Opinion
No. 111,674.
2014-10-31
In the Interest of C.D.A. Date of Birth XX/XX/2005, A Child Under the Age of 18 Years.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Kevin P. Moriarty, Judge.John W. Leighty, of Paola, for appellant mother.Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Kevin P. Moriarty, Judge.
John W. Leighty, of Paola, for appellant mother. Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, for appellee.
Kathryn S. Barker, guardian ad litem.
Before POWELL, P.J., LEBEN, J., and HEBERT, S. J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Mother appeals from the district court's finding that she voluntarily relinquished her rights to her son, C.D.A. Mother argues that she did not voluntarily relinquish her rights because her attorney—Tobi Bitner—unduly influenced her and caused her to give up her rights under duress. She says Bitner told her that if the court found her unfit to parent C.D.A., it would also take her other son and any future children. As a result, she contends that she did not make the decision to relinquish her rights of her own free will. But the district court, after hearing testimony from Mother and Bitner, accepted Bitner's testimony that the attorney had not threatened Mother and had merely told Mother the potential consequences of being found unfit after a contested hearing. Based on the district court's factual findings from the evidence, it correctly found that Mother voluntarily relinquished her rights without being unduly influenced or put in legal duress. In addition, Mother signed the legal form voluntarily relinquishing her rights and testified to understanding what voluntarily relinquishing her rights meant. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
On July 26, 2011, the State filed a child-in-need-of-care petition on behalf of C.D.A., who was nearly 6 years old at the time. In November 2011, Mother signed a no-contest statement, acknowledging that C.D.A. was a child in need of care. The court gave Mother a 6–month reintegration plan, but 3 months into the plan, the State alleged that Mother had made limited progress. The State informed the court that Mother had not yet found employment or housing and had not complied with the mental-health requirements of her reintegration plan.
On April 2, 2012, the State moved to terminate Mother's rights, and the matter was set for trial on June 21, 2012. Two days before trial, on June 19, 2012, Mother met with Bitner, her attorney, for the first time outside of court proceedings since she had been served with the termination-of-parental-rights notice. Mother and her attorney had not met before because Mother had not provided the phone number or address where she could be reached.
At this meeting, Bitner told Mother that she thought Mother still had problems with a lack of employment and stable housing, and they discussed whether they should go to trial or whether Mother should relinquish her parental rights. Mother testified that she had not thought about the possibility of relinquishing her rights to C.D.A. before the meeting and that until then, she had not understood that her parental rights could be terminated. Mother did admit, however, that she had read the State's petition to terminate her rights. Mother said she had thought she would not lose her rights to C.D.A. at trial because she had been doing everything she was supposed to do to get him back. But Mother admitted that she had been to court in May because the other parties felt she had not been completing the reintegration tasks.
Mother testified that at one time, she had shown Bitner information from C.D.A.'s teachers and principals and told Bitner that they would testify to her fitness as a parent. But Bitner testified that she had not known who to call to testify and didn't mention that Mother had given her any suggestions. Bitner counseled Mother that if she went to trial and the court found her unfit, the finding could impact Mother's rights to her other son and to children she might have in the future because the State could rely on a statutory presumption that Mother was unfit.
At trial, Bitner requested that she be allowed to withdraw from representing Mother because of conflicts that had arisen and requested that the trial be continued for a later date. The court denied both motions. The court did grant Mother a brief recess to talk to Bitner.
Mother testified that during this time, Bitner had told her the State would take her other son if she didn't relinquish her rights to C.D.A. and that the State would go pick him up before the trial ended. Mother testified that Bitner had also told her that any children she had in the future would be taken from her as well if she didn't relinquish her rights to C.D.A. Mother said she believed that what Bitner was telling her was true. Mother also said that Bitner had repeatedly told her she wasn't going to win. Mother testified that she had made progress by the trial date: she had obtained employment and housing and had consistently tested negative for drugs. Mother also testified that as of the date of trial, she had planned to go to trial.
