Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD223958, JD223959, JD223960, JD224423
BUTZ, J.
M.F., the mother of O.H., L.F., Je.F., and Jo.F (the minors), appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petitions for modification without an evidentiary hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) and terminating her parental rights (§§ 366.26, 395). Mother makes three contentions of alleged prejudicial error in the proceedings, including a claim that the court’s denial of mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing on her petitions constituted reversible error. Disagreeing with each of those claims, we shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2006, Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed original dependency petitions pursuant to section 300 on behalf of O.H., L.F., and Je.F., who ranged in age from 10 months to five years old. Those petitions alleged mother’s substance abuse problem rendered her incapable of providing adequate care for the three minors, and that mother had a history of domestic violence. On June 2, 2006, the Department filed a petition on behalf of days-old Jo.F., alleging mother had a history of domestic violence, she tested positive for methamphetamine while pregnant with Jo.F., and averring that mother had failed to obtain dental care needed for L.F. and Je.F.
The juvenile court sustained the petitions in part, adjudged the minors dependent children, and granted mother reunification services. The minors were removed from parental custody and eventually all were placed together in foster care. Mother visited the minors regularly, and generally those visits went well. Although she denied using controlled substances, on several occasions during the reunification period mother tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine.
On May 4, 2007, the Department placed L.F. in mother’s custody, but detained L.F. several weeks later, due to mother’s allegedly inappropriate contact with two men. Thereafter, the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services. According to the Department, although she had completed various services, mother had not benefited from them, as she continued to use controlled substances and engage in domestic violence.
The two oldest minors, L.F. and Je.F., told the Department they wished to return to mother’s custody. All four minors were in good health, except that Je.F. required speech therapy. The Department recommended adoption for the minors as a sibling group to be the appropriate permanent plan.
The minors’ foster parent wished to adopt only Jo.F. The paternal aunt and uncle of the minors, who had visited the minors regularly, indicated their desire to adopt all four minors. After receiving an initial denial of their adoption request, the aunt and uncle later were approved for placement. However, the Department was required to conduct an additional investigation to determine whether the uncle could pass an adoption home study, as he had a 2000 misdemeanor conviction for spousal battery. One Department report suggested it was likely the aunt and uncle would receive final approval. Opining that the minors were generally adoptable, the Department stated it would search for an adoptive home concurrently with the aunt and uncle’s request.
On January 22, 2008, mother filed four identical petitions for modification on behalf of the minors, seeking custody of them and an additional period of reunification services. In each petition, mother averred she was participating in various programs on her own initiative, had tested negative for controlled substances, was employed, and had adequate housing. As to why the modifications she was requesting would be better for the minors, mother claimed that she had maintained consistent contact with the minors, and continued to participate in services intended to mitigate the problems that led to the filing of the dependency petitions. Moreover, according to mother, the minors were in a placement that was unwilling to provide permanency for them. Mother attached copies of documents to her petitions pertaining to her participation in services. The juvenile court scheduled the matter for a hearing on the modification petitions.
At the February 22, 2008 hearing on the petitions, the juvenile court denied mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing, ruling mother had failed to sustain her burden of proof. Counsel for mother then asked the court to grant the modification petitions, arguing mother had established changed circumstances sufficient to justify reunification with the minors. In denying the petitions, the juvenile court stated in part as follows: “I do recognize that [mother] has made some decisions that were very clearly difficult for her personally to make. But the newness of those decisions and . . . the modification of her behavior has been still very recent when the Court considers the long-standing nature of her domestic violence history and her involvement in relationships that are domestically violent and the long-standing nature of her addiction that she [has] only begun to very recently deal with fully. So I do think that she’s made some change, but I do have to agree with counsel that the change can best be summarized as ‘changing circumstances,’ that [mother] is beginning to make the level of progress that she would need to be showing much earlier in these proceedings for the Court to consider continuing reunification services. [¶] I cannot find that it is in the best interests of the children to ask them to delay permanency. Very clearly the law contemplates giving parents an opportunity of time to safely and successfully reunify with their children, and that this cannot occur [sic] to move to permanency planning for the children. [¶] The Court in September and October relative to these children terminated reunification services at that time. The evidence continued to establish the mother maintaining domestically violent relationships, and the mother not being fully in recovery from her substance abuse problem. The petition[s] that [are] before the Court reference[] the mother participating in services back in 2006. It’s difficult for the Court to glean from th[e] petition[s] exactly what the mother has done subsequent to the termination of reunification services because as counsel have argued [mother] has consistently gone to services. Her[e] the benefit she’s received from those services has always been the question. And when the Court considers the full circumstances of the case, including the history, the long-standing history that these children have been subjected to, with the recency of the mother’s progress, clearly risk would exist to reunify the children at this time with their mother. [¶] If the Court doesn’t reunify the children, then I am asking the children to wait yet an extended period of time with merely the hope that [mother] this time truly will not only participate in the service[s] but make equal and lasting change. The Court cannot find there is sufficient compelling evidence that that is the situation such that it would be consistent with the best interest[s] of the children to delay permanency . . . .”
