Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD216609, JD216610, JD216611, JD229957
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Jeannie N., mother of the minors, appeals from the judgment of disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 360, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code].) Appellant contends the order removing the minors from her home is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Three minors, M.N., age 5, C.N., age 2, and O.C., age 10 months, were first removed from appellant’s custody in March 2001 due to neglect, domestic violence and physical abuse of M.N. by appellant’s boyfriend S.C., who was also the father of O.C. A psychological evaluation concluded appellant was mildly mentally retarded and dependent on others for structure in her life. Appellant tended to be impulsive and assaultive and to project blame on others. The prognosis for appellant to develop the ability to parent was, at best, cautiously optimistic. Appellant completed her service plan, the minors were returned to her care and the first dependency was terminated in November 2002.
Following the minors’ return to appellant, there were several referrals alleging neglect and abuse but the allegations were assessed as inconclusive or unfounded. In 2004, a referral on a half sibling, P.S., who was burned by appellant, was substantiated and the minors were placed in protective custody. P.S. was eventually placed with his father and the other minors were returned to appellant but referrals for physical abuse and neglect continued. In December 2007, there was a referral for sexual abuse of M.N. and O.C. by S.C., which was investigated but resolved as unfounded. Four months later in 2008, there was another referral for sexual abuse of the minors by S.C. with specific statements by C.N. and O.C. about the abuse. The referral was again resolved as unfounded.
In July 2009, the Department filed petitions for the original three minors, M.N., age 14, C.N., age 10, O.C., age 9, and a younger sibling, A.C., age 3, due to risk of sexual abuse by S.C. and appellant’s failure to protect the minors. The reports stated that appellant came home and found S.C. locked in a bedroom with O.C. in May 2009. O.C. and M.N. told appellant they were sexually abused by S.C. during the past three years. Appellant called police because S.C. was threatening suicide. S.C. admitted sexually abusing M.N. and O.C.
Following S.C.’s arrest and interviews of the minors, appellant agreed to a safety plan to keep the minors away from S.C. and to comply with a restraining order prohibiting contact between the minors and S.C. Thereafter, appellant did not take the minors to follow-up examinations or schedule their therapy and did not cooperate in prosecuting S.C. In June 2009, the Department learned appellant visited S.C. in jail several times and, at his request, brought the children with her and left them at a location across the street so S.C. could see them from the jail. Further, the Department was informed that S.C. told appellant he would send a card to M.N. but sign it with a different name, and that appellant did not object to this deceptive contact with the minor. Appellant discussed marrying S.C. when he was released and moving the family to another county. When confronted, appellant was argumentative, insisting she had a right to take the minors to the jail. Appellant confirmed she had not taken the minors to follow-up examinations or counseling. The follow-up examinations finally occurred in July 2009, by which time both M.N. and O.C. had become depressed and withdrawn. The minors were placed in protective custody shortly thereafter. Appellant said she was done with S.C. forever.
The jurisdiction report stated S.C. was currently in jail due to criminal charges. Appellant remained in contact with S.C. despite his admissions of sexual abuse and her knowledge that P.S.’s father previously made allegations that S.C. abused the minors. Appellant herself had a long history of abusing and neglecting the minors. The Department recommended offering services to appellant, including counseling on sexual abuse and domestic violence, but denying services to S.C.
An addendum filed in September 2009 provided additional details of the abuse which had occurred only when appellant was not in the home. M.N. reported the molests were accompanied by violence by S.C. Appellant continued to visit S.C. in the jail and express her love for him although police officers confirmed she was aware he admitted molesting the minors.
In September 2009, the Department filed amended petitions adding allegations that appellant failed to comply with the safety plan, continued to visit S.C. and failed to protect the minors from S.C.’s violence.
A second addendum stated appellant was unable to see S.C. as a risk to the minors even after she completed services in the first dependency. The social worker stated that, although the prior psychological evaluation was too old to be valid, it was consistent with appellant’s current behavior. Appellant had participated in services prior to her discovery of the minors’ molestation and had shown some progress at that time.
At the contested hearing in October 2009, M.N. testified she wanted to return home and she missed S.C. for the positive things in their relationship. M.N. said she did not disclose the ongoing abuse to appellant because she was afraid.
Appellant testified she was aware after the first dependency that contact between S.C. and the minors was up to her. S.C. wanted to see the minors and, because she trusted him, she allowed it. She did not discuss the prior dependency or whether he had participated in classes or therapy dealing with domestic violence before she permitted him to return to the family. There was some domestic violence after S.C. returned, but he went to jail and then they worked it out. Appellant testified there was no physical abuse of the minors but acknowledged an incident where S.C. shot C.N. with an air gun, although she insisted the minor was unharmed.
Appellant did not recall being aware M.N. was molested when she was four years old but recalls M.N. had an examination for molestation then. No one told her the results. S.C. was living in the home at that time. Appellant testified there was an investigation of sexual abuse of the minors by S.C. in 2007 but again no one told her anything so she allowed him to remain in the home. Appellant stated there was another investigation of sexual abuse of three of the minors by S.C. in 2008. She did not understand whether the allegations were true or not and did not question the minors or S.C. Appellant blamed the referrals on people who had nothing better to do with their time. Appellant testified there was a no-contact order between P.S. and S.C. because P.S.’s father accused S.C. of child molestation. Appellant believed the accusations were only a “power play” by P.S.’s father.
Appellant said she no longer wanted a relationship with S.C. even if he was released from jail and she last visited him in jail in August 2009. Appellant said she contacted S.C. after the minors were taken because she was alone and had no one to talk to.
