Opinion
No. 6-132 / 05-0820
Filed April 12, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel, Judge.
Karla Miller-Weatherford appeals from an order requiring her to return personal property to James Weatherford. AFFIRMED.
Katherine Spencer, Des Moines, for appellant.
James C. Weatherford, Des Moines, pro se.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Karla Miller-Weatherford obtained a default dissolution decree of her marriage to James Weatherford on December 30, 2004. On January 4, 2005, James filed a pro se motion to "re-evaluate" the decree. On February 2, 2005, the court denied James's motion, but modified the default decree to award certain items of personal property to James. On April 6, 2005, James filed a motion to "force my x-wife" to return the listed items, which he valued at $1500.
On April 14, 2005, Karla filed a motion to dismiss James's motion, which she characterized as an application for contempt, because it was not supported by an affidavit, as required by Iowa Code section 665.6 (2005), and because it was not personally served on her, as required by section 665.7. The court overruled Karla's motion on April 20, 2005, and held a hearing on James's motion on April 25, 2005. The proceeding commenced with no statement by the court or the parties as to the nature of the hearing.
That same day, the court entered an order concluding Karla had not returned the specified items and was "responsible for either not returning or losing these items." The court ordered Karla to return the items or pay $485, the value the court assigned to the items. The order contained the following warning to Karla: "Failure to abide by this order may result in sanctions or contempt."
Karla appeals. To the extent she alleges violations of chapter 665, our review is for the correction of errors at law. Christenson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 557 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1996). In all other respects, our review is de novo. Iowa Code § 598.3; Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. After considering the issues presented and the record made in the district court, we affirm the order of the district court.
Karla first alleges (1) the district court should have granted her motion to dismiss for James's alleged violations of the procedure required by chapter 665 and (2) the "punishment" imposed by the district court in its April 25 order was not authorized under section 665.4. Underlying these arguments are two assumptions: (1) James's April 6 motion was an application seeking a finding of contempt, and (2) Karla was found in contempt and "sentenced." We reject both assumptions. Chapter 665, being quasi-criminal in nature, is to be "rather strictly" construed. Hicks v. Stigler, 323 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Iowa Ct.App. 1982). Construing James's application in this manner, we cannot see how it could be considered a request to hold Karla in contempt. It was not supported by affidavit or personally served. Rather, it appears to be a request to clarify, for enforcement purposes, the court's prior order. That is how it was treated by the district court. In fact, the court's April 25 order warned Karla that disobedience could constitute contempt. If James's motion had in fact been an action under chapter 665, the court's admonition to Karla would have been unnecessary. As James's motion did not begin a proceeding under chapter 665, all of Karla's arguments based on alleged violations of that chapter have no merit. The claim of an improper sentence for contempt of court is also without merit as we conclude the order neither found Karla in contempt nor sentenced her.
Karla next argues James's April 6 motion constituted an improper modification of the December 30 decree. We disagree. In our view, the dollar amount placed on the property, to be paid only if Karla did not return items awarded to James, did not modify the property division. Rather, it provided a value to be paid to James if Karla did not comply with the property division. This is not improper.
Finally, Karla argues the district court's finding that she had not returned the property was not supported by the record. She points to her trial testimony, where she stated she did not have the listed items. In essence, this issue is one of credibility that was won, in the eyes of the district court, by James. On our de novo review of the record, we give weight to the district court's findings of fact "especially when considering the credibility of witnesses." Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g). Giving due weight to the credibility assessment of the district court, we adopt its findings of fact on this issue as our own.
In all respects, the order is affirmed.