At the hearing on selection of a permanent plan for the minors, mother testified that her visits with the minors had gone well. Counsel for mother stated that mother opposed adoption as the permanent plan for the minors, and argued termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, as she visited them regularly and they loved her.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found it likely the minors would be adopted and terminated mother’s parental rights. In doing so, the court stated in part as follows: “I don’t think . . . the evidence establishes that under Section 366.26, subdivision (C)(1) . . . the children are not adoptable. I should probably phrase that in the opposite because I think the Department bears the burden at the outset, and the Department has met [its] burden to establish that it’s likely the children would be adopted if rights are terminated. The Department is clearly cognizant that this is a sibling group. The Department initially asked for a 120-day continuance to evaluate the relative placement as a possibility and whether or not the aunt and uncle may be able to pass a home study. That is a situation that continues to be evaluated. [¶] The Department doesn’t have an answer to that. That could be a very lengthy process. But the Department has also indicated in [its]--in the information in the reports before the Court, that but for [Je.F] having some speech difficulties and related issues, that these children are all emotionally healthy with no major behavioral problems, no developmental delays. And they all appear to be developmentally on track. Again, noting [Je.F’s] need for a speech therapist. The Department has said that home finding is occurring for the children. And the position of the Department is that having consulted with the home-finding worker, I guess is the appropriate title, it’s likely a home will be found for these children. [¶] So I will make the finding by clear and convincing evidence that the children are likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. The Court does not find that Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) is satisfied. There is insufficient evidence for the Court to find that the statutory language is applicable. The children shall not be living with a relative who is unable or unwilling to adopt the children. And the Court has previously found under Section 361.3 that placement is not appropriate at this point in time. So I don’t think that it is then appropriate for the Court to somewhat indicate that the language somehow--or the statute somehow nonetheless applies to this situation. [¶] I think very clearly that the change in Section 366.26 is . . . a clear intention that when children are with relatives, relatives should not be put in a position where they are forced, so to speak, to adopt children. I think that the law is very, very clear, though, that placing the children in any home, even a relative placement, is something that should be undertaken with the utmost appreciation and concern for the concurrent planning that is required for every dependent child. [¶] I, likewise, cannot find that there’s sufficient evidence, even a preponderance of the evidence, to determine that Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) is applicable, specifically [(B)(i)], in regard to the mother maintaining regular contact and visitation such that the child--each of the children individually would benefit from continuing that relationship. It’s clear to me that the mother has regularly attended her visits. It’s clear that the children enjoy visits, that the mother very much loves her children. But the evidence necessary to be established is that the contact between the children and the mother is so beneficial to the children that they would suffer long-term detriment, and that evidence just simply is not before the court as the Court would be required to consider under Autumn H. and that progeny of cases.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 (Autumn H.).)
DISCUSSION
I
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in denying her petitions for modification without an evidentiary hearing. According to mother, by participating in various programs on her own initiative, she had demonstrated changed circumstances. Noting a bond existed with the minors, mother also suggests the record reflects it would have served the minors’ best interests to grant mother an evidentiary hearing. Mother argues that the court’s denial of her petitions for modification without an evidentiary hearing deprived her of the opportunity to present favorable evidence. Therefore, mother contends, reversal of the orders terminating her parental rights was required.
