Opinion
05-20-00333-CV
01-31-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF N.K.C., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-21825
Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE
NKC's Father sought enforcement of a medical support order by filing a Motion for Enforcement of Child Support Order. The trial court denied the motion stating that medical support was terminated and re-allocated according to an agreed modification order. On appeal Father raises one issue complaining about the court's ruling. We affirm, holding that the parties' agreement to terminate child support included the termination of the original medical support obligations and re-allocated them between the parties.
I. Procedural History
A. The Divorce Decree
Appellant Father was married to Appellee Mother. They had two minor children. They divorced in December 2007.
The parties' divorce decree allocates child support, including medical support, between the parties. The decree contains the following health care provision:
IT IS ORDERED that [Father] and [Mother] shall each provide medical support and health care coverage for each child as set out in this order as additional child support for as long as the Court may order [Father] and [Mother] to provide support for the child under sections 154.001and 154.002 of the Texas Family Code.(Names redacted, emphasis added).
The decree named both parents Joint Managing Conservators of the children and granted Mother the exclusive right to establish the children's residence.
B. The Modification Order
On December 19, 2017, the parties modified their support obligations by agreement. The trial judge approved and signed an agreed Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship (modification order). The modification order terminated Father's parental rights to the parties' younger child and granted him the exclusive right to establish the residence of the parties' older child. It ordered the following relevant modification:
Child Support
THE COURT FINDS that due to the income of the parties it is in the best interest of the children that neither party be ordered to pay child support. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that as of March 1, 2017, neither party shall be ordered to pay child support.
IT IS ORDERED that [Father] shall provide health insurance for [the older child], either through his own employment, that of his spouse, or privately. [Father] shall be responsible for all of [the older child's] out of pocket medical expenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that beginning tax year 2016, [Father] shall have the right to claim [the older child] on his taxes.
. . . .
Termination
. . . .
The Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between [Father] and [the younger child] is in the best interest of the child.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parent-child relationship between [Father] and [the younger child] is terminated.
. . . .
[Mother] shall provide health insurance for [the younger child], either through her own employment, that of her spouse, or privately. [Mother] shall be responsible for all of [the younger child's] out of pocket medical expenses.
Beginning with tax year 2016, [Mother] shall have the right to claim [the younger child] on her taxes.(Names redacted).
C. The Enforcement Action
On February 4, 2019, Father filed his enforcement action as "Motion for Enforcement of Child Support Order." According to Father's brief, Father incurred medical expenses for the older child in May and June 2017, in the amount of $2, 110.70. He alleges Mother was responsible for these expenses.
Father requested that the court hold Mother in contempt, that she be jailed for up to 180 days and fined up to $500 for failure to pay the medical expenses. In addition to contempt remedies, Father sought confirmation of arrearages, judgment plus interest on arrearages, attorney's fees, costs, and interest.
On September 25, 2019, the trial judge began a hearing on the enforcement action. Before Father's attorney could elicit substantive testimony from Father, and prior to Father's resting and closing his case, the trial judge asked Father's counsel and Mother several questions, then orally denied Father's request for enforcement:
I don't agree that I am suppose[d] to separate these sentences. I believe this is a contract. It was an agreed order, and I have to review everything in the four corners of the document, and consider my interpretation. And the way that the court interprets this is that the way it is written, which is what I have to go on, which is all child support, which would include the medical support was terminated as of March 1, 2017. And that beginning that date [Father] was responsible for all [the older child's] out-of-pocket medical expenses.
So, to the extent those are the only issues that here [sic] today, I am going to deny the request for enforcement based on that language.
The trial judge signed a final order denying Father's requested enforcement on February 13, 2020. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Father's sole issue on appeal asserts that the modification order is unambiguous and that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that he had no right to seek enforcement or reimbursement of medical expenses incurred after March 1, 2017. Central to Father's position is the argument that, without specific reference as such, medical support is not child support.
Father alternatively argues that there is at least an ambiguity in the modification order that can be resolved only by factual analysis, which-according to the hearing transcript-was cut short by the trial judge's sua sponte interpretation of the parties' agreement and denial of Father's motion.
