Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 08CEJ601003-1. Robert H. Oliver, Judge.
Cathryn E. Lintvedt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Kane, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 16, 2008, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition in superior court alleging appellant minor N.G. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) in which a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
On July 17, 2008, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing and appellant denied the allegations of the petition.
On August 14, 2008, the court granted the district attorney’s motion to consolidate appellant’s case with that of her older sister, minor M.G. (Pen. Code, §§ 954, 1098; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 675).
On September 10, 2008, the court conducted a contested jurisdictional hearing as to appellant and found the allegations of the petition to be true.
On September 30, 2008, after the appellant and her sister submitted statements in mitigation, the court conducted a disposition hearing and committed appellant to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for a term of six years with 79 days of custody credits.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (a)(4) refers to the governmental entity as “the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities,” also known by the acronym “DJF.”
On October 31, 2008, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the 3 a.m. hour on July 14, 2008, David Wright was employed as a cashier at the 7-Eleven store on Fresno Street and McKinley Avenue in Fresno. Shortly before 4 a.m., Wright completed a transaction with a customer and then turned around to deal with the store trash. He heard someone behind him. Wright turned around and saw two Hispanic girls, one of whom was carrying a long, single barrel gun, either a shotgun or rifle. The girls were about as tall as Wright, approximately five feet, eight inches, and one girl was heavier than the other. The girls were dressed in black and brown apparel and had their faces covered. One wore sunglasses and one had a mask or article of clothing that she kept pulling up. The girls instructed Wright to give them money and he would not get shot. Wright turned around and gave them money from the store register. The girls then asked for “Prime Times.” Wright opened up a clear plastic case that held some cigars, and the girls took a handful of the cheroots and departed. On their way out the door, the girls said they knew where Wright worked and promised to come back if he called the police. Wright said he was in fear for his life during the encounter. Wright ultimately activated a silent alarm and telephoned the police.
Spring Wilson, a Fresno Police Department Crime Scene Bureau Technician, testified she went to a home in the 3900 block of North Augusta Street in Fresno sometime after the 7-Eleven robbery. She recovered a rifle from a closet on the east side of a room, just south of the kitchen at the residence. The rifle was a Winchester and a magazine in the weapon contained four live “30 ott 6 cartridges.” Wright said the weapon looked like the one he saw on the morning of July 14, 2008. Wilson was able to lift one latent print from the stock area of the rifle but the print did not match those of appellant or her sister, M.G. Wilson also lifted latent prints from a cigar dispenser and the doorways at the 7-Eleven store. However, she was unable to match those prints with those of appellant or her sister, M.G.
Fresno Police Officer Nathan Heinrichs testified he was dispatched to the scene of the 7-Eleven robbery on July 14, 2008. He made contact with David Wright and saw an empty plastic product container on the counter along with an empty cash drawer. Wright described the perpetrators for Officer Heinrichs. He said one suspect weighed between 120 and 130 pounds and the second weighed between 160 and 180 pounds. According to Wright, both women appeared to be between the ages of 20 and 30.