Conversely, Bitner testified that while she had reminded Mother of the consequences of going to trial—it could result in a finding of unfitness that would impact Mother's rights to her other children—she had never told Mother that she would lose or that the State would definitely take her other son if she went to trial. Bitner said that she had talked with the State's attorney during the court's recess and that the State's attorney had told her that if Mother went to trial, the State planned to file a child-in-need-of-care petition for her other son.
Two of Mother's friends, Mike and Amanda Paquette, had been called as witnesses by the State because they had been with Mother during part of her discussion with Bitner. Mother testified that Bitner had asked her friends to convince her to relinquish her rights.
Amanda Paquette testified that when she was in the room with Mother and Bitner during the trial recess, Bitner had told them that Mother wouldn't win at trial and that if she lost, there was a possibility that the State would take her other son before the end of the day. Amanda did say, however, that Bitner hadn't told her to convince Mother of anything and had just asked her to be supportive of Mother. Amanda said that she understood the conversation as leaving Mother no choice but to sign away her rights to C.D.A. or she could lose both C.D.A. and her other son.
After meeting with Bitner, Mother signed a form relinquishing her parental rights to C.D.A. Mother acknowledged that she had read the clause that stated she was signing it voluntarily and that she took that to mean she was doing it on her own. The form Mother signed included a clause in which Mother acknowledged that her decision to relinquish her rights was her own: “1 am signing [the relinquishment form] as my free and voluntary act.”
Based on Mother's relinquishment of her rights, the district court terminated Mother's parental rights to C.D.A. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to this court. She argued that she had not voluntarily relinquished her rights to C.D.A. and that she would not have signed the relinquishment form if Bitner had not told her that she would lose her other child if she went to trial. We remanded the case back to the district court for a hearing on whether Mother's relinquishment was voluntary. Sec In re C.D.A., No. 108,903, 2013 WL3491303, at *1–7 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished decision).
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and requested that both parties submit proposed findings of fact and law. After hearing testimony from Mother, Bitner, and Paquette, the district court held that Mother had voluntarily relinquished her rights to C.D.A. It held that learning that a finding of unfitness could impact her rights to her other son helped Mother make an informed decision. The district court concluded that Mother wasn't under duress or otherwise improperly influenced when she made the decision to relinquish her rights. Mother again appealed to this court.
Analysis
Mother Voluntarily Relinquished Her Parental Rights.
Mother argues that the district court erred by concluding that she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to C.D.A. and by allowing the termination of her rights to stand without requiring the State to prove her unfitness at trial. Because whether Mother's relinquishment was voluntary presents mixed questions of fact and law, we review the district court's determination that it was voluntary using a two-step process. See In re C.P., No. 109,359, 2014 WL 349616, at *3 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished decision). First, we review the district court's factual findings for substantial evidence. 2014 WL 349616, at *3. Then, we review the district court's legal conclusions independently, without any required deference to the district court. 2014 WL 349616, at *3.
Mother is correct that for the relinquishment of her rights to be valid, she must have given up her rights voluntarily. Although the text of the relinquishment statute, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2268, doesn't use the term “voluntary,” it provides that relinquishments be in writing and “in substantial conformity with the form for relinquishment” provided by the Kansas Judicial Council. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2268(b)(2); K.S.A. 59–2143; Kansas Judicial Council Form (“Relinquishment of Minor Child to Agency”), available at http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/Forms/Chapter59_Adoption.shtml. The form provides, immediately above the parent's signature, that “1 am signing [this] as my free and voluntary act.” Taken together, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2268 and the form authorized by K.S.A. 59–2143 require that the relinquishment of parental rights be knowing, free, and voluntary. In re C.P., 2014 WL 349616, at *5; see also In re A.W., 241 Kan. 810, 816, 740 P.2d 82 (1987). Even if it were not required by statute, since a parent's right is fundamental and constitutionally protected, due process would require that the relinquishment of parental rights be voluntary. See In re Welfare of H.Q., 330 P.3d 195, 200–02 (Wash.App.2014).
Further, to ensure that a parent relinquishes his or her rights voluntarily, the statute requires the court to follow certain procedural safeguards before accepting a parent's relinquishment. For instance, the relinquishment must be in writing, it must substantially conform to a specific form that emphasizes the voluntary nature of signing the document, it must be made before a judge or a notary, and if acknowledged before a judge, the judge must advise the parent of the consequences of relinquishing parental rights. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2268(b)(2), (b)(3).
