In re Novick

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Uscinski

    2 A.3d 154 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Where we impose disbarment as reciprocal discipline, we may dismiss a criminal conviction matter as moot and forego the moral turpitude inquiry. See In re Gailliard, 944 A.2d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C. 2008) (citing In re Novick, 619 A.2d 514 (D.C. 1993)) (holding that where a discipline proceeding involves both a criminal conviction and a reciprocal discipline matter, the court may impose reciprocal discipline without engaging in a moral turpitude inquiry on the criminal conviction if the resulting discipline would be the same if a moral turpitude inquiry had been conducted). Bar Counsel recommended to the Board that we adopt this approach here.

  2. In re Gailliard

    944 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 2008)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that "if respondent ever seeks reinstatement, he will have to confront then, and the Board will have to resolve, the issue of whether his underlying conviction involved moral turpitude on its facts"

    In the context of a discipline proceeding involving both a criminal conviction and a reciprocal discipline matter, we have previously sanctioned a Board's decision to focus on the latter without holding a hearing to determine the issue of moral turpitude. See In re Novick, 619 A.2d 514 (D.C. 1993). The Board is correct that Novick provides only "some" justification for imposing reciprocal discipline here instead of addressing whether respondent's crime was one of moral turpitude.

  3. In re Ezrin

    703 A.2d 1246 (D.C. 1997)

    If an attorney is disbarred by consent, the mechanism for reinstatement to the bar is found in D.C. Bar Rule XI § 16 (1997), wherein the attorney has the burden of proving rehabilitation. In re Novick, 619 A.2d 514, 514 (D.C. 1993). There is no mechanism for automatic restoration following disbarment by consent, and the granting of a pardon for any related convictions cannot be determinative. Thus we need not, and do not, reach the question of the effect of a pardon on an attorney who has been disbarred pursuant to § 11-2503(a), supra, after certification of conviction of a crime of moral turpitude.

  4. In re Simon

    626 A.2d 333 (D.C. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    The Board on Professional Responsibility recommends disbarment on consent, pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12(b). See In re Novick, 619 A2d 514 (D.C. 1993). We accept the recommendation of the Board and grant respondent's request for disbarment. Accordingly, it is