Fresno Police Officer Art Rodriguez testified he responded to a dispatch in the early morning hours of July 15, 2008. Sergeant Bowlan advised Officer Rodriguez and Detective Manny Romero to respond to Radio Park, at First Street and Clinton Avenue, where two suspects in the 7-Eleven robbery had been detained. Officer Rodriguez went to Radio Park and saw officers detaining appellant and M.G. in separate locations. He first made contact with M.G., who said she was not intoxicated and waived her Miranda rights. Officer Rodriguez advised M.G. she was being accused of robbing the 7-Eleven at McKinley and Fresno. M.G. told Officer Rodriguez “we jacked a liquor store” and confirmed it was the 7-Eleven at Fresno and McKinley. Upon further questioning, M.G. said she and her sister, appellant N.G., planned the robbery several hours before committing it. She said they entered the store and M.G. was armed with a rifle. M.G. walked behind the counter and demanded money from the clerk. Appellant stayed in front of the counter and took the money from the clerk after he placed it in a plastic bag. M.G. held the weapon, which she described as “a big, long gun,” during the entire robbery. M.G. told the clerk she was going to shoot and kill him if they did not get the money.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Officer Rodriguez asked M.G. what she wore during the commission of the robbery. M.G. said she wore a Tupac Shakur shirt, dark pants and white tennis shoes. The officers located the shirt in a backpack that M.G. had with her. Security officers from the Veterans’ Administration (VA) Medical Center advised Fresno Police they had seen M.G. carry the backpack in questioN.M.G. said the shoes she was wearing in Radio Park were the same ones she wore at the 7-Eleven. When Officer Rodriguez asked why M.G. and her sister planned the robbery, M.G. said “[t]hey needed money for person[al] items: Makeup, clothes, stuff they needed for school.” M.G. giggled several times during her interview with Officer Rodriguez despite his admonition that they were dealing with serious matters. The interview with M.G. lasted from 3:01 to 3:18 a.m. and took place in the back trunk area of one of the marked patrol units.
Officer Rodriguez subsequently gave appellant her Miranda rights and she waived them. Appellant informed the officer that she and her sister had robbed a liquor store and planned the robbery several hours before the commission of the offense. Appellant said she stood in front of the register counter during the robbery and M.G. stood behind the counter. Appellant initially indicated that M.G. handled the rifle the entire time and that she did not touch it. Upon further questioning, appellant said she loaded one or two rounds into the rifle itself. Appellant claimed she and her sister purchased the rifle from “a bum on the streets,” but Officer Rodriguez did not believe her. At the time of her detention, appellant was wearing a dark shirt and gray sweatpants. On the day of the offense, appellant placed the top portion of her shirt over her face.
Officer Rodriguez viewed a security videotape of the 7-Eleven robbery and said it showed that M.G. had the rifle during the offense. He based his identification of M.G. on her facial features, hair, build, the Tupac shirt and the white shoes.
Appellant said the money from the 7-Eleven register was placed in a plastic bag. She also said they took cigars from a clear, locked case located in front of the counter area. According to appellant, she and her sister told the clerk that M.G. was going to shoot him if he did not give up the store money. Officer Rodriguez said appellant giggled and laughed several times during their interview and that Officer Rodriguez advised her “this was a serious matter.” Officer Rodriguez said appellant “was a little cockier, a little more arrogant, had a bigger attitude” than M.G. He also said the sisters’ giggling “was more of a cruel type of laugh, more of a cocky, arrogant type of laugh.” According to Officer Rodriguez, he and appellant spoke for 15 to 20 minutes near the trunk area of a patrol car.
Appellant told Officer Rodriguez that she and her sister fled eastbound from the 7 Eleven after the robbery occurred. They hid in a backyard for about 20 minutes and then placed the gun and the money taken from the store inside of a bush. On July 15, 2008, M.G. told officers she and her sister were going to retrieve the money and the gun when they were detained. M.G. offered to take officers to the place where they discarded the items from the robbery. Officer Rodriguez characterized the search as “a wild goose chase.” He said they went to the area of First Street and McKinley Avenue and traveled a couple of side streets. M.G. became uncooperative and declined to help the officers further. M.G. and appellant became very upset and verbally hostile. They yelled profanities in the police car and, after six or seven minutes of driving around, the officers took them back to the 7-Eleven.
