Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0064
10-30-2014
IN RE N.R.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By Corinne Schram, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JV17735702
The Honorable Julia Connors, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Corinne Schram, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Howard and Judge Vásquez concurred.
KELLY, Presiding Judge:
¶1 N.R. appeals from the juvenile court's order adjudicating him delinquent for possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues the court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police officers because the officers failed to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm.
¶2 In reviewing the juvenile court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and we view that evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling. See State v. Kinney, 225 Ariz. 550, ¶ 2, 241 P.3d 914, 917 (App. 2010). In October 2013, two police officers stopped a vehicle in which N.R. was a passenger. After one of the officers saw a scale containing what appeared to be marijuana residue between the two front seats, the officers instructed the driver and N.R. to sit together on a nearby curb. One of the officers asked the driver and N.R. who the scale belonged to, and N.R. admitted the scale was his. Apparently, neither officer advised the driver or N.R. of their rights pursuant to Miranda before asking them about the scale. The encounter lasted approximately fifteen minutes and ended with N.R.'s arrest.
¶3 Although we review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, whether a defendant's statement was obtained in violation of Miranda is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. See State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶¶ 4, 30, 150 P.3d 787, 790, 796 (App. 2007). A police officer has authority to detain and question a person without administering Miranda warnings if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, ¶ 15, 979 P.2d 5, 8 (App. 1998). Miranda warnings are required only when a person is subjected to a "custodial interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
¶4 The objective test used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial "is whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way." State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 105, 700 P.2d 488, 492 (1985). In making this determination, courts may consider: "(1) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present; (2) the site of the interrogation; (3) the length and form of the investigation; and, (4) whether the investigation had focused on the accused." State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 523, 809 P.2d 944, 948 (1991); see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1994) (officer's knowledge or beliefs bear upon custody issue only if conveyed to individual questioned and affect how reasonable person would gauge breadth of freedom of action).
¶5 In the context of roadside investigative questioning, an interrogation becomes custodial for purposes of Miranda only when "police have both reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and reasonable grounds to believe that the person they are questioning is the one who committed it." Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, ¶ 15, 979 P.2d at 8. And "[n]eutral, nonaccusatory questioning in furtherance of a proper preliminary investigation is permissible under Miranda." Id. ¶; 16.
¶6 We agree with the juvenile court that the officers were not required to provide N.R. warnings pursuant to Miranda before asking the driver and N.R. about the scale and that N.R. was not in custody when he told the officer that the scale belonged to him. There were no objective indicia of arrest—N.R. was not handcuffed, his freedom of movement was not meaningfully restrained, and the officers made no overt show of authority and did not tell the driver and N.R. they were not free to leave. See Carter, 145 Ariz. at 105-06, 700 P.2d at 492-93 (absence of handcuffs or show of force supports conclusion defendant not in custody). The questioning occurred in an open, public locale, was extremely brief, and was neutral and
nonaccusatory. See Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, ¶ 16, 979 P.2d at 8; State v. Castellano, 162 Ariz. 461, 463, 784 P.2d 287, 289 (App. 1989) (brief public questioning does not require Miranda warning).
¶7 N.R. suggests that a "similarly situated, reasonable 16-year-old boy would" not have felt free to leave. We recognize that the fact the individual questioned is a juvenile may be relevant to determining whether that individual would reasonably have considered his or her "'freedom of action to be curtailed in a significant way, i.e., to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" In re Jorge D., 202 Ariz. 277, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d 605, 609 (App. 2002), quoting State v. Doe, 948 P.2d 166, 173 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). But N.R. has not developed any meaningful argument that a sixteen-year-old's reasonable consideration of the circumstances would materially differ from an adult's under the facts of this case. Accordingly, we do not address this argument further. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995) (insufficient argument waives claim on review).
¶8 We affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating N.R. delinquent and its disposition.