Although much of mother’s argument is directed at the denial of her request for a contested hearing on her petitions, we presume she also is challenging the court’s denial of the petitions themselves and therefore we will address the merits of the petitions.
At the outset of the hearing on the modification petitions, counsel for mother argued a contested or evidentiary hearing was required to enable mother to testify about her participation and progress in the services she had undertaken on her own initiative. According to mother’s counsel, mother also would testify that she was “ready to reunify with [the minors] because of the services that she [has] been participating in.”
In denying the request for an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found that the proffered testimony by mother was no more than an addition to the petitions filed by mother, an update of those petitions, which the court suggested could have been provided earlier and would show merely “changing” circumstances. Looking at modification petitions generally, the court also stated that when balanced against the delay likely to be occasioned by parents requesting contested hearings, especially where, as here, it was unclear that any contested issue of fact existed, the court did not believe mother had sustained her burden of proof.
We agree with the juvenile court’s ruling. First, as the record reflects, mother was accorded a hearing on the petitions, including argument on the petitions, which the record shows the court considered. Moreover, as the court found, evidence in the form of mother’s testimony pertaining to her efforts perhaps would show changing circumstances, but already was contained in the petitions filed. As the court ruled, such testimony would not be relevant to any contested issue of fact. Finally, contrary to mother’s assertion, mother availed herself of the opportunity to show the best interests of the minors would be promoted by modifying previous orders when she presented that argument in her petitions. There was no due process violation or other error in the court’s decision.
A parent may bring a petition for modification of any order of the juvenile court pursuant to section 388 based on new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances. “The parent requesting the change of order has the burden of establishing that the change is justified. [Citation.] The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.) Determination of a petition to modify is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and, absent a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the juvenile court must be upheld. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) The best interests of the child are of paramount consideration when the petition is brought after termination of reunification services. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child, the juvenile court looks not to the parent’s interests in reunification but to the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Ibid; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Section 388 states in part: “(a) Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (c) If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, recognition of a sibling relationship, or termination of jurisdiction, the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . .”
The court may consider “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.)
To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include facts that make a prima facie showing of a change in circumstances and demonstrate “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414.) More than general conclusory allegations are required to make this showing, even when the petition is liberally construed. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence . . ., would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.)
Here, the minors’ “‘needs . . . for permanence and stability’” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317) required a demonstration that mother had made significant changes in her circumstances and would be able at some point in the near future to resume custody of the minors. Alternatively, mother was required to show that the proposed modification might serve the best interests of the minors. Unfortunately for mother, the record demonstrates neither circumstance was shown.
As the Department suggests and the record shows, mother did not demonstrate that she had benefited from the services which she had received. In fact, from an examination of her petitions, it is apparent that mother still was participating in services. Moreover, mother’s petitions for modification did not aver when she might be ready and able to resume custody of the minors without also continuing to receive services. Accordingly, mother’s circumstances may have been changing, but were not yet “changed.”
Mother’s efforts to participate in services on her own are commendable. But the minors in this case had been out of mother’s custody for many months. Their rights to permanence and stability are paramount. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306.) Childhood cannot wait while a parent rehabilitates herself. (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038.) On the record of this case, there was no prima facie evidence of changed circumstances or that some additional period of services causing more delay in selecting a permanent plan would promote the best interests of the minors.
Citing the importance of the minors’ need for permanence, the juvenile court determined that mother had made no prima facie showing in support of her request for an evidentiary hearing on her petitions. The record supports the court’s determination. There was no abuse of discretion or other error. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.)
II
Claiming the minors are members of a large bonded sibling group that should not be separated and that no prospective adoptive home has been approved, mother contends the finding by the juvenile court that it was likely the minors would be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. Mother argues that, as the minors are difficult to adopt, the juvenile court should have granted a continuance in order to ensure that all information was before it. According to mother, based on various uncertainties about the circumstances of the minors in the record, the minors eventually might become legal orphans.
“In order for the court to select and implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are terminated.” (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Usually, the issue of adoptability focuses on the minor, “e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) However, “in some cases a minor who ordinarily might be considered unadoptable due to age, poor physical health, physical disability, or emotional instability is nonetheless likely to be adopted because a prospective adoptive family has been identified as willing to adopt the child.” (Id. at p. 1650.)