A. Standard of Review
While we generally review a trial court's denial of a child support enforcement action for abuse of discretion, the issue on appeal only presents a question of law: construction of an unambiguous order, which we review de novo. See Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 274 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
B. Applicable Law
The Family Code provides that the parties may enter into an agreement concerning child support. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.124(a). If the agreement is the child's best interest, the court renders an order according to the parties' agreement. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.124(b). In a proceeding in which periodic payments of child support are modified, the court shall render an order for the medical support of a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.181(a)(1).
While the court may not enforce terms of an agreement pertaining to child support as a contract, the court necessarily interprets an agreed child support order applying general rules of contract construction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.124(c); In re K.M.J., No. 02-09-00303-CV, 2011 WL 3525439, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ex parte Jones, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. 1962) (orig. proceeding), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding)); see also Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006).
Separate writings may be construed together if the connection appears on the face of the documents by express reference or by internal evidence of their unity. Kartsotis v. Bloch, 503 S.W.3d 506, 516 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2016, pet. denied). Documents incorporated into an agreement by reference become part of that agreement. Id. When a document is incorporated into another by reference, both instruments must be read and construed together. Id.
In construing a contract, we look to the language of the parties' agreement. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019). Contract language that can be given a certain or definite meaning is not ambiguous. Chrysler Ins. Co. v. Greenspoint Dodge of Houston, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex. 2009); see also In re C.W.W., No. 05-15-00960-CV, 2016 WL 3548036, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Ambiguity does not exist simply because parties disagree over meaning. Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740, 743-44 (Tex. 2020).
Our primary concern is to determine the parties' true intent as expressed in their agreement. Kartsotis, 503 S.W.3d at 515. To that end, we examine and consider the entire writing to harmonize and give effect to all the contract's provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). Objective manifestations of intent control, not what one side or the other alleges they intended to say but did not. URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763-64 (Tex. 2018)
The most common type of child support order is one that requires the noncustodial parent to pay the custodial parent a sum of money on a periodic basis. But other types of support are authorized. See In re H.L.B., No. 05-18-01061-CV, 2020 WL 104623, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Child support includes providing the child with medical and dental care. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.074(3). A key tenet for child support is that it is a duty owed by a parent to a child. In re H.L.B., 2020 WL 104623, at *3 (citing Ochsner v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 724-26 (Tex. 2016)). Medical support for a child is a child support obligation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.183 (a)(2).
Every agreement incorporates the laws that exist at the time and place of its making, regardless of whether that incorporation is express. Comcast Cable of Plano, Inc. v. City of Plano, 315 S.W.3d 673, 684 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Once the trial court approves the parties' agreement and makes it part of the judgment, the agreement is no longer merely a contract between private individuals. See Hallsted v. McGinnis, 483 S.W.3d 72, 74-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Gorena 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding)). It becomes part of a valid and binding final judgment and is enforceable as part of the order. See id. at 75 (citing Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 844; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 991 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); Shoberg v. Shoberg, 830 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
C. The Parties' Arguments and Counterarguments
The parties dispute when their original medical support obligation terminated and when their re-allocated obligation commenced.
Father argues that the paragraph regarding child support is unambiguous, stating that beginning March 1, 2017, neither party shall pay child support. He asserts that the paragraphs relating to medical support are also unambiguous, stating that each parent is responsible for the health insurance and out-of-pocket medical expenses for the child in their respective possession as of the date of the order, December 19, 2017. Father maintains that since no date is given for this paragraph its effective date must "by necessity" be the order's entry date: December 19, 2017.
Liberally construing Mother's briefing, we ascertain her response to Father's issue on appeal. While delving into extensive allegations concerning the parties' conflicts, Mother also argues that the order is unambiguous. She states that it was in the best interest of the children that neither party pay child support. She asserts that medical support is child support, and the fact that both sentences are placed under the same heading of "Child Support" supports the interpretation of medical support as a type of child support. Mother alleges that Father intended to separate all types of support completely from "the very beginning of (Father's) Modification case."