A voluntary act is one “done by design or intention.” C.P., 2014 WL 349616, at *5 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1710 [9th ed.2009] ). The district court explained in its oral ruling that for Mother's relinquishment to have been voluntary, she must have chosen to give up her rights, rather than being compelled or mandated to do it. We will begin our review by considering the evidence presented and the district court's factual findings.
First, Mother signed a form that substantially complied with the Judicial Council's form. Though the form Mother signed hasn't been included in the appellate record, the district court read from the form in open court. The district court read aloud the salient provisions where Mother acknowledged she was permanently forfeiting her legal rights to C.D.A. and where she acknowledged that she was doing so as a voluntary and free act:
“This is an important legal document. By signing it, you are permanently giving up all custody and other parental rights to the child named herein. ... I do hereby relinquish the child to [the] Secretary of SRS which I understand will have full power and all rights of the birth parent and legal guardian over the child, including the power to place the child for adoption and give consent thereto. I wish to and understand that by signing this relinquishment, I do permanently give up all custody and parental rights I have to such child ___. Finally, I have read and understand the above, and I am signing it as my free and voluntary act.”
The provisions read into the record from Mother's form match the provisions on the model form, which by statute results in sufficient—presumably voluntary—consent. K.S.A. 59–2124(b) (noting “[a]ll relinquishments to an agency under K.S.A. 59–2111 through 59–2143, and amendments thereto, shall be deemed sufficient if in substantial compliance with the form for relinquishment set forth by the judicial council”).
Second, Bitner's testimony supports the district court's conclusion that Mother's relinquishment was voluntary. Bitner stated that she went over the relinquishment form with Mother line by line and explained what making a voluntary decision meant.
Third, Mother's own testimony supports the district court's conclusion that Mother voluntarily relinquished her rights to C.D.A. It revealed that she “felt like [she] had to” relinquish her rights because the State “had already taken [C.D.A.] from [her] and [she] didn't want the same thing to go through with her [other son],” which shows that Mother weighed the pros and cons of relinquishing her rights. Further, Mother testified that she had signed the form knowing that her signature had to be voluntary, which Mother said she understood to mean “doing it on [her] own.” When the State's attorney asked Mother if the act of signing the relinquishment was voluntary, Mother said it was.
Fourth, Mother's original attorney asked questions of Mother at the June 21, 2012, hearing to confirm that Mother understood the relinquishment form, understood that she had the option of going to trial, and wanted to submit the form to the court:
“Ms. Bitner: [Mother], you and I completed this form just a few minutes ago; correct?
“[Mother]: Yes.
“Ms. Bitner: Prior to completing this relinquishment form, we covered the fact that you had the right to a trial or you had the right to relinquish; correct?
“[Mother]: Yes.
“Ms. Bitner: And you have chosen that you would like to go ahead and go forward with a relinquishment of your rights to [C.D.A.]; correct?
“[Mother]: Correct.
“Ms. Bitner: Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs at this time?
“[Mother]: No.
“Ms. Bitner: When we went over this document, did we cover each piece to your satisfaction?
“[Mother]: Yes.
“Ms. Bitner: Did you knowingly complete this document?
“[Mother]: Yes.
....
“Ms. Bitner: So it is your desire then at this point to submit this relinquishment to the Court for submission to [the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services]?
“[Mother]: Correct.
“Ms. Bitner: And you understand that this document then would relinquish your rights to [C.D.A.]?
“[Mother]: Correct.”
Substantial evidence therefore supports the district court's conclusion that Mother's relinquishment was voluntary.
Mother argues, however, that despite this evidence, her decision was not truly voluntary because she made it under duress caused by her attorney and because her attorney unduly influenced her. We will separately discuss each of these arguments.
Mother Did Not Relinquish Her Rights Under Duress.