We reject mother’s suggestion the minors were difficult to place as a large sibling group due to their placement history. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) states in part that a minor “may” be found to be difficult to place for adoption due to various factors. Here, although the minors were not yet placed in a prospective adoptive home, there was every indication one would be found in a reasonable time. Moreover, the juvenile court made no finding that the minors were “difficult to place,” and we conclude the record would not support such a finding.
It is true that the minors were living in a foster home where the foster mother did not wish to adopt them. However, it is unknown why the current foster mother did not wish to adopt. Moreover, the minors generally had adjusted well with their current foster parent, with whom they had been living for many months. Finally, the paternal aunt and uncle, who were committed to adopting all of the minors, were awaiting approval of their home study. On this record, we reject as speculative mother’s suggestion that separation of the minors or legal orphanage was a possibility for them.
Cases cited by mother do not compel a different result. In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510-511, involved siblings, five and seven years old, who exhibited significant emotional and behavioral problems and who needed specialized placement. Although the social worker reported that her agency was “confident” an adoptive home could be located, the minors’ current foster parents were not committed to adoption and there was no evidence of other approved families willing to adopt children with the problems faced by the siblings. (Id. at pp. 510-512.) Under those circumstances, the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability. (Id. at pp. 512, 515.)
Here, there was no evidence of any special needs of the minors that would necessitate a specialized placement. Moreover, unlike in In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4that pages 511-512, where only a willingness to consider adoption was present, here the record reflects the paternal aunt and uncle had expressed their commitment to adopt all four minors. Nor was there anything else about “the minor[s’] age, physical condition, and emotional state [that would] make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor[s].” (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.)
In In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624, also cited by mother, the social worker’s opinion that a child was adoptable was held insufficient to sustain a finding of adoptability where the social worker provided no facts to support her opinion. In contrast to the characteristics of the four-and-one-half-year-old child in that case--he had only recently begun to speak, had problems with his “gait,” was still learning to dress himself and was only recently toilet trained--the record here does not reflect that any possible developmental delays would create difficulties for purposes of placing the minors for adoption. (Id. at p. 619.)
In In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, a finding of adoptability was reversed where 10 siblings had “various developmental, emotional and physical problems, some of a serious nature” (id. at pp. 1062-1063) and only two of the siblings’ five foster families were even “considering” adopting the large sibling group (id. at pp. 1062, 1065). The minors’ circumstances here are readily distinguishable--the sibling group numbers only four members, and the record does not reflect any potential delays preventing placement, as the Department was making several efforts to locate a prospective adoptive home, rather than relying only on the possibility that the paternal relatives’ application would be approved.
Mother also cites In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1203, 1205, in which the prospective adoptive parent of a nearly nine-year-old child was the mother’s former boyfriend, who had various potential legal impediments to adoption. As there was insufficient evidence of the child’s “general adoptability,” the appellate court reversed the finding of adoptability. (Id. at pp. 1205-1206.) The reasoning in that case does not apply to children such as the minors here, whose relatively young ages and other appealing characteristics support the juvenile court’s finding of likely adoptability, and who have relatives awaiting final approval for adoption.
In In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, cited by mother, the social services agency was unable, after a 10-month search, to find an adoptive home for the child. (Id. at pp. 802-803.) Ultimately, the juvenile court granted a guardianship after finding the agency had failed to show the minor was likely to be adopted. (Id. at p. 803.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the order of guardianship. (Id. at p. 808.)
This case is different from the circumstances found in In re Tamneisha S., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 798. Here, there has been no excessively lengthy search for adoptive parents and, as we have seen, the minors have shown the ability to form attachments with caregivers. This fact suggests the adoptability of the minors does not depend on the willingness of any particular foster parent to adopt them.
Analogizing the situation of the minors to that of circumstances involving a “special needs” child, it is true that sometimes special needs children are more difficult to place than those without such needs. For example, in In re Michael G. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 56, the minor was developmentally disabled and suffered from serious emotional problems. According to the record in that case, the seven-year-old minor functioned below his age level, was not completely toilet trained, and possessed limited language abilities. On that record, the court noted all parties had conceded adoptive placement would be difficult. (Id. at pp. 58-59.)