At about 2:45 a.m. on July 15, 2008, Fresno Police Officer John Mendes was dispatched to the area of the VA Medical Center and Radio Park. Officer Mendes learned the call related to two females who might have been involved in a robbery one day earlier. The VA security officers told Officer Mendes they had seen appellant and M.G. walking in the vicinity of the medical center and Radio Park on the previous evening. The VA officers had a surveillance video from the medical center and recognized the shoes and large earrings worn by one of the girls. Officer Mendes and Sergeant Bowlan eventually went to the home of appellant and M.G. on North Augusta Street in Fresno. The officers met the father of appellant and M.G. at the front door, explained that his daughters had been arrested and asked for permission to look for a gun on the premises. The father said he did have a hunting rifle that he stored in a closet. He took the officers to the closet, checked the top shelf and discovered the rifle was missing. The father and officers eventually went to M.G.’s bedroom and found the rifle in the corner of her closet. The officers arranged for technician Spring Wilson to come to the home and photograph the weapon in the closet. After Wilson took the pictures, the officers removed the rifle from the closet and found a magazine with four bullets in the weapon. Officer Mendes viewed the 7-Eleven security videotape and said the weapon found in the residence on Augusta Street was similar to the rifle in the videotape because both instruments had “open sides.”
Defense
Fresno Police Officer Angel De La Fuente testified she responded to a dispatch from the VA Medical Center at 2:35 a.m. on July 15, 2008. A VA security officer had seen two girls on a medical center surveillance video on July 14 and 15. On July 15, one of the girls was wearing a black tank top with blue jeans and the other was wearing a black tank top with blue jean shorts. The girls took the same path of travel on both July 14 and 15. Officer De La Fuente said officers contacted the girls at Radio Park and confiscated a backpack in their possession because there were concerns it might contain some type of weapon.
DISCUSSION
I. DID THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY COMMITTING APPELLANT TO THE DJJ?
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing appellant to the DJJ without considering any intermediate rehabilitative facilities. Appellant maintains a court cannot commit a minor to the DJJ for the sole reason that suitable alternatives do not exist.
On September 29, 2008, the juvenile court read and considered the September 23, 2008, report and recommendation of the probation officer. The probation officer noted in pertinent part as to appellant:
“[Appellant] has no previously adjudicated matters, but the current offense involves a potential level of violence of an extremely serious nature, in the opinion of this officer. By her actions, [appellant] has demonstrated a wanton disregard for the lives and safety of others. [Appellant] and the co-offender, her sister, committed the robbery for their own gain. It is obvious that the potential for someone to suffer harm during such an offense is great, particularly when weapons are involved. [Appellant] was fully involved in the robbery, planning it in advance with her sister, then loading the rifle, and taking the money from the clerk.
“This officer believes that the local, less restrictive options available are inadequate to hold [appellant] responsible for her actions or to provide protection for the community, given the magnitude of [appellant’s] delinquency in this matter. This officer believes that placement services and the Substance Abuse Unit are unneeded in this matter and that the New Directions program for [g]irls is simply insufficient to rehabilitate [appellant]. Obviously, the Electronic Monitoring Program and community service are completely inadequate.
“This officer believes that the only option that would provide adequate sanctions to hold [appellant] responsible for her actions and to provide protection for the community as well as rehabilitation for [appellant] is a commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice. Therefore, it is recommended that [appellant] be committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice.”
On September 29, 2008, appellant’s counsel prepared a statement in mitigation (Pen. Code, §§ 1170, subd. (b), 1203) on behalf of appellant. Counsel noted appellant was before the court on her first offense and that she had never been on informal probation, electronic monitoring, subject to a conditional plea or sentenced to time in the Juvenile Justice Center. Counsel conceded the charges were serious and that “placement poses some nearly insurmountable difficulties, given budget limitations, availability of space.…” Nevertheless, counsel maintained commitment of appellant to the DJJ was inappropriate.
The juvenile court stated in pertinent part at the September 30, 2008, disposition hearing:
“Neither [appellant nor M.G.] have prior criminality. Or effectively no prior contact with law enforcement, no gang affiliations that were noted, no substance abuse. Having said that, their absolute inability to wish to attend school as clearly set forth in their respective records, [appellant] … dropped March 30, 2007. And prior to that time, she had 43 unexcused absences out of 176 days. In 06/07, 12 out of 134. And anger issue[s], hitting a female student in the face in 2005.… The most troubling thing with the Court is I just heard from [appellant] that they’ve been out and didn’t like school.