Legal duress exists when: (1) one person makes threats to another person for the purpose of coercing the threatened party; (2) the object of the threats is securing an undue advantage over the threatened party; (3) the threats are reasonably adequate for that purpose; (4) the threats deprive the threatened party of his or her own free will; and (5) the threats cause the threatened party to act to his or her detriment. Bank of America v. Narula, 46 Kan.App.2d 142, 164, 261 P.3d 898 (2011). What constitutes duress is a question of fact unique to the particular circumstances of each case; whether the facts constitute duress is a question of law. 46 Kan.App.2d at 163–64.
Mother argues that she was under duress because her attorney threatened that if she went to trial and didn't voluntarily relinquish her rights to C.D.A., the State would take away her other son. Mother claims that if Bitner had not told her this, she would not have relinquished her rights to C.D.A. Mother argues her attorney did this because she was not prepared for trial. In support of that claim, Mother notes that Bitner had not subpoenaed any witnesses to testify at the evidentiary hearing scheduled to occur that day.
But the district court—which was tasked with finding the facts—found that Bitner did not threaten Mother and rejected the contention that Bitner was unprepared for trial. These factual findings are also supported by substantial evidence.
First, the district court found that Bitner explained the law to Mother but did not otherwise threaten or pressure her. The court noted Bitner's testimony that she had not told Mother the State would take her other son if she didn't relinquish her rights to C.D.A. Rather, Bitner testified that she had explained to Mother that if she was found unfit to parent C.D.A. at trial, that finding could aid the State in terminating her parental rights to her other son and to any future children she might have. As the district court noted, this is the law in Kansas: a finding of unfitness as to one child can be the basis for a rebuttable presumption of unfitness as to other children. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2271(a)(1).
When an attorney advises a client about the possible ramifications of his or her legal decisions, that advice does not cause legal duress. In the criminal context, for example, an attorney who gives a defendant harsh but accurate advice about the consequences of going to trial rather than taking a plea does not coerce the defendant into pleading guilty simply because the attorney gave the defendant unpleasant news. See, e.g., State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 838, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012) (holding that attorney who told his client that the jurors might be racially biased if he opted for a jury trial did not coerce his client into taking a plea); State v. Atteberry, 44 Kan.App.2d 478, 496, 239 P.3d 857 (2010) (holding defendant's plea was not involuntary simply because his attorney told him his best strategy would be to accept responsibility for his guilt and request probation), rev. denied 292 Kan. 966 (2011).
In fact, the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to counsel their clients on the possible results of different courses of action—even unpleasant ones—to aid their clients in making the most informed decisions possible. See Supreme Court Rule 226, Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4(b) and Comment 2 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,” including the client's “prospects of success”); Supreme Court Rule 226, Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.1 and Comment 1 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 580) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall ... render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation,” which may include “unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.”) Bitner appropriately told Mother about the potential consequences of being found unfit to parent at trial, and Mother wasn't placed in duress simply because she knew the consequences of going to trial and did not like them.
Mother notes her own testimony that Bitner had threatened her. But in finding that Bitner merely explained the consequences of being found unfit at trial and by not finding that Bitner had threatened Mother, the court made a credibility determination: Bitner's testimony was credible on this issue, and Mother's was not. We must defer to a district court's findings about witness credibility. In re Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 431, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010). The district court hears the evidence directly; we do not.
Second, the district court found that Bitner lacked a motive for putting Mother in duress. Mother argued that Bitner's motive was that she was not prepared for trial. But the district court found that this motive did not exist:
“The suggestion is that the—Ms. Bitner was not prepared for trial because she did not have witnesses.
“The court does not find that that is the situation.
“Even at the time of the hearing on [remand], the mother did not suggest there would be any other witnesses that could be called or would be helpful in understanding—presenting a different understanding of her situation.
“The mere fact that somebody does or does not subpoena witnesses for an evidentiary hearing does not mean that they are not prepared.
“Frequently in cases such as this, there is an absolute overlapping of the witnesses the State would call, the Guardian Ad Litem would call, and one of the parents would call. In fact, they're almost always exactly the same.”