The trial judge, after forgoing presentation of evidence, ruled that the child support agreement was unambiguous and that the term "child support" encompasses medical support in addition to periodic payments to mother. She interpreted the agreement to make Father responsible for the older child's healthcare expenses and Mother responsible for the younger child's healthcare expenses beginning the same day as termination of their previous child support obligations. We agree with the trial court.
D. Interpreting the parties' agreement
Because the interpretation of an agreement is a legal question, we consider the extent of the agreement, consider whether its terms can be given certain or definite meanings, and construe the order in the context of the entire document. See Seagull Energy, 207 S.W.3d at 345; K.M.J., 2011 WL 3525439, at *2.
1. Original Decree and Modification
The agreed modification order states:
IT IS ORDERED that all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is denied. All other terms of the prior orders not specifically modified in this order shall remain in full force and effect.
This paragraph expressly incorporates "prior orders" into the agreed modification order by reference. The only prior order in the record is the parties' divorce decree. As a prior order, it is incorporated into the modification order. See Kartsotis, 503 S.W.3d at 516. With this incorporation, we construe the documents together and harmonize their respective provisions. Id.
2. Definite Terms
The crux of the parties' dispute involves the definition of the phrase "child support." Father claims that this phrase in the modification order was intended to apply only to periodic payments from one parent to another. Mother claims that this phrase was intended to apply to all types of support, including medical support.
The decree expressly classifies medical support and health care coverage as child support. Construing the orders together, the phrase "child support" is given certain and definite meaning. That meaning includes the definite categories of monthly support payments, medical support, and health care coverage. Read objectively in the context of the two documents, the term "child support" is not ambiguous. See Chrysler Ins. Co., 297 S.W.3d at 252; C.W.W., 2016 WL 3548036, at *3.
Construing the modification as terminating only monthly support payments renders the decree's classification of medical support as child support meaningless. That construction adds language that is not there. Yet Father urges us to read the modification order as "child support, except medical support."
To harmonize the orders, termination of the parties' child support obligation must include termination of both periodic payments and medical support as of the date stated in the modification order, March 1, 2017. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.
Father complains that he can find "no case or interpretation of common practice" that would allow the court to conclude that child support refers to the children's medical support. But we need look no further than the parties' Decree of Divorce, their Modification order, Father's Motion for Enforcement, and the Texas Family Code to find instances of "medical support" being referred to as "child support" or "child support" existing in the form of medical support.
• The Decree of Divorce orders medical support and health care coverage payable as additional child support.
• The modification order paragraph making Father responsible for all the older child's medical support is in the section titled "Child Support."
• Even though he did not seek to enforce periodic support payments, and sought to enforce only medical support, Father titled his own petition for relief "Motion for Enforcement of Child Support Order."
• Texas Family Code § 153.074(3) includes in its definition of child support the provision of medical and dental support.
• Texas Family Code Chapter 154 entitled "Child Support" contains two types of support: Subchapter A, which sets forth rules for calculating and establishing periodic payments, and Subchapter D, which requires medical and dental support for children. Section 154.183 expressly characterizes it as a child support obligation.
Inclusion or exclusion of a support provision in an order's child support section alone is not indicative of whether that provision is considered child support. See H.L.B., 2020 WL 104623, at *4. It is listed here as one of many instances of practice where medical support is arguably included as child support.
That order provided in relevant part as follows:
THE COURT FINDS that due to the income of the parties it is in the best interest of the children that neither party be ordered to pay child support. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that as of March 1, 2017, neither party shall be ordered to pay child support.
IT IS ORDERED that [Father] shall provide health insurance for [N. K.C.], either through his own employment, that of his spouse, or privately. [Father] shall be responsible for all of [N.K.C.'s] out of pocket medical expenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that beginning tax year 2016, [Father] shall have the right to claim [N. K.C.] on his taxes.
Father could have titled his motion "Motion for Enforcement of Medical Support Order." He did not. He applied the common practice of using the phrase "child support" to refer to medical support.