“I wish to make this record clear, the statements that are made … for disposition are not … evidence as it would be set forth in an adjudication. I do, however, find it interesting that the weapon by all the evidence, uncontroverted, and the ammunition was found in their closet. Now one of the young ladies anyway says, that was [appellant], that that wasn’t the gun. Which would lead any rational person to wonder how many weapons [appellant] had at her disposal. Just as an observation … I don’t think we leave our common sense at the door when we come in here.… I’ve sentenced some 1500 persons to felony convictions in adult courts. There’s no winners, no losers, just one’s intent to do what is appropriate under the circumstances. I suspect the heart of Pollyanna that still beats somewhere within this aging body, notwithstanding the fact that the heart in the context of my work has been bruised, battered, and broken in more times than I like to think about as I weigh these matters. I have looked into all alternatives that this Court believes would be appropriate for rehabilitation and public safety, focusing particularly on rehabilitation.…
“The seriousness of the offense is staggering to me. The fact—given what we clearly saw by way of evidence, the manner in which the weapon was waved around, it is no less than divine providence that it didn’t go off. The weapon that was clearly in the video did not seem to anyone in this courtroom at the time as anything other than what it was described as. The attitude that is set forth of … [appellant and M.G.] leaves a great deal to be desired. But frankly, I give that the littlest weight of all. Attitudes are subjective at best. And I give great credence to the fact that under pressure, emotional or otherwise, attitudes … visibly expressed may not be what is in someone’s heart or soul. I further take into consideration as I indicated earlier, no priors, no gang affiliation, no substance abuse. I balance it against that, however, the seriousness and the basis of rehabilitation. This court is mightily concerned that the rehabilitation opportunities with the local juvenile custody and then Juvenile Probation are—the odds of [success] are staggering under the best circumstances. I see nothing, frankly, with either [appellant or M.G.] that would lead this Court to believe that they’re motivated even minimally to succeed on the rigorous steps that would be necessary for successful completion of probation.
“This Court moved the ball down the field toward the ultimate placement thereof by imposing some combination of a stayed DJJ commitment with the fiction of 365 days locally, which this Court believes given the budget constraints and the capacity of the facility would be difficult to do with a straight face. The backlog of meaningful rehabilitation capabilities … it’s not a fiction. And by saying that, it’s not a criticism of Probation. [I]t is an indictment of our society that we have not, in some fashion, been able, along with all the other stress of our society, to understand that where there is the opportunity for rehabilitation, two things—successful rehabilitation does two things: One, it creates a productive human being. And the second in a far more cynical but realistic view is it saves society hundreds of thousands of dollars, and saves lives by successfully rehabilitating them.
“All that ruminating aloud is simply to lead to the conclusion that I will now voice.… [¶] … [¶]
“[Appellant] would receive 79 days towards a six-year commitment pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 731[, subdivision] (c). Parents are incapable of providing or failed to provide or neglected to provide maintenance, training, or education for [appellant]. Welfare of [appellant] requires custody be taken from her parents. Probation has considered all less local restrictive options and forms of custody and is fully satisfied these are [in]appropriate dispositions at this time. The mental and physical conditions of [appellant] are such to render it probable that [appellant] will benefit from reformatory and educational discipline and specifically other than treatment provided by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice.… Therefore, [appellant] shall be adjudged a ward of the court until further order be committed to … DJJ, be detained at the Juvenile Justice Campus until she is delivered to DJJ.”
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725.5, the juvenile court must consider the minor’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and the minor’s previous delinquent history. In addition, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a DJJ commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 484-485.) The court must consider the broadest range of information in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and to afford him or her adequate care. A juvenile court’s order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion. Appellate courts must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.)
The record must be viewed in light of the purposes of juvenile law. As described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, those purposes include rehabilitation, treatment, guidance, punishment as a rehabilitative tool, and protection of the public. (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576 (Teofilio A.).) In California, a DJJ commitment may be made in the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive alternatives. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473; In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.) The gravity of an offense, coupled with other relevant factors, is always a consideration. (In re Samuel B. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1104, disapproved on another ground in People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 206, fn. 14.)
