Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Donna L. Crandall, Judge. Super. Ct. No. DL023940
Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez, Scott A. Taylor and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
IKOLA, J.
Defendant Nam Nhut T. appeals from a final judgment, declaring him a ward of the court, which was entered after he admitted possessing a weapon on school grounds. Before defendant admitted the allegations, the court denied his motion to suppress the weapon, a butterfly knife. Defendant contends the court wrongly denied his motion because an assistant principal found the knife during an illegal search. The record shows the assistant principal reasonably suspected defendant possessed some kind of contraband. Thus, the court correctly denied the suppression motion. We affirm.
FACTS
A teacher at Bolsa Grande High School sent defendant, a student at the school, to the assistant principal’s office for disrupting class. In the assistant principal’s experience, disruptive students often have drug problems. According to the assistant principal, defendant was “nervous” and “more agitated than most students [sent to his office] would be.” Defendant engaged in “nervous laughter” atypical of students sent to the office. He was “moving around a lot” and “moving back and forth quite a bit.” The assistant principal had been trained to recognize agitation as a symptom of illegal drug use. Defendant asked two or three times to use the restroom. The assistant principal knew students sometimes go to the restroom to “get rid of something” — the restroom is “a dumping ground for weapons and drugs.”
The assistant principal asked defendant to empty his pockets before leaving for the restroom. Defendant took out a roll of dollar bills. The assistant principal noticed a four to five-inch bulge still in defendant’s pocket. Defendant placed the bill roll back in his pocket. The assistant principal asked defendant about the bulge. Defendant claimed the bulge was the bill roll he had just put back in his pocket. The assistant principal told defendant he was going to reach into his pocket. Defendant made a sound like, “mmmmmmmm,” and shrugged. The assistant principal reached into defendant’s pocket and pulled out a four to five-inch folded butterfly knife.
The People filed a petition to declare defendant a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, charging him with one count of possessing a weapon on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).) Defendant moved to suppress the knife and subsequently obtained evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.) The court denied the suppression motion after a hearing. Defendant immediately admitted the petition’s allegations. The court adjudged defendant a ward of the court and placed him on formal supervised probation on stated terms and conditions.
“Any person . . . who brings or possesses any dirk, dagger [or] knife having a blade longer than 21/2 inches . . . upon the grounds of . . . any public or private school providing instruction in . . . any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, is guilty of a public offense, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).)
DISCUSSION
“‘On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.’” (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.)
To balance a school’s duty to provide a safe learning environment against a student’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches, a school official may search a student upon a reasonable suspicion the student has violated a criminal statute or school rule. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 341-342 (T.L.O.); In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 564 (William G.).) “Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” (T.L.O., supra, at pp. 341-342, fns. omitted.)
Substantial evidence shows the assistant principal had a reasonable suspicion to search defendant. Defendant had been reported for disrupting class, appeared to be unusually nervous and agitated, and laughed inappropriately. The assistant principal knew these behaviors often indicated illegal drug use. Defendant repeatedly asked to use the restroom, which the assistant principal recognized as a ploy sometimes used by students to dispose of contraband. After defendant removed the role of dollar bills from his pocket, he lied about the remaining four to five-inch bulge in his pocket. Defendant’s conduct thus provided “reasonable grounds” for the assistant principal to suspect defendant possessed contraband. (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 342.) And the scope of the search was reasonably related to the search’s objective and “not excessively intrusive.” (Ibid.) The assistant principal initially asked defendant himself to empty his pockets, and only reached into the pocket when defendant lied about its contents.
Defendant misplaces his heavy reliance on William G. In William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d 550, the school administrator had no “prior knowledge or information” whether the defendant might use or possess drugs. (Id. at p. 566.) And the defendant’s only arguably suspicious behavior was guarding his privacy by shielding a calculator case from the administrator’s view and demanding a search warrant. (Id. at p. 567.) Here, in contrast, the assistant principal had some prior information defendant may be using drugs: defendant had been reported disrupting class. And defendant engaged in suspicious behavior besides just trying to hide his knife. He was unusually agitated, moved constantly, and laughed nervously — indications of drug use. He also repeatedly asked to use the restroom, which was “a dumping ground for weapons and drugs.”
Defendant further misplaces his reliance on In re Lisa G. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 801. In Lisa G., the teacher searched the defendant’s purse to find identification so that the teacher could write a disciplinary report, and instead found a knife. (Id. at p. 805.) The court reversed the resulting conviction, noting, “Mere disruptive behavior does not authorize a school official to rummage through his or her students’ personal belongings.” (Id. at p. 807.) That is not the case here. The assistant principal did not search defendant merely because defendant had disrupted class. Defendant not only disputed class, but acted in other ways indicating drug use, as noted above. “[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 341, italics added.) Defendant’s reported disruptive behavior was just one of many circumstances reasonably suggesting defendant possessed contraband.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., FYBEL, J.