Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. JCM218356, Lawrence Kapiloff and Laura H. Parsky, Judges.
McINTYRE, J.
The juvenile court declared 17-year-old Nico S. a ward of the court after he admitted the crime of assault and ordered that he pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) The juvenile court, however, terminated jurisdiction before entering an order setting the restitution amount. The juvenile court later rescinded its order terminating jurisdiction based on mistake, and entered an order setting the amount of victim restitution.
Nico appeals, contending the order setting the amount of victim restitution must be vacated because the juvenile court lacked the authority to rescind its earlier order terminating jurisdiction. We agree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The juvenile court ordered Nico committed to the Short Term Offender Program, but stayed the commitment pending a review hearing. Meanwhile, it released him on probation. The court also ordered Nico and his parents jointly liable for victim restitution in an amount to be determined through the San Diego County Office of Revenue and Recovery, and set a hearing to review the commitment and restitution order. The probation department submitted an ex parte request for victim restitution in the amount of $5,881.42, and asked the court to vacate the restitution hearing. The juvenile court returned the ex parte request to probation with a note that it would hear from the parties at the restitution hearing.
After Nico allegedly violated his probation, the juvenile court set a probation violation hearing. In the meantime, police arrested Nico for sexual offenses that he committed after he had turned 18-years old. At the violation of probation hearing, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Nico and vacated all pending hearings, unaware that it had not yet set the amount of victim restitution. When the probation department brought the defect to the attention of the juvenile court, the court rescinded its order terminating jurisdiction based on mistake. At a subsequent hearing, the juvenile court ordered victim restitution in the amount of $5,881.42. Nico timely appealed from the order setting the amount of victim restitution.
DISCUSSION
Except as provided by subdivision (b) of section 602, a person under age 18 who commits a crime is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudicate the person a ward of the court. (§ 602, subd. (a).) Once declared a ward of the juvenile court, the person is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 470-471.) The juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction over the person after the person turns 18-years old. (In re Maria A. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 901, 903-904.) Similarly, the juvenile court does not relinquish jurisdiction over a ward who commits a new crime while an adult; rather, the ward remains subject to juvenile court supervision even though tried and punished as an adult for subsequent crimes. (See In re Donald B. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 804, 806-808.)
After a juvenile court determines that wardship is no longer necessary, it terminates its jurisdiction over the ward. (In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 117.) "Any order made by the court in the case of any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article." (§ 775, italics added.) We believe the import of section 775 is to limit the juvenile court's authority to set aside a prior order to persons under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the juvenile court lacked the authority to rescind the prior order terminating its jurisdiction over Nico. To avoid this inevitable result, the People contend: (1) the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction based on mistake, and Nico should be estopped from objecting due to his role in the mistake and (2) the juvenile court was constitutionally mandated to impose victim restitution and any disposition failing to do so was invalid and subject to correction. These contentions lack merit.
The People concede there is no evidence showing intentional deceit by Nico or defense counsel. The People have also failed to present any evidence to support their argument that Nico or defense counsel played any role in the court's mistake. The transcript of the jurisdiction termination hearing is exceedingly short with the juvenile court (Judge Kapiloff) stating that Nico had pleaded guilty in adult court, and that the juvenile court had "no recourse but terminating unsuccessfully, so that's what I will do." After the probation department informed the juvenile court (Judge Parsky) that an order setting the amount of restitution had never been entered, the court set the matter for hearing. However, it questioned why the deputy district attorney did not raise the matter at the probation violation hearing "since there was actually even a hearing that was pending that addressed restitution."
Although the juvenile court believed it lacked jurisdiction to issue a further restitution order, it allowed counsel the opportunity to brief the issue. At a hearing the following day, Judge Kapiloff rescinded his order terminating jurisdiction and set the matter for further hearing. The transcripts of these hearings do not support respondent's estoppel argument; rather, they suggest that the probation department and counsel simply forgot that the juvenile court had not yet set the amount of victim restitution. (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305 [setting forth elements of equitable estoppel].)
We also reject the People's argument that the failure to order a restitution amount rendered the disposition invalid. First, there is no merit in the argument that the disposition was invalid for failing to include a victim restitution order because the juvenile court ordered that Nico pay victim restitution. It simply failed to set a restitution amount. (Compare People v. Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1751 [failure to issue a victim restitution award altogether renders sentence under Pen. Code, § 1204.4 invalid].)
Next, the People analogize the instant situation with People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966 (Bufford), an adult case where the trial court set the amount of restitution after the defendant had served her sentence and been discharged from custody. (Id. at pp. 968-969.) Bufford, however, involved an interpretation of Penal Code section 1202.46, which applies only to sentences imposed under Penal Code section 1202.4. (Bufford, supra, at p. 970; Pen. Code, § 1202.46.) Moreover, the broad language of Penal Code section 1202.46 provides that "when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing... the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined." In contrast, section 730.6, subdivision (h) provides that "[i]f the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court at any time during the term of the commitment or probation." (Italics added.) The clear language of section 730.6 limits the court's authority to impose or modify a restitution order to the term of the commitment or probation.
Because the juvenile court lacked the authority to issue the order setting the amount of victim restitution, that order must be vacated.
DISPOSITION
The order setting the amount of victim restitution is reversed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J. O'ROURKE, J.