In short, medical support is child support. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.183(a)(2); Hontanosas v. Hontanosas, No. 13-08-00309-CV, 2012 WL 432642, at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also H.L.B., 2020 WL 104623, at *3. It is an obligation of a parent to a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.183(a). It is ordered as child support, and it is enforced as child support. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.183(a)(3).
3. Giving effect to terms in the context of the agreement
However, our analysis cannot stop at merging the orders and construing their terms. The provision of the modification order that allocates the medical support obligation between the parties does not have a beginning date.
A court errs when it fails to allocate medical support in an action for modification of child support. See State v. Hernandez, 802 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet.).
The Family Code requires child support modification orders to allocate responsibility for the children's medical support. Because the parties terminated medical support on March 1, 2017, the subsequent paragraphs served the purpose of allocating the responsibility on March 1, 2017. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.181(a).
To read the agreement to commence the parties' medical support obligation as of the date of entry of the order would ignore the mandate of Family Code § 154.181(a). We read the order as incorporating the Family Code requirement, even though the incorporation is not express. See Comcast Cable of Plano, Inc., 315 S.W.3d at 684. Because the modification order terminated the parties' child support obligations as of March 1, 2017, and because § 154.181(a) therefore requires the order to provide what the parties' medical support obligations are, we must read the re-allocation of the parties' medical support obligations as being effective as of March 1, 2017, also.
Had the parties' agreed modification order terminated all child support without allocating their respective medical support obligations at all, it might have been rendered ambiguous. But that is not the case here. Starting the parties' new medical support obligation on the termination date of their old medical support obligation harmonizes the terms of the contract while satisfying the Family Code mandate to define the parties' medical support obligations.
E. Father's alternative argument
Since we deem the modification order's medical support provisions unambiguous, we need not address Father's alternative argument that the court should have conducted a factual analysis to determine the meaning of ambiguous terms contained in the modification order.
F. Mother's request for sanctions
Mother's brief includes a request for sanctions complaining of several matters, including Father's alleged failure to serve Mother with a motion for extension of time and certain statements in Father's brief. After consideration, we deny Mother's request for sanctions. Cf. Hale v. Rising S Co., LLC, No. 05-20-01025-CV, 2021 WL 1248273, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (denying appellees' request for Rule 45 sanctions).
III. Conclusion
We conclude that the divorce decree's allocation of medical support was terminated on March 1, 2017, and that the modification order re-allocated the medical support obligation as of that date.
We affirm the trial court's order.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Ashley Montgomery recover her costs of this appeal from appellant Jimmy Cail.
CONCURRING OPINION
DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE
I concur in the majority's decision to affirm the trial court's order denying Father's motion for enforcement of child-support provisions of a final decree of divorce. I write separately because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the modification order is unambiguous and instead would address whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father's motion without reaching construction of the modification order.
Father Failed to Set Forth Sufficient Evidence to Support His Motion
I first note that I would apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny the relief requested in a motion for enforcement. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); In re W.R.B., No. 05-12-00776-CV, 2014 WL 1008222, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 20, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (most appealable issues in family law case, including trial court's ruling on child-support arrearages, reviewed for abuse of discretion). A trial court abuses its discretion by acting arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding principles. See In re W.R.B., 2014 WL 1008222, at *2.
I agree, however, that when interpreting an agreed order for child support, this Court interprets the order as a contract between the parties and applies the general rules of contract construction. See Ex Parte Jones, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) ("This agreed judgment must be interpreted as if it were a contract . . . and the interpretation thereof is governed by the laws relating to contracts, rather than laws relating to judgments."). In doing so, our primary concern is ascertaining the meaning of the contract and giving effect to the true intent of the parties. Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006); Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311-12 (Tex. 2005).
According to Father, the Modification Order ended his obligation to make periodic payments of child support to Mother as of March 1, 2017, but did not modify his obligation to provide medical support until the date of the Modification Order of December 19, 2017. Therefore, he argues the terms set forth in the Divorce Decree apply to his motion for enforcement. However, even I were to assume Father's interpretation of the Modification Order is correct and that until December 19, 2017, he could seek reimbursement under the terms set forth in the Divorce Decree, I would conclude that he failed to offer sufficient evidence to obtain the relief he sought.
