Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
SIMS, Acting P.J.
Nicholas P., a minor, admitted maliciously removing a wireless communication device with the intent to prevent the use of the device for summoning assistance (Pen. Code, § 591.5) and was placed on six months informal probation in the home of his guardian pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a).
Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Conditions of probation imposed by the court included his being subject to testing for the presence of drugs, submitting to search and seizure at any time without a warrant or consent, and not being present in a place where illegal drugs are present.
On appeal, the minor contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it imposed, over his objection, the drug testing and search and seizure conditions because they were unrelated to the offense he admitted, and (2) the prohibition against being in a location where illegal drugs are present was constitutionally vague in that it failed to include the requirement that he know of the presence of the illegal drugs. We reject the minor’s first contention, but agree with him as to the second. Accordingly, we shall amend the latter probation condition to include a knowledge requirement.
The minor also raised a third contention in his opening brief--the court err in taking an admission to a count not charged in the petition. However, in his reply brief the minor has withdrawn this contention, noting that the matter was corrected by the court.
FACTS
In July 2006 police officers went to the residence of Sharon B., the guardian of the minor, in response to a call of an out of control juvenile. Sharon B. informed the officers that the minor had returned home extremely upset because his summer school teacher had denied him permission to participate in a school field trip. The minor began yelling at Sharon B. and unplugged a telephone so she could not call for assistance. Fearful for her safety, Sharon B. went to the garage with the minor’s younger brother and got into her car to use her cell phone to call the police. Before the younger brother was able to lock the garage door, the minor entered. Just as Sharon B. made contact with the dispatcher, the minor took the phone from her. When the police arrived, the minor locked himself in the bathroom. He later walked out and was taken into custody.
DISCUSSION
I
The minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it imposed drug testing and warrantless search and seizure as conditions of probation. It was an abuse of discretion, the minor argues, because the offense was not drug related, he had no history of drug or alcohol abuse, he had no prior delinquent history, and his crime was simply one of anger. We disagree.
Section 725.5 provides: “In determining the judgment and order to be made in any case in which the minor is found to be a person described in Section 602, the court shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history.” (Italics added.)
“[Section 725.5] and other relevant policies of juvenile court law require that the court consider ‘the broadest range of information’ in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him adequate care.” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.)
Here, the minor was 14 years of age at the time of the offense. He flew into a rage at Sharon B. because his summer school teacher refused to permit him to go on a field trip, a decision over which Sharon B. had no control. He unplugged the phones in the home and yelled at her to the point where, fearing for her safety, she ran to the garage to use her cell phone in her car to call the police. He followed and forcefully took the phone from her even though he knew she was talking to the police.
Nor was this the first episode of uncontrolled anger by the minor. Sharon B. explained that while the minor was usually well behaved, he does have “extreme anger” problems, throws “temper trantrums” and breaks items in the home, punches holes in the doors and throws barstools across the kitchen. Because of his anger he was seeing both a psychologist and a psychiatrist and had been prescribed Zoloft. Thus, the minor does have a history of delinquent and violent behavior. Further, his violent behavior is becoming more serious and aggressive, progressing from vandalism to actually frightening and physically taking an object from his guardian.
Being only 14 years of age, the minor is going to physically mature and get stronger. Although there may be no evidence now regarding his use of illegal substances, it is an unfortunate circumstance of growing up that he will also have increased opportunities to obtain and experiment with illegal substances, which not only is a crime but may well make him even more aggressive and dangerous. Given this realistic future possibility, the imposition of drug testing and warrantless search and seizure conditions achieve the dual purposes of reducing the likelihood of such an occurrence and protecting society. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the challenged conditions.
II
The juvenile court also ordered the minor “[n]ot [to] associate with persons who you know or whom the Probation Officer informs you are users or sellers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, or be in places where such substances are present.”
The minor contends that the phrase “or be in places where such substances are present” is vague because it lacks the requirement that he know such drugs are present. Therefore, he concludes, the condition must be deleted or modified accordingly.
The People argue the minor’s failure to object in the juvenile court on the constitutional ground he now asserts forfeits the issue for appeal. And, in any event, the People claim, if the minor is charged with violating the portion of the condition he now challenges, “the juvenile court will interpret in the probation condition a requirement that [he] know his particular conduct was prohibited.” We reject both of the People’s positions.
In In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, filed after the filing of the briefs herein, the California Supreme Court held that a probation condition prohibiting the probationer from associating with anyone who was a member of a specified class of persons, without a requirement that the probationer know the person was a member of the class, is lacking in adequate notice and, therefore, is constitutionally vague (id. at pp. 889-893); that because such conditions present a pure question of law, a probationer’s failure to object to its imposition does not forfeit the issue for appeal (id. at pp. 880-889); and that an acceptable remedy when such a condition is challenged on appeal is for the appellate court to insert a knowledge requirement (id. at p. 892).
Although the condition in Sheena K. was that she “not associate with anyone disapproved by probation” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878), for purposes of constitutional vagueness analysis we see no logical distinction between the Sheen K. condition and the phrase at issue here “or be in places where such substances are present.” Consequently, by parity of reasoning with Sheena K. the latter phrase requires a similar knowledge requirement.
Nor do we agree with the People that if the minor is charged the court will necessarily “interpret” the probation condition as implying a knowledge requirement. The minor is entitled to a condition of probation leaving no doubt as to what is either required or prohibited. (See People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [knowledge requirement in probationary condition relating to constitutional rights “should not be left to implication”].)
DISPOSITION
The portion of the probationary condition reading “or be in places where such substances are present” is amended to read “or be in places where such substances are known by you to be present.” The juvenile court is directed to amend its records to reflect the foregoing changes and to forward the appropriate documents to the minor and the probation department. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., ROBIE, J.