Summary
finding good cause for delay in a juvenile's speedy adjudication
Summary of this case from In re Interest of A.P.Opinion
No. 5-715 / 05-0473
Filed December 7, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell, District Associate Judge.
A minor child appeals his delinquency adjudication, arguing his speedy adjudication rights were violated and the juvenile court erred in admitting certain evidence. AFFIRMED.
David A. Kuehner of Laird Luhring Law Office, Waverly, for appellant-minor child.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, and Kasey E. Wadding, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Nathan appeals a delinquency adjudication. He contends the districtcourt abused its discretionin (1) overruling his motion to dismiss the State's petition for failure to comply with the speedy adjudication rule and (2) admitting certain evidence. We affirm.
I. Background Proceedings
On December 13, 2004, the State petitioned to have Nathan adjudicated a delinquent for possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The adjudication hearing was initially set for January 21, 2005 but, following an unreported hearing, was rescheduled for February 18, 2005.
After the hearing was rescheduled, Nathan moved to dismiss the petition. He asserted the sixty-day speedy adjudication deadline set forth in Iowa Court Rule 8.8 expired on February 11, 2005. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the court admitted two documents over the objection of Nathan's attorney. The court subsequently adjudicated Nathan a delinquent, and this appeal followed.
II. Speedy Adjudication Deadline
Iowa Court Rule 8.8 provides:
If a child against whom a delinquency petition has been filed has not waived the right to a speedy adjudicatory hearing, the hearing must be held within 60 days after the petition is filed or the court shall order the petition dismissed unless good cause to the contrary is shown.
Nathan argues the delinquency adjudication hearing fell outside this sixty-day window and the State did not establish good cause for the delay. The State concedes the hearing was not held within sixty days of the petition's filing but argues the districtcourt "impliedly found good cause for the delay."
Our review of this issue is hampered by the absence of a record of the proceeding that triggered the rescheduled hearing. The parties disagree on whose responsibility it was to create this record and how it affects our review. Our court was faced with an identical obstacle in a criminal appeal involving a speedy trial issue. See State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). We agreed with the State that the burden rested with the defendant to provide a record disclosing the claimed error. Id. In the absence of a record or bill of exceptions, we accepted the district court's findings on the issue "as being supported by the evidence." Id.
We will do the same thing here. While our review of delinquency proceedings is generally de novo, we will review this issue for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001).
Following the unreported hearing, the juvenilecourt found, "[Nathan's] attorney has requested that this matter be scheduled for approximately one-half day of court time." The court also found "the parties had reached an agreement in this matter. The agreement of the parties is set out in the orders below." One of the orders stated, "the hearing previously scheduled on the 21st day of January, 2005, shall be continued to the 18th day of February, 2005, at 2:30 o'clock p.m. in the Bremer County Courthouse, Waverly, Iowa."
We accept these findings. Based on the findings that the parties "reached an agreement" and the agreement encompassed the rescheduled hearing date, we conclude Nathan acquiesced in the rescheduled hearing date. See State v. Gansz, 403 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1987) ("The defendant was present, was aware of the assumption under which the district court was assigning the case for trial, and acquiesced in that date without bothering to advise the court that he believed his speedy trial rights were properly to be measured from the date of the procedendo."). Therefore, he cannot now complain of a speedy adjudication violation. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Nathan's motion to dismiss.
III. Admission of Evidence
After the petition was filed, the State gave Nathan's attorney a single police report. Approximately one month before the rescheduled adjudication hearing, Nathan's attorney informally asked the assistant county attorney for additional documents. On the day of the rescheduled adjudication hearing, the State offered a Department of Criminal Investigation report and a property inventory sheet. Nathan's attorney objected to both on the ground they had not been given to her before the hearing. The districtcourt overruled the objections.
On appeal, Nathan contends "the trial court erred in overruling the objection of the child to the admission of documents not available to the child prior to trial." This issue raises the question of whether the court should have excluded the documents as a discovery sanction. Although our review of juvenile proceedings is generally de novo, we review this question for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Iowa 1983).
The scope of discovery in juvenile proceedings is to "be as full and free as possible." Iowa Ct. R. 8.1. On the request of a juvenile's attorney, the State is to "give the juvenile's counsel access to all documents, reports and records within or which come within its possession or control that concern the juvenile or the alleged offense." Iowa Ct. R. 8.2(1). Informal discovery methods are preferred. Id. at 8.2(2).
The assistant county attorney conceded he did not give Nathan's attorney either of the contested exhibits until the day of the hearing. He explained that the first was only prepared the day before the hearing and the second was not in his file until the day of the hearing.
This type of belated disclosure could be deemed inconsistent with the following purposes of discovery in juvenile proceedings: "to expedite trials, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination and meet the requirements of due process." Iowa Ct. R. 8.1. However, the exhibits were essentially cumulative of other evidence. Specifically, the State offered a marijuana pipe as its first exhibit. Nathan did not object to the admission of the pipe, and it was admitted. The contested exhibits simply established the presence of marijuana residue in the pipe and the chain of custody of the pipe. By the time the documents were admitted, a deputy sheriff had testified that Nathan consented to an examination of his mouth, which revealed signs that he had recently been smoking marijuana. The officer additionally recounted Nathan's admission that he recently smoked marijuana. In light of this unchallenged evidence, we conclude the districtcourt did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested exhibits.
Generally a statement that evidence is cumulative is made in the context of whether admission of evidence was prejudicial error. State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1998) (noting testimony was merely cumulative and, therefore, not prejudicial). Here, because we are treating this issue as a request for a discovery sanction, our conclusion that the evidence is cumulative is made in the context of an abuse of discretion standard.
The DCI report does not state the residue was found in the pipe but a deputy sheriff testified to this fact.
Based on our resolution of this issue, we find it unnecessary to address Nathan's related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. We also find it unnecessary to address the State's contention that Nathan's remedy for its belated disclosure was to request a continuance.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the adjudication of Nathan as a delinquent.