The trial court denied Father's motion for enforcement of child-support order without any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support the order. In a bench trial, as here, where no findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed, this Court is obliged to imply the necessary findings to support the trial court's judgment. See In re N.A. F., No. 05-17-00470-CV, 2019 WL 516715, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Holt Atherton Indus. Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)). Because a reporter's record was filed, Father may challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied findings. See id. (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)). If the implied findings are supported by the evidence, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id.
In his motion, Father argued the terms of the Divorce Decree required Mother to compensate him for amounts of medical support he paid for N.K.C. He presented his own testimony, but that testimony primarily consists of his statements that he is the father of N.K.C., that Mother is N.K.C.'s mother, and that he filed his motion seeking to enforce provisions of the Divorce Decree. The Divorce Decree provides in relevant part that:
if health-care expenses are incurred for a child, [Father] and [Mother] shall pay all reasonable and necessary health-care expenses not paid by insurance or covered by the amount of cash medical support ordered and incurred by or on behalf of the child in the following portions:
a. If the health-care expenses are incurred by using a EPO, HMO or PPO plan, in an emergency, or with the written agreement of the other party, [Father] is ordered to pay 50 percent and [Mother] is ordered to pay 50 percent.
What is absent from the reporter's and clerk's records is any evidence that the amounts Father claims are unpaid healthcare expenses that meet the terms of the Divorce Decree such that Mother is obligated to pay. Specifically, Father provided no evidence the claimed expenses were incurred by using an EPO, HMO, or PPO plan, in an emergency, or written agreement of Mother as the Divorce Decree requires in order for the expenses to be shared between the parents. Instead, Mother testified that at the time Father incurred the expenses, she "was already carrying insurance for both of the children on my policy, because [Father] had let their insurance lapse." She further testified the expenses were not incurred in an emergency or with her written agreement. Accordingly, I would not conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying the enforcement motion and thus would affirm the trial court's order without reaching construction of the Modification Order.
If Pressed to Reach an Interpretation of the Modification Order, I Would Conclude It Is Ambiguous
Mother argues, despite the fact that the Modification Order provides a specific date for the parties "child support" obligations and none for the parties' health insurance and N.K.C.'s out-of-pocket medical expenses, the trial court intended for that same date to apply to both provisions. The majority apparently agrees with Mother's interpretation and further finds no ambiguity in that order.
According to the majority, when the Modification Order states that "neither party shall be ordered to pay child support," the trial court intended to include monthly support payments, medical support, and health care coverage as part of child support. However, if "child support" includes those three categories of payment obligations, why would the Modification Order find and order that as of March 1, 2017, neither of the parties be ordered to provide monthly support payments, medical support, and health care coverage, but then in the next line order the parties to pay medical expenses and health insurance? And if the Modification Order was intended to make all changes retroactive to March 1, 2017, why was that date only included in the first paragraph regarding "child support?"
The Divorce Decree does not provide much in the way of illumination, as it provides monthly support payments under the heading "child support" and the parents' respective obligations to provide medical support and health insurance for the children under the heading "health care." Instead, the Divorce Decree might support an interpretation of "child support" that only refers to monthly support payments.
I find no support in the Texas Family Code, either. For example, the code uses the term "child support" as the title of Chapter 154, which includes a section providing for application of guidelines to net resources "in rendering the child support order," see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.0125, as well as a section requiring "an order for the medical support of the child." See id. § 154.181. Thus, even within Chapter 154, "child support" may refer to either a monthly support obligation alone or to that obligation and a medical support obligation to a child. Compare id. § 157.005(a) (defining limitations for enforcement of "child support order") with § 157.005(b) (defining time limitation for confirming arrearages of "child support, medical support, and dental support").
Although the parties' briefings raised the issues of whether the Modification Order applied here and whether the medical-expense provision of that order was intended to have a retroactive effect similar to the child-support provision, I would not address either of those issues because neither is necessary to resolve this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Accordingly, I concur.