Opinion
W.C. No. 4-563-466.
May 11, 2004.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Muramoto (ALJ) which imposed a fifty percent reduction in compensation based on a finding that the claimant violated an employer safety rule requiring him to wear a seat belt. Section 8-42-112(1)(b), C.R.S. 2003. The claimant contends the evidence is insufficient to establish that he willfully violated the rule or that the violation caused his injuries. The claimant further contends the ALJ's order violates "public policy" because it is inconsistent with § 42-4-237, C.R.S. 2003 (mandatory seat belt law). We affirm.
On the morning of December 6, 2002, the claimant sustained serious head injuries while driving a company pickup truck. At the time, the claimant was driving from a job site in California to his home in Colorado, and the accident occurred in Utah. The claimant "rolled" the vehicle several times and was found 20 to 30 feet from where the vehicle came to rest.
The ALJ found, based on the claimant's own testimony, that the claimant was aware of a company rule which required him to wear a seat belt while driving company vehicles. Moreover, the ALJ found the vehicle was equipped with "operational" safety belts at the time of the accident. The ALJ concluded from the testimony of a Utah state trooper, the physical evidence gathered at the accident scene, and emergency medical reports, that the claimant was not wearing the seat belt and was "ejected" from the truck. Further, the ALJ inferred the claimant's failure to wear the belt was willful, and found the violation of the rule resulted in "serious injury." Thus, the ALJ imposed the reduction in compensation authorized by § 8-42-112(1)(b).
I.
On review, the claimant first contends the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that he violated the safety rule by failing to use the seat belt. The claimant asserts there is no evidence to controvert his testimony that he fastened the belt before departing Las Vegas, Nevada. Instead, the claimant argues the evidence merely permits the inference he was not wearing the belt when he was ejected from the vehicle. We disagree.
Section 8-42-112(1)(b) requires the imposition of a fifty percent reduction in compensation if the claimant's injury results from a "willful failure to obey any reasonable safety rule adopted by the employer for the safety of the employee." The questions of whether there was a violation, whether the violation was willful, and whether the injury resulted from the violation are all issues of fact for determination by the ALJ. City of Las Animas v. Maupin, 804 P.2d 285 (Colo.App. 1990); Tatum-Reese Development Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo. App. 149, 490 P.2d 94 (1971).
Because these issues are factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2003. Substantial evidence is probative evidence which would support a reasonable belief in the existence of a fact without regard to conflicting evidence or inferences. Ackerman v. Hilton's Mechanical Men, Inc., 914 P.2d 524 (Colo.App. 1996). This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. If two or more equally plausible inferences may be drawn, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 117 (Colo.App. 2003).
The claimant's argument notwithstanding, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's inference that the claimant was not wearing the seat belt at the time of the accident. First, the claimant admitted the seat belt was "operational." (Tr. P. 28). The claimant was found some 20 feet from where the truck came to rest. The trooper testified that, although there is no way to know for sure whether the claimant was wearing the seat belt when the accident began, if a lap and shoulder belt are worn, a person should not be "ejected" from a vehicle at all. Thus, the trooper opined the claimant was not wearing a belt. (Pitts Depo. Pp. 14, 21, 26, 31; Deposition Exhibit A). The ALJ logically inferred from this evidence that the claimant did not fasten the belt and, as a consequence, was ejected when the truck began to roll.
Moreover, the claimant introduced no evidence, expert or otherwise, suggesting that the seat belt failed or became accidentally unbuckled before the accident. It is true there was some evidence, including left shoulder bruising and a fractured clavicle, from which the ALJ might have inferred that the belt was worn or that the respondents failed to meet their burden of proof. However, the ALJ has drawn a plausible inference from this record and we may not interfere with it. Ackerman v. Hilton's Mechanical Men, Inc., supra.
The claimant next contends the evidence does not support the inference that the violation of the safety rule was "willful." The claimant argues the ALJ's finding is "conjectural." The claimant relies on his own testimony that he habitually buckled the belt and he acted in accordance with that habit when he left Las Vegas on December 6.
Willfulness means that the claimant acted with deliberate intent. However, a finding of willfulness does not require the ALJ to find the claimant, having in mind the rule, determined to break it. Rather, it is sufficient to show that the claimant, knowing the rule, intentionally did the forbidden thing. Stockdale v. Industrial Commission, 76 Colo. 494, 232 P. 669 (1925). Willful conduct may be inferred from the circumstances, including evidence that the claimant was aware of the rule and the obviousness of the danger. See Bennett Properties Co. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 135, 437 P.2d 548 (1968); Gargano v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation District, W.C. No. 4-335-104 (February 19, 1999).
Here, the claimant admitted he was aware of the employer's rule, knew the reason for the rule, and that it was his practice to comply with the rule. Indeed, the claimant admitted that if he did not wear the belt, he would have "decided" not to. (Tr. Pp. 36, 41, 50). This evidence amply supports the ALJ's inference that the claimant's failure to wear the belt was "willful." As the ALJ found, there was ample basis to question the claimant's hearing testimony that he remembered he put the seat belt on in Las Vegas. Indeed, the claimant admitted that he testified in his deposition that he couldn't remember if he was wearing the belt.