A friend of appellant’s testified that appellant asked her to take money to the jail for S.C. in September. Another acquaintance, who witnessed the air gun incident, testified C.N. was hurt by the projectile S.C. fired and the other minors were upset.
The court, relying on both the first case and the current facts, stated appellant should have learned how to protect the minors, observing that part of that was communicating with them and providing an environment where they felt safe disclosing abuse. Appellant did not provide such an environment. In sustaining the petition, the court found appellant should have known of the ongoing sexual abuse. The Department’s investigations and the prior allegations by P.S.’s father should have led her to question the minors. The court removed the minors from the home, finding there was a substantial danger to the minors’ health, safety and emotional well-being as well as a risk of sexual abuse if they were returned home and that there were no reasonable means to protect the minors from these dangers in appellant’s care.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the order of the juvenile court removing the minors from her custody. Appellant argues that the minors would not be at risk in her custody because S.C. is in jail and will not return to her home. Further, she was unaware of the ongoing molestation but now believes the minors were molested and has participated in services. She also argues that she could participate in further services while they remained in her care.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
When removing the minors, the court found both that there would be a substantial danger to their physical and emotional well-being if returned home and that they would be at risk of further sexual abuse. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1) & (4).) The court also found there were no reasonable means to protect the minors’ physical health or to protect the minors from sexual abuse without removing them from appellant’s physical custody. (Ibid.)
Appellant’s arguments minimize the history of her interactions with S.C. which have led to physical and emotional harm to her children and her inability to effectively use the services she has had available to her to provide a nurturing and protective environment in which her children could flourish.
In 2001, appellant and her children were subjected to serious physical abuse by S.C. and appellant neglected the care of her children. After successfully completing services designed to improve her parenting skills and teach her how to protect the minors from harm, the minors were returned to her care. Appellant had a fourth child, P.S., who was seriously injured in her care and ultimately placed with his father. Clearly, her prior services had not resulted in improved parenting or protection of the minors.
Sometime thereafter, S.C. returned and expressed a desire to rejoin the family. Because she “trusted” him, appellant allowed him to return without any inquiry or conditions. There was a renewal of physical abuse which appellant now minimizes. Appellant also minimized concerns raised in 2004 by P.S.’s father about S.C. molesting the children. Appellant was aware of investigations by the Department in 2007 and 2008 of allegations of sexual abuse of the minors by S.C. but did not ask either the minors or S.C. about them and again minimized the reports as having been made by people with nothing better to do with their time. Finally, in May 2009, appellant caught S.C. with a naked child and heard from both O.C. and M.N. of the history of ongoing abuse. At that point she called police, not because of the abuse, but because S.C. had a knife and was threatening suicide.
S.C. was arrested and the minors remained in appellant’s care under a plan to keep them safe. Appellant did not comply with the plan. She did not assist in the prosecution of S.C., enroll the traumatized minors in therapy or complete their medical examinations until urged to do so. With full knowledge of S.C.’s admission of molesting the minors, appellant continued to visit him in jail, provide him money and accede to his requests to bring the minors to a location where he could see them. She did not object to his suggestions for surreptitious contact with the minors and did not appear to understand that such contact could be damaging to them. After the minors were removed, appellant continued contact with S.C. because she was lonely and, after she had ceased visiting in August 2009, asked a friend to take him money a month before trial because she was concerned about him.
Appellant had services in the first dependency and, in the months preceding S.C.’s arrest, was in counseling. The counselor said appellant’s prognosis was fair if she completed several other programs and had a support network, and that she expressed “‘some insight’” but areas of concern remained. From the record, it appears that the only service she was participating in at the time of trial was nonoffender sex abuse counseling, and there was no information on how well she was doing in that program.
Over many years, appellant has consistently pursued a course of conduct which has met her needs but which has not protected the minors. She has had services designed to allow her to recognize and avert the potential for physical abuse of the minors but has not used those skills to do so. She minimized or ignored information which signaled the probability of sexual abuse of the minors and failed to provide an atmosphere conducive to disclosure. Even when presented with the reality of such abuse, appellant continued to serve her own interests by maintaining contact with an individual she knew physically, emotionally and sexually abused her children. Until the pattern of this course of conduct is broken and appellant can place the needs of the minors before her own, the minors are at risk in her care. The presence or absence of a particular abuser is not determinative in this case because the conditions placing the minors at risk of harm arise from appellant’s dependency, her focus on meeting her own needs and her failure to benefit from services. Substantial evidence supports the order of removal since it is clear the minors are not safe from abuse in her care. For the same reasons, substantial evidence also supports the finding that there is no reasonable means to protect the minors if returned to her care.
In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, relied on by appellant, is factually distinguishable from this case. In Steve W., the court reversed an order removing an infant minor from parental custody due to the death of a half sibling resulting from actions by the minor’s father. (Id. at pp. 12, 13.) The mother had no prior dependency history and was in services at the time of the hearing. (Id. at pp. 13-15.) Once on notice of possible abuse, she attempted to investigate and later cooperated with prosecution of the father. (Id. at pp. 21-23.) She began an independent life, did not intend to resume a relationship with the father, and the court’s removal order was based on speculation that she would enter a new relationship with another abusive type of person. (Id. at pp. 15, 22-23.)
In contrast, appellant previously participated in services, yet allowed S.C. to return to the home knowing of his violent proclivities. She was on notice of but avoided gaining knowledge about possible sexual abuse and did not aid in prosecuting S.C. She sought contact with S.C. and was likely to form a relationship with another abusive individual. The court’s order for removal in this case was not founded on speculation but on appellant’s well-documented conduct which placed the minors at risk.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of disposition is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, J. NICHOLSON, J.