As noted above, a juvenile court errs when it fails to consider less restrictive alternatives to a DJJ commitment. (Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) In Teofilio A., neither the juvenile court nor the probation report considered alternatives to a commitment to the CYA (predecessor to DJJ). Here, in contrast to Teofilio A., both the juvenile court and the probation officer considered less restrictive alternatives than a commitment to DJJ. The court acknowledged several mitigating circumstances but then noted the severity of the offense (second degree robbery), the reckless handling of the firearm, the potential consequences of the charged offense and enhancement, and the absence of a minimal level of motivation to successfully undertake the rigorous steps required for probation. Citing the magnitude of appellant’s delinquency, the probation officer observed that less restrictive options were inadequate to hold appellant responsible for her actions and were insufficient to provide protection for the community and to rehabilitate her. During the disposition hearing, Deputy Probation Officer Susan Solis specifically stated:
“Defense counsel has brought up the different options available to [male juvenile offenders.] [F]rom a Probation standpoint, even if those options were available to females, [appellant and M.G.] would have been considered and rejected based upon the seriousness of the offense, the lack of remorse, their school record. Pretty much the only thing they’re having in their favor is they’re not gang members, they’re not using illegal substances, and they have no prior record.”
Officer Solis also noted that, unlike the local probation office, the DJJ had a variety of services readily available to the minor. These services included victim awareness, education, college credits and family parenting, among others. While Officer Solis acknowledged a disparity between the local services available to minor males and minor females, she concluded: “[W]e cannot in good conscience consider anything other than Department of Juvenile Justice based upon all the things that are outlined in the report.”
In our view, the record sets forth evidence demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a DJJ commitment and the inappropriateness of a less restrictive alternative. The juvenile court thoughtfully and carefully exercised its discretion and reversal of the dispositional order is not required.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATE APPELLANT’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION BY COMMITTING HER TO THE DJJ?
Appellant contends the failure of Fresno County to provide an intermediate rehabilitative facility for female juvenile offenders violated appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws and therefore a new dispositional hearing is in order.
Appellant submits that Fresno County has intermediate rehabilitative facilities for male juvenile offenders (including “‘Delta’” and “‘boot camp’”), but none for female juvenile offenders. She points out the probation officer acknowledged the additional options available for male offenders, but maintained appellant would have been ineligible for them based on the seriousness of the offense, her lack of remorse and her poor school record.
The concept of equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that like treatment be accorded to persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law. This principle does not preclude the state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals. However, it does require that classifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose, at a minimum. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 198.) To succeed on a claim under the equal protection clause, an accused first must show the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) This initial inquiry is not whether the persons are similarly situated for all purposes. Rather, the inquiry is whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged. (Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960, 990.)
In In re Gwenette D. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1247, the 17-year-old minor accompanied some girlfriends, stole garments from a sportswear store and fled the scene in a stolen automobile. The minor, a three-time ward of the court, requested to be placed in an open setting such as a group home. A Contra Costa Probation Department screening committee recommended her placement in a locked facility and the juvenile court followed that recommendation. The minor petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting a violation of her right to equal protection. She maintained the county provided an unlocked ranch or camp facility for boys, but not for girls. The superior court denied the petition and she appealed from the dispositional order. Division One of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed. The appellate court held the purported lack of an unlocked facility for girls was never a factor in the juvenile court’s decision. The juvenile court concluded the minor was not an appropriate candidate for any unlocked environment and substantial evidence supported that conclusion. The minor was unable to show her placement was a result of the lack of less restrictive alternatives for girls. Since she was not a member of the class allegedly discriminated against, she was not injured by the challenged practice and had no standing to attack the purported discrimination.