The claimant next contends the evidence does not support the inference that failure to wear the belt caused the injuries. The claimant asserts there is "not one scintilla of evidence" on this issue, and the ALJ did not even address it. We disagree.
The ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is sufficient if the findings indicate the factual and legal bases of the order. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
Here, the ALJ found the claimant sustained "serious injury" as a "result" of his failure to wear a safety belt. (Finding of Fact 8). Thus, the claimant's assertion that the ALJ did not address the causation issue is without merit.
Further, this finding constitutes a plausible inference from the record. The medical record indicates the claimant sustained a serious head injury and was in a coma after the accident. According to the Utah trooper, a pool of blood was found where the claimant's head came to rest, but no blood was observed inside the vehicle. The trooper inferred that the claimant hit his head on an "external object." (Pitts Depo. P. 28). Based on this evidence, the ALJ could find the claimant's head injury resulted from his failure to wear the seat belt. While other inferences might be possible from this record, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the causation issue. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra.
III.
The claimant next contends that imposition of the penalty in this case violates "public policy." In support of this proposition, the claimant cites the mandatory seat belt law. This argument is not persuasive.
Section 42-4-237(2), C.R.S. 2003, requires drivers of vehicles "equipped with a safety belt system" to wear and fasten the belt "while the motor vehicle is operated on a street or highway in this state." Section 42-4-237(7), C.R.S. 2003, provides as follows:
Evidence of failure to comply with the requirement of subsection (2) of this section shall be admissible to mitigate damages with respect to any person who was involved in a motor vehicle accident and who seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for injuries resulting from the accident. Such mitigation shall be limited to awards for pain and suffering and shall not be used for limiting recovery of economic loss and medical payments.
The claimant reasons that in this case, the respondents are attempting to use the claimant's failure to wear a seat belt as a method for mitigating economic loss payable as workers' compensation benefits. The claimant reasons that this application of § 8-42-112(1)(b) violates the public policy set forth in subsection (7) of the mandatory seat belt law (no mitigation of economic loss).
It is true that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together to effect the legislative intent. Spracklin v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 66 P.3d 176 (Colo.App. 2002). However, in our opinion the mandatory set belt law and § 8-42-112(1)(b) do not address the same subject matter. Moreover, construing these statutes in the way argued for by the claimant would defeat the public policies inherent in both the mandatory set belt law and the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).
Subsection (7) of the mandatory seat belt law explicitly addresses "mitigation" of pain and suffering damages in "litigation" where the plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt. Thus, the statute contemplates civil tort litigation in which "non-economic" damages may be assessed. As stated in Anderson v. Watson, 953 P.2d 1284, 1290 (Colo. 1998), a case interpreting the mandatory seat belt law, "it is not unusual for the legislature to circumscribe non-economic damages as a declaration of public policy," as was the case with "tort reform legislation."
However, workers' compensation claims do not involve civil tort litigation between a plaintiff and an alleged tortfeasor. To the contrary, the workers' compensation system replaced the employee's common law right to sue and is based on the "mutual renunciation of common law tort claims and defenses in favor of a no-fault system and reduced guaranteed benefits." Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Colo. 2003). The reduced benefits provided by workers' compensation are economic in nature, encompassing primarily medical and related expenses and loss of earning capacity as measured by temporary and permanent disability benefits. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999). The only arguable exception is disfigurement benefits.
Thus, subsection (7) of the mandatory seat belt law operates in the realm of common law tort litigation based on fault. Because workers' compensation claims involve an essentially no-fault system providing economic benefits, it makes little sense to infer that the General Assembly intended the principles of subsection (7) to have any effect whatsoever on the statutory scheme of workers' compensation where "non-economic damages" are unavailable. The mandatory seat belt law and the Act simply do not address the same kinds of cases.
In any event, the claimant's argument would defeat the public policies underlying both subsection (7) and the Act. Subsection (7) was enacted to encourage the use of seat belts by reducing pain and suffering damages in cases where the plaintiff did not use a belt. Anderson v. Watson, 953 P.2d at 1290. Section 8-42-112(1)(b) was enacted to deter employee misconduct by reducing compensation indemnity benefits. Arenas v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 8 P.3d 558 (Colo.App. 2000). The claimant's interpretation of these statutes, when applied to workers' compensation claims, would excuse failure to use a seat belt contrary to subsection (7), and encourage misconduct by excusing a violation of the employer's seat belt rule contrary to § 8-42-112(1)(b). Thus, we perceive no error in the ALJ's application of § 8-41-112(1)(b).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated January 27, 2004, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
David Cain
Dona Halsey
Chayo Oldson, Denver, CO, Digital Communication, Englewood, CO, Lumberman's Mutual Casualty, c/o Nhu Miller, Specialty Risk Services, Denver, CO, Neil D. O'Toole, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
Kyle L. Thacker, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).