¶ 10 Whether there was substantial compliance with a statutory provision presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1072, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2nd Dist.2011). A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The court did not credit the slight inference from the police report's lacking a start time that the observation period might have begun after Officer Haase read the warning.¶ 13 Defendant's reliance on In re Nicholas L. , 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011), is misplaced. In Nicholas L. , this court reversed an order that allowed the State to involuntary administer psychotropic medication to the respondent.

Additionally, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine also provides us with a basis upon which to consider the issue. In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004); see also In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1071, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011) (noting that mootness does not apply to questions about compliance with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1–100 et seq. (West 2012)) because such matters involve substantial public concern). Because only one exception must apply for us to bypass mootness and consider the merits of an appeal (see In re Christopher P., 2012 IL App (4th) 100902, ¶ 19, 364 Ill.Dec. 532, 976 N.E.2d 1095), we need not consider whether the third exception to the mootness doctrine also applies.

¶ 5 “The rationale underlying the requirements of section 2–102(a–5) is to not only ensure that a respondent is fully informed, but also ‘to ensure that a respondent's due process rights are met and protected.’ [Citation.] Strict compliance is necessary to guard a respondent's fundamental liberty interest in refusing invasive medication [Citation.] Verbal notification is insufficient and the right to receive written notification under section 2–102(a–5) cannot be waived by a respondent.” In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1072, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011).¶ 6 II. HEARING

¶ 26 An appeal is moot where no actual controversy is presented or where the issues raised below have ceased to exist, such that a reviewing court cannot grant relief to the appellant. In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1070, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011). In this case, there can be no dispute that the underlying judgment is moot, since the involuntary medication order was limited in duration to 90 days and that period has long since passed.

¶ 25 The State, for its part, does not raise any argument regarding the merits of this appeal. Instead, it argues solely that we should dismiss Tony's appeal as moot, since the trial court's order expired on June 5, 2013. ¶ 26 An appeal is moot where no actual controversy is presented or where the issues raised below have ceased to exist, such that a reviewing court cannot grant relief to the appellant. In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1070 (2011). In this case, there can be no dispute that the underlying judgment is moot, since the involuntary medication order was limited in duration to 90 days and that period has long since passed.

Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 355, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. Where the substantive issue on appeal involves the State's compliance with the Code, the public interest exception applies. See In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011); In re James H., 405 Ill.App.3d 897, 904, 348 Ill.Dec. 135, 943 N.E.2d 743 (2010); In re Robin C., 395 Ill.App.3d 958, 963, 335 Ill.Dec. 471, 918 N.E.2d 1284 (2009). ¶ 16 Here, one of the issues raised by Connie G. on appeal is whether the petition for involuntary commitment filed against her by Nicole G. complied with the Code. Because this question involves statutory compliance, it qualifies as a matter of a public nature.

Where the substantive issue on appeal involves the State's compliance with the Code, the public interest exception applies. See In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061 (2011); In re James H., 405 Ill. App. 3d 897, 904 (2010); In re Robin C., 395 Ill. App. 3d 958, 963 (2009). ¶ 16 Here, one of the issues raised by Connie G. on appeal is whether the petition for involuntary commitment filed against her by Nicole G. complied with the Code. Because this question involves statutory compliance, it qualifies as a matter of a public nature.

¶ 27 Whether there was compliance with a statutory provision presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1072 (2011). However, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Laura H., 404 Ill.App.3d 286, 290 (2010).

¶ 27 Whether there was compliance with a statutory provision presents a question of law, which we review de novo.In re Nicholas L. , 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1072, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011). However, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.