The district court's factual rejection of Mother's claim that Bitner was unprepared is supported by substantial evidence. Bitner testified that she had been representing Mother for nearly a year and had read all of the reports submitted to the court before trial. Though Mother stated that she had people who could testify to her fitness to parent and that she had shown Bitner some letters from these people, Bitner testified that she had not known of any witnesses to subpoena. Because the district court found Bitner's testimony credible—and because her testimony supports the court's finding—we cannot accept Mother's argument that Bitner threatened her because she was unprepared for trial.
The district court found as a matter of fact that Mother wasn't threatened and that Bitner had no motive for putting Mother in duress. Accordingly, Mother failed to establish two crucial elements of duress.
Mother Was Not Unduly Influenced.
Mother also argues that Bitner unduly influenced her, making her relinquishment involuntary. Though no one has cited a Kansas appellate decision considering a claim of undue influence in the relinquishment-of-parental-rights context, our courts have examined undue-influence claims in the similar context of whether consent to adoption was voluntarily given. In these cases, on appellate review, the appellate courts have applied the substantial-evidence standard. In re Adoption of X.J.A., 284 Kan. 853, Syl. ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 396 (2007); In re Adoption of Z.N.E., No. 111,348, 2014 WL 3907120, at *4 (Kan.App.) (unpublished decision), petition for rev. filed September 3, 2014.
In the adoption-consent context, the Kansas Supreme Court has said that whether a parent's decision was voluntary or tainted by undue influence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy Irons, 235 Kan. 540, Syl. ¶ 10, 684 P.2d 332 (1984); In re Adoption of Chance, 4 Kan.App.2d 576, 583, 609 P.2d 232, rev. denied 228 Kan. 806 (1980). Because the question is fact specific, these issues are best determined by the district court, which has the best opportunity to weigh the evidence and test the witnesses' credibility. Irons, 235 Kan. 540, Syl. ¶ 1 0. Once again, under established standards, we do not reweigh the evidence or redetermine questions of fact and must focus on the evidence that supports the district court's findings, not on evidence that might have supported a contrary finding. 235 Kan. 540, Syl. ¶ 10. The task of this court is therefore to decide whether substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Mother was not unduly influenced.
A party is unduly influenced when he or she makes a decision not of his or her own free will or voluntary judgment but because of the will and influence of another person. In re Estate of Brodbeck, 22 Kan.App.2d 229, 241–42, 915 P.2d 145, rev. denied 260 Kan. 993 (1996); Leppke v. Heier, No. 108,377, 2013 WL 5187437, at *4 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished decision). To determine whether a party has been unduly influenced, courts look at the time and manner of the influential suggestions, the relationship of the person exerting the influence to the party claiming undue influence, the suggesting party's motive for making the suggestions, and the effect of the suggestions on the complaining party. Cersovsky v. Cersovsky, 201 Kan. 463, 467, 441 P.2d 829 (1968) (applying undue influence in the context of a deed).
The parties do not contest that Bitner was Mother's attorney and was therefore in a position to influence Mother. But the other factors do not support finding that Mother was unduly influenced:
Time and Manner of Suggestions: Mother argues she only had a short time to decide whether to relinquish her rights to C.D.A., but the motion to terminate parental rights had been pending for 3 months before trial, and Mother testified that she had talked to Bitner 2 days before trial about the possibility of relinquishment. Thus, the time and manner of the suggestions weighs against a finding of undue influence because Mother had sufficient time to decide what to do. • Bitner's Motive: Mother argues that Bitner was not prepared for trial and that her lack of preparation motivated her to influence Mother. But evidence supported the district court's rejection of that claim. Thus, avoiding trial was not a motive for Bitner, and Mother gave no suggestion of any other motive. Bitner's lack of motive weighs against finding that she unduly influenced Mother.
The Suggestions' Effect on Mother: We certainly recognize that the loss of parental rights is an emotional and difficult matter. See, e.g., In re V.C., No. 109,719, 2014 WL 902158, at * 1 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion). But simply because Mother was emotional about her decision does not mean that knowing the consequences of being found unfit at trial undermined her free will. Further, the district court found that Bitner only told Mother the truth—that a finding of unfitness as to C.D.A. could create a presumption of unfitness as to her other son. The district court found that this truth is what impacted Mother's decision, not the fact that her lawyer told her of it, and substantial evidence—Bitner's and even Mother's testimony—supports the district court's conclusion.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Mother was neither in duress nor unduly influenced when she relinquished her parental rights to C.D.A. Substantial evidence also supports the district court's holding that Mother's consent was voluntary—not the product of undue influence or legal duress—and public policy favors honest legal representation and timely solutions for children needing care.