The circumstances here are different. Although the minors arguably are in a “special situation” with their siblings, the record makes clear that the four members of this sibling group are sufficiently young and healthy to present an attractive adoptive set, rather than one whose members are likely to become legal orphans. The evidence before the juvenile court provides ample support for its determination that the minors were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (Cf. In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 843-844.)
As we have seen, the minors are healthy and overall have made a good adjustment to foster care. Moreover, the record contains no evidence, contrary to the claim of mother that two of the minors at ages five and six no longer are young, suggesting that anything about the personal characteristics of the minors would make it difficult to locate a prospective adoptive home for them. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in finding it likely the minors would be adopted.
III
Mother contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in finding that the minors would not benefit from continuing their relationship with her. Noting evidence of the parental role she occupied in the life of the minors, the regular contact she had with the minors, and the benefit to the minors in continuing their relationship, mother argues that terminating her parental rights would cause the minors great harm.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.) The juvenile court is not required to find that termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances. (Id. at p. 1373.) Even frequent and loving contact is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent a significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
In this case, it is true that mother had regular contact with the minors, and had had custody of three of the four minors before their removal. Moreover, the two oldest minors had indicated their desire to return to mother. However, as mother had not benefited from services, it was difficult to discern how returning the minors to her custody would be beneficial to them. Finally, the minors had bonded to other adult figures, most recently their aunt and uncle.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing that the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test, and both Autumn H. and Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, posit a high level of parental-type involvement and attachment. Even assuming those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support mother’s suggestion that the minors would benefit from continuing their relationship with her simply because of the attachment existing between them and due to their visits. (Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
Mother suggests the record establishes the existence of a beneficial relationship between the minors and herself, precluding a finding of adoptability. The juvenile court was authorized to conclude the contrary was true. Evidence of a significant parent-child attachment by itself does not suffice. Instead, the record must show such benefit to the minor that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Here, as the court determined, the record was bereft of such a showing. Instead, there was evidence suggesting it was critical for the minors to obtain the benefits of a stable placement.
In In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, the juvenile court found it was in the best interests of the minors to establish a guardianship, rather than terminate parental rights, so the minors could maintain their relationship with their mother. (Id. at p. 1533.) Affirming, the Court of Appeal held substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, because their mother had maintained regular, beneficial visitation with them. (Id. at pp. 1533, 1534, 1537, 1538.)
In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1530 is distinguishable from the proceedings here. The Brandon C. court found ample evidence of benefit to the minors of continued contact with their mother. (Id. at pp. 1537, 1538.) Here, by contrast, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that there would not be sufficient benefit to the minors if their relationship with mother were continued. Moreover, as the record also suggests, the minors had a need for stability and security, a need which only adoption could satisfy.
Mother suggests that because she had maintained a significant parent-child relationship with the minors, which included regular, unsupervised contact while in placement, the circumstances of her case compare favorably with those found in other cases. We disagree. In In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51, the Court of Appeal did not find an “exceptional case” where a beneficial relationship existed that would preclude adoption. Accordingly, the court in Casey D. affirmed the order that terminated parental rights. (Id. at pp. 53, 54.) However, the court in Casey D. did recognize the possibility that a beneficial relationship might exist despite the absence of daily contact between parent and child. (Id. at p. 51.) The difficulty for mother here, as the juvenile court found, is that she failed to establish the requisite beneficial relationship with the minors, in the absence of which the exception does not apply.
Here, the issue was as follows: In light of the minors’ adoptability, would a continued relationship with mother benefit the minors to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefits they would gain in a permanent adoptive home? Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s answer in the negative. On the record before it, the juvenile court could conclude, as it did, that only adoption, which is the preferred disposition (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), would promote the best interests of the minors. As the record reflects, the juvenile court had before it ample evidence on the matter, including the social worker’s reports and mother’s testimony.
After it became apparent that mother would not reunify with the minors, the juvenile court had to find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In this case, on the contrary, the court determined the minors would not benefit from continuing their relationship with mother to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to them. Mother had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. We conclude that mother failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating parental rights. (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 821-822.)
DISPOSITION
The orders denying the request for an evidentiary hearing on the petitions for modification, denying the petitions, and terminating the parental rights of mother are affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., HULL, J.