paternal grandmother, did not display any behavior problems, and was healthy. An adoptive home study had been approved for paternal grandmother and her husband, who were “financially and emotionally capable to meet Olivia’s needs” and had been “parenting Olivia full time for over 11/2 years.” DCFS recommended that parental rights be terminated and that the court approve Olivia’s adoption by paternal grandmother and her husband.
A section 366.26 hearing was held on July 2, 2010. Mother did not appear, but her attorney requested a continued contested hearing on her behalf. Father’s counsel indicated that father was in favor of the adoption and that he was submitting on DCFS’s recommendations. Olivia’s counsel stated that he also favored adoption and was submitting on DCFS’s recommendations. The court noted that mother had not reenrolled in her drug programs, had not submitted for drug testing, and was having only monitored visits with Olivia; thus, “tentatively[, ] it looks like the mother is not really in a position to put forward much of a contest.” Nonetheless, the court continued the hearing to August 2 to permit mother to contest termination of her parental rights if she wished to do so.
At the continued hearing on August 2, 2010, mother testified that she visited Olivia for an hour and a half each week. During visits, she “will find activities that we can both do together getting quality time, ” such as making hand prints in clay. Mother said she acted in a parental role, by “giv[ing] [Olivia] lots of hugs and kisses and encouragement for the next week for school and I sing her songs.... I still tell her little stuff so she knows I’m still in charge like, ‘Put your shoes back on, thank you, ’ stuff like that.” She said that when Olivia left the visits, “[s]ometimes she’s sad and others I have to talk to her before she leaves and goes to Nana, but she loves her Nana, too.” Mother believed that terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Olivia because “[s]he also has two other siblings which I have custody of now. You know, she was born into the family and all of a sudden she was ripped from all three of us and it’s hard for her to even talk to them on the phone without crying or even talk to them in general because she doesn’t get to see them at all.” Olivia asks for her siblings “[a]ll the time and they also cry for her.”
Mother’s counsel argued that mother had frequent and loving contact with Olivia and acted in a parental role during visits. It asked the court to find that the bond between Olivia and mother was sufficiently strong that it would be detrimental to Olivia if the bond were severed. County counsel disagreed, contending that mother had failed to demonstrate that she occupied a parental role or that Olivia would suffer detriment if her bonds with her half-siblings were severed. Olivia’s counsel concurred, stating that although the evidence showed that Olivia was “friendly” with mother, there was no evidence of a strong bond between Olivia and her mother or half-siblings such that the detriment of termination would outweigh the benefits of a permanent placement.
Following argument, the court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights and ordered Olivia placed for adoption. It stated as follows: “The [In re] Autumn H. [(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 (Autumn H.)]interpretation of [section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(1)] creates a much higher standard than just frequent contact and [an] enjoyable relationship. This mother has not acted as the parent in a parental role or primary caretaker role in quite some time. The court finds that neither that nor the sibling exception nor any other exception under 366.26 applies. The court has considered all the evidence. The court finds that continued jurisdiction is necessary because conditions continue to exist which justified the court taking jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable. The court finds that it would be detrimental to the child to be returned to the parents. The parental rights of [mother] and [father] and anyone else who claims to be a parent to this child are hereby terminated[.]”
Mother appealed from the termination order on August 2, 2010.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. Specifically, she contends that: (1) Olivia benefits from her relationship with mother, within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i); and (2) Olivia benefits from her relationship with A. and Carlos Jr., within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). She thus urges that her parental rights should have been preserved and Olivia should have been placed in a guardianship with paternal grandmother. We consider these issues below.
I. The Adoption Exceptions-Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(B)
Once a juvenile court has terminated a parent’s reunification services, it must order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-297.) If a dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans. (Ibid.; San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 888.) “‘“Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) “Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344.)’ (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)” (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 122.)
If the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, the court “shall” terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption unless it finds a “compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Among the circumstances specified are the following:
“(i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.
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“(v) There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (Ibid.)
If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child because of one of the conditions identified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B), the court “shall either order that the present caretakers or other appropriate persons shall become legal guardians of the child or order that the child remain in long-term foster care.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).) “‘The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)’ (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534; see In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.)” (In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 122.)
On appeal from juvenile court rulings rejecting claims that one of the adoption exceptions set out in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) apply, the appellate courts have applied two different standards of review. Some appellate courts have applied the substantial evidence standard of review (e.g., In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 297-298; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228), while others have reviewed for abuse of discretion (e.g., In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351).
We find, as the Sixth District recently did in In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 (Bailey J.), that both standards of review apply to our determination, and thus we adopt that court’s analysis here. “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination. Thus, as this court noted in In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the ‘undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.’ (In re I.W., at p. 1529.) Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court’s determination cannot succeed. [¶] The same is not true as to the other component of these adoption exceptions. The other component of both the parental relationship exception and the sibling relationship exception is the requirement that the juvenile court find that the existence of that relationship constitutes a ‘compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) A juvenile court finding that the relationship is a ‘compelling reason’ for finding detriment to the child is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue. It is, instead, a ‘quintessentially’ discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951.) Because this component of the juvenile court’s decision is discretionary, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies.” (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315; see also In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 [“We agree that the abuse of discretion standard governs review but also recognize that the substantial evidence test applies to pure findings of fact.”].)