In the instant case, the juvenile court lamented the lack of intermediate dispositional alternatives in Fresno County. However, such a facility—even if available—was not suitable for appellant. As the probation officer noted, an intermediate facility was inappropriate for appellant and her sister, M.G., “based upon the seriousness of the offense, the lack of remorse, their school record.” The court underscored the probation officer’s observations, noting “[t]he seriousness of the offense is staggering to me.” The court further noted, “I see nothing, frankly, with either [appellant or M.G.] that would lead this Court to believe that they’re motivated even minimally to succeed on the rigorous steps that would be necessary for successful completion of probation.”
Appellant failed to demonstrate to the juvenile court that she was a suitable candidate for an intermediate facility and her equal protection challenge must be rejected on appeal.
III. SHOULD THE DISPOSITIONAL ORDER BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SET APPELLANT’S MAXIMUM PERIOD OF CONFINEMENT?
Appellant contends the dispositional order should be reversed because the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in setting the maximum period of her confinement.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (c) states in pertinent part:
“A ward committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses that brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. A ward committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities also may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may not exceed the maximum period of adult confinement as determined pursuant to this section.”
Under section 731 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as construed by this court, “the juvenile court must determine the maximum period of confinement to [DJJ] based on the facts and circumstances.” (In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1542.) “[T]his maximum may not be more than that for a comparable adult, but may be less. The maximum period of confinement set by the court is not a determinate term, it is the ceiling on the amount of time that a minor may be confined in [DJJ], and recognizes that the committing court has an interest in and particularized knowledge of the minors it commits to [DJJ].” (Ibid.) “[S]ection 731 [of the Welfare and Institutions Code] unmistakably requires the trial court to set a maximum term of physical confinement in [DJJ] based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter. The court must set the term in all cases where it is committing a minor to [DJJ] and it must exercise its discretion in making the determination of what that term will be.” (Id. at p. 1543.) The California Supreme Court recently ruled that (1) a written statement of the juvenile’s maximum period of confinement is sufficient under Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (c), and (2) on a silent record, an appellate court will presume that the juvenile court performed its duty under section 731, subdivision (c), to consider the “‘facts and circumstances’” of the matter or matters that brought or continued the juvenile under the court’s jurisdiction. (In re Julian R. (Aug. 17, 2009, S159282) ___ Cal.4th ___ [2009 Cal. Lexis 8081].)
Here, the juvenile court stated at the dispositional hearing: “[appellant] would receive 79 days [of time credits] towards a six-year commitment pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 731[, subdivision] (c).” Appellant submits the trial court considered the facts and circumstances of her case “solely in the context of deciding whether to commit appellant to the DJJ.” She contends the court failed to “similarly exercise its discretion with regard to setting the maximum confinement time.” The juvenile court read and considered the report of the probation officer, which stated in pertinent part: “After weighing the facts and circumstances of the matter, this officer believes the Maximum Period of Confinement should be set at 6 years. This will hold the minor accountable, afford him/her an opportunity to rehabilitate and provide protection to the community.” The formal commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation DJJ (Judicial Council Form JV-732), signed by Judge Oliver, expressly stated: “The statutory maximum period of confinement is 6 years. The Court exercises its discretion to select 6 years as the maximum period of confinement pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 731[, subdivision] (c).” Thus, the record on appeal confirms the juvenile court considered the facts and circumstances of the case when it exercised its discretion to commit appellant to a maximum period of confinement of six years in DJJ. This is not a case in which the juvenile court sentenced a minor to a maximum term based solely on the fact that it constituted the maximum term an adult would face. (See In re Carlos E., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1533.) Nor is this an instance in which the record was silent on the facts and circumstances that were considered by the juvenile court. Rather, the juvenile court read and considered the matters set forth in the probation officer’s report, implicitly agreed with the recommendation therein, expressly acknowledged the “staggering” seriousness of the offense, and concluded that appellant would benefit from the reformatory and educational discipline of the DJJ.
In our view, the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion under section 731, subdivision (c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code and made an informed determination in setting the maximum period of appellant’s confinement. Reversal is not required.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order of the juvenile court are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Dawson, Acting P.J., Hill, J.