We note that our ruling is in accord with other courts that have considered similar arguments. For example, the Indiana and Minnesota Courts of Appeals found that the emotions, tensions, and pressures of a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding are insufficient to void the relinquishment of a parent's rights—even when the appealing parties argued that they had been pressured to relinquish their rights or when they had been advised that they were unlikely to succeed at trial. In re Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of Infant Ellis, 681 N.E.2d 1145, 1151 (Ind.App.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Neal v. DeKalb County Div. of Family and Children, 796 N.E.2d 280 (Ind.2003); Youngblood v. Jefferson Cnty. Div. of Family and Children, 838 N.E.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Ind.App.2005); In re Welfare of W.M.W., No. A07–134, 2007 WL 1747221, at *3–4 (Minn.App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied July 24, 2007. If a parent could set easily aside the relinquishment of parental rights based on a claim that he or she “was unduly influenced or placed under duress during an otherwise emotional decision to give up a child ... the door of certainty and finality would never be closed and the best interests of a child could never be served.” In re Welfare of N.M.C., 447 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.App.1989).
The District Court Did Not Exceed the Scope of Its Mandate on Remand.
Mother's final argument is that the district court erred by considering the full record it compiled when Mother's case was initially before it when it was making its decision about whether Mother's relinquishment was voluntary. She contends that the record was relevant only to whether she was a fit parent but not to whether she voluntarily relinquished her rights. Accordingly she argues that the district court exceeded the scope of this court's instructions on remand by considering the entire case record rather than limiting its consideration to the testimony provided by Mother, Bitner, and Paquette about the signing of the relinquishment form.
When an appellate court has remanded a case for proceedings consistent with its instructions, the district court is obligated to carry out the mandate and has no authority to consider other matters not contained in the mandate. Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, 258 Kan. 226, 231, 898 P.2d 1131 (1995); State v. DuMars, 37 Kan.App.2d 600, 603, 154 P.3d 1120, rev. denied 284 Kan. 948 (2007); In re C.P., 2014 WL 349616, at *2. This generally means that the district court cannot raise new issues on remand that are not relevant to this court's mandate. See, e.g., Riverside Drainage Dist. of Sedgwick County, Kansas v. Hunt, No. 94,084, 2006 WL 213880, at *l–2 (Kan.App.2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that district court erred by considering additional intrusions into easement that were not at issue in initial appeal). Whether the district court complied with this court's mandate is a legal question subject to unlimited review. State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012).
Mother's argument that the district court erred by considering her case's record is misplaced because she attempts to use the law governing a district court's authority to consider new issues on remand to suggest that the district court cannot consider evidence in the case's record. The initial record in Mother's case was critical to the issue of whether Mother relinquished her rights voluntarily. As discussed above, whether a parent's decision to relinquish his or her rights was voluntary or the result of duress or undue influence is a fact-specific question that depends on all of the circumstances of each case. In re Adoption of N.A.P., 23 Kan.App.2d 257, 266, 930 P.2d 609 (1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1085 (1997) (noting that whether consent to adoption was voluntary depends on facts and circumstances of each case); In the Matter of the Estate of Koch, 18 Kan.App.2d 188, 200, 849 P.2d 977, rev. denied 253 Kan. 858 (1993) (cautioning the court to look at all of the circumstances to determine if undue influence impacted a decision). To determine whether Mother's consent was voluntary, the district court therefore needed to look at the circumstances surrounding Mother's decision—which were reflected in the record before it. Mother made her relinquishment decision in the context of what had taken place in the proceedings up to that date. In using the record of Mother's case to put Mother's relinquishment into context, the district court did not exceed this court's mandate.
The district court correctly held that Mother's decision to relinquish her rights to C.D.A.—though a difficult decision—was a voluntary one. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.