II. Continuing Beneficial Relationship Exception
Mother contends that since there was evidence that she regularly visited Olivia and that she and Olivia had a positive, affectionate relationship, the juvenile court erred in concluding that she did not come within the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) to terminating parental rights. We disagree.
To overcome the statutory preference for adoption when reunification has failed to occur within the statutory timeframe and to meet the burden of proving that the beneficial relationship exception applies, the parent must show “‘the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The juvenile court ‘balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ (Ibid.) ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ (Ibid.)” (In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.)
“‘The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.’ (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.)” (In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.)
To meet the burden of proving that the beneficial relationship exception applies, “the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) “Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.... The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; see also In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [a “pleasant and emotionally significant” relationship was insufficient].)
“The Legislature emphasized the exceptional nature of all the circumstances identified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) by revising the statute in 1998 to require the court to find not only that one of the listed circumstances exists, but also that it provide ‘a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.’ (Stats. 1998, ch. 1054, § 36.6.) This amendment... makes it plain that a parent may not claim entitlement to the exception provided by subdivision [(c)(1)(B)(i)] simply by demonstrating some benefit to the child from a continued relationship with the parent, or some detriment from termination of parental rights.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)
In the present case, mother notes that Olivia had lived with her for the first two and a half years of her life, is physically affectionate with her, seems happy and comfortable in mother’s presence, and sometimes is sad when visits end. Further, during visits mother engages Olivia with constructive activities that include art and music. Mother urges that Olivia “not only understands the concept of a biological parent, she perceives Mother as such (‘come to mommy’) and values their relationship.”
We agree with mother that she has regularly visited Olivia and is appropriate and affectionate with Olivia during visits. Further, Olivia is happy and comfortable in mother’s care. In short, we have no doubt that mother and daughter love one another and enjoy spending time together. We do not agree with mother, however, that these facts required the juvenile court to order guardianship, rather than adoption. As we have said, frequent and loving contact between a parent and child, while necessary to establish the continuing beneficial relationship exception, is not enough; rather, “‘[t]he exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.) Thus, for example, in In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pages 1343-1344, the court found no abuse of discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights although mother “ha[s] been consistent in her visitation with Jasmine, ” “‘has been nurturing and has provided for the child’s needs to be taken care of, ’” and “‘has a special relationship with Jasmine.’” Although the appellate court recognized a positive relationship between mother and daughter, it found that the record supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that “[t]he benefit of a stable, permanent adoptive home for Jasmine clearly outweighed the benefit of a continued relationship with” mother. (Id. at pp. 1351-1352.) Similarly, in In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at page 1316, the court found no error in terminating mother’s parental rights despite positive, consistent visitation, during which mother “would take responsibility for changing Bailey’s diapers and feeding him, ” and the child looked to mother “for ‘comfort’ and in ‘times of stress’ during the visits.” While acknowledging the positive relationship between mother and son, the court said that the juvenile court had not abused its discretion in finding “that the relationship between the mother and Bailey did not constitute a ‘compelling reason’ for finding that adoption would be detrimental to Bailey” because mother and child’s “frequent and loving contact was insufficient to show the requisite beneficial parental relationship.” (Id. at pp. 1316-1317.)
In the present case, the record is virtually silent as to the strength of the bond between Olivia and mother. That is, while the record undoubtedly bears out a loving relationship between Olivia and mother, it does not establish that Olivia would suffer significant harm if that relationship ceased, or that any such harm is likely to outweigh the benefit to Olivia of a secure, permanent placement with her grandparents. (See, e.g., In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316 [“frequent and loving contact” between mother and child “was insufficient to show the requisite beneficial parental relationship”].) Further, even if mother had established that Olivia would benefit from an ongoing relationship, that would not be sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard. In addition, mother also would have to show “that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that the relationship between [mother and Olivia] did not constitute a ‘compelling reason’ for finding that adoption would be detrimental to” Olivia. (Ibid.) Mother makes no assertion in this regard, and on the present record we find that the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that the absence of mother from Olivia’s life would not result in significant detriment and therefore was not a compelling reason for rejecting adoption.
Mother contends that Olivia’s bond with her is similar to the parent-child bond in In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681. There, Amber and her siblings (ages five years, two and one-half years, and seven months) were removed from their mother’s custody and placed with their grandparents. Mother failed to reunify, and the juvenile court terminated her parental rights. (Id. at p. 684.) Mother appealed, contending among other things that the juvenile court erred by failing to find that the children would benefit from a continuing relationship with her. (Ibid.) The court noted that a psychologist who conducted a bonding study concluded that mother and Amber shared a “‘primary attachment’” and a “‘primary maternal relationship’” and that “‘[i]t could be detrimental’” to sever that relationship. Amber’s therapist also believed that Amber and mother had a strong bond and that it was important that their relationship continue. (Id. at p. 689.) The court-appointed special advocate (CASA) testified that Amber’s younger brother loved and missed mother and had difficulty separating from her. (Ibid.) According to the court, “The common theme running through the evidence from the bonding study psychologist, the therapists, and the CASA is a beneficial parental relationship that clearly outweighs the benefit of adoption. There is no challenge to the fact that Amber and Samuel love and miss Mother and have a strong primary bond with her. Even Destiny, while seemingly too young to have developed much of a relationship with Mother, nevertheless was very strongly attached to her.” (Id. at p. 690.) Thus, the court said, the juvenile court erred in addressing the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception “in no more than a cursory manner and [failing to] look at the long-term effect on the children of terminating Mother’s parental rights.” (Amber M., supra, at p. 691.) It reversed and remanded for a new section 366.26 hearing “that shall include a finding whether the exception has been demonstrated.” (Amber M., supra, at p. 691.)
Mother also contends that the present case is similar to In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289. There, although S.B.’s father had “‘complied with every aspect of his case plan, ’” physical and emotional health issues prevented him from reunifying with her. (Id. at pp. 293-294.) The juvenile court terminated his parental rights, finding that although father maintained frequent and loving contact with S.B. and they shared an emotionally significant relationship, there was no evidence to suggest that the relationship was parental in nature or that it would be greatly detrimental to S.B. to terminate her relationship with her father. (Id. at p. 296.) The appellate court reversed. It noted that a bonding study described the bond between father and child as “‘fairly strong’ or ‘moderate’” and opined that there was a potential for harm to the child if she were to lose the parent-child relationship. (Id. at p. 295.) The court further noted that father was S.B.’s primary caregiver for three years and that after she was removed from his custody, S.B. continued to display a strong attachment to him. Based on this record, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference is that S.B. would be greatly harmed by the loss of her significant, positive relationship with her father. (Id. at p. 301.)
We do not agree with mother that Amber M. and In re S.B. require us to conclude that termination of parental rights was improper here. In each of those cases, there was evidence of a strong primary attachment between parent and child: In Amber M., the psychologist who conducted a bonding study testified that mother and child shared “‘a primary attachment’” and a “‘primary maternal relationship’” and that “‘[i]t could be detrimental’” to sever that relationship (103 Cal.App.4th at p. 689); in In re S.B., a psychologist described the bond between father and child as “‘fairly strong’ or ‘moderate’” and testified that there was a potential for harm to the child if she were to lose the parent-child relationship (164 Cal.App.4th at p. 295). In the present case, there is no such evidence. Indeed, the only evidence to support mother’s claim of detriment is in the form of the social workers’ reports that mother was appropriate and loving with Olivia during monitored visits. We simply have noevidence-whether in the form of psychologist’s testimony, bonding study, or otherwise-of the strength or quality of the bond between mother and child or of the likely consequences to Olivia if that bond were to be severed. Thus, although there is no dispute that Olivia loves her mother, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Olivia likely would suffer detriment if mother’s parental rights were terminated.
Mother also contends that, even if Olivia cannot be returned to her custody, guardianship, rather than adoption, should have been ordered because it would give her a better chance of ensuring a continuing relationship with her daughter. We do not agree. “The Legislature has decreed... that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them. In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the Legislature recognized that, ‘Although guardianship may be a more stable solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.’ (Jones T. v. Superior Court [(1989)] 215 Cal.App.3d [240, ] 251.)” (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)
III. Sibling Relationship Exception
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption. For the following reasons, we disagree.
“The sibling relationship exception applies where the juvenile court finds that ‘substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship’ is a ‘compelling reason’ to conclude that adoption would be detrimental to the child. In making this determination, the court should take into consideration ‘the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)” (In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.)
“‘Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for adoption when possible, the “sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a ‘compelling reason’ for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be ‘detrimental’ to the child due to ‘substantial interference’ with a sibling relationship.” [Citation.] Indeed, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption. (In re L. Y. L.[, supra, ] 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952-953....)’ (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61.)” (In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)
In the present case, Olivia lived for the first two and a half years of her life with her siblings. Mother testified that Olivia asked for her siblings “[a]ll the time” and that it was hard for her to talk to them on the telephone without crying. A social worker observed that Olivia appeared happier when playing with her siblings. While these facts suggest a bond between Olivia and her siblings, they do not compel a finding that “ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Further, sole physical custody of Olivia’s siblings had been awarded to their father, not to mother, and thus the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded that the sibling group would not have been able to maintain a relationship even if mother’s rights were not terminated.
For all of these reasons, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that, even if adoption would interfere with Olivia’s sibling relationships, the benefit of continuing those relationships was outweighed by the benefit of adoption and, therefore, the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons discussed above, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s parental rights and referring Olivia for adoptive placement.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., MANELLA, J.