E.g., In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co., 66 B.R. 753, 757-58 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 1986) (bankruptcy could determine whether debtor had breached sublease to pay mining royalties in connection with the debtor's motion to assume); In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985) ("The determination of the dispute concerning the status of a lease is a necessary part of the bankruptcy court's determination of the motion to assume the lease. . . ."); In re National Sugar Refining Co., 21 B.R. 196, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (in connection with assumption motion, bankruptcy court resolved disputed lease provision regarding distribution of profits from later assignment).
, In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co., 66 B.R. 753, 757-58 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 1986); In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985); In re National Sugar Refining Co., 21 B.R. 196, 198 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1982), we believe that nothing in § 365 provides such authorization. As we held in Minges, the process of deciding a motion to assume is one of the bankruptcy court placing itself in the position of the trustee or debtor-in-possession and determining whether assuming the contract would be a good business decision or a bad one.
Other courts have upheld a bankruptcy court's authority to enter nonappealable orders under Section 305. See Matter of Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1985); Matter of Axona Int'l Credit and Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Safon Ochart, 74 B.R. 131 (Bankr.D.P.R. 1986); and, In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985). These cases are also not dispositive because the issue of the constitutional authority of a bankruptcy court to issue a Section 305 order was either not raised and not considered or raised and summarily dismissed without analysis.
As part of the discretionary decision whether to allow the trustee to assume a contract and perform under it, see In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979), a judge will often need to determine whether the contract has been terminated, see, e.g., In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Nat'l Sugar Ref Co., 21 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); if the judge were prevented from making such a determination, the performance of the trustee could subsequently prove futile. Showtime claims that the proceedings below were "legal" in nature, entitling it to a jury trial.
As such, it is part of a core proceeding." In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985). B. Judicial Economy
nty, Va., 22 B.R. 488, 490 (E.D.Va. 1982) (reaching a compromise position by reading into § 305(c) an exception "permitting appeals based on constitutional grounds [to avoid making]. . . . a non-Article III judge the final arbiter of constitutional questions arising under 305"); In re Colorado Industrial Bank of Loveland, 85 B.R. 855 (D.Col. 1988) (holding that § 305(a) must be addressed to a district judge "since all jurisdiction is vested in the district court and only the district judge has Article III status"); In re Aaronics Equipment Rentals and Sales, Inc., 56 B.R. 297, 299 (Bankr.M.D.La. 1985) (bankruptcy court deferring the issue of abstention to the district court on account of the perceived unconstitutionality of issuing a non-appealable order); In re Ronald J. Pankau, 65 B.R. 204 (Bankr.Ill. 1986); Matter of First Landmark Corp., 51 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1985); (bankruptcy court limiting its role on abstention motions to submitting proposed findings and conclusions); In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 597 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985) (bankruptcy court upholding its power to issue an non-reviewable order pursuant to § 305(a) by finding that the abstention order was one entered by the district court since the bankruptcy court was a unit thereof). See also In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 1986) (in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), a similar bankruptcy provision, holding that "a strong case can be made for the proposition that, because of the statutory amendments.
This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) which the court has the authority to hear and determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). SeeIn re Nexus Commc'ns, Inc. , 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (noting that a motion to lift the automatic stay is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) ). The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334 and the General Order of Reference entered on August 3, 1984 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) which the court has the authority to hear and determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). See In re Nexus Commc'ns, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (noting that a motion to lift the automatic stay is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G)). The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334 and the General Order of Reference entered on August 3, 1984 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) which the court has the authority to hear and determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). SeeIn re Nexus Commc'ns, Inc. , 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (noting that a motion to lift the automatic stay is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) ). The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334 and the General Order of Reference entered on August 3, 1984 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
The Stay Motion, which necessarily includes a determination of the debtor's and Ms. Rose's respective interests in the ESOP as requested in the Property Motion, is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). In reNexus Commc'ns, Inc. , 55 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (noting a motion to lift the automatic stay is a core proceeding). The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the authority to hear this matter pursuant to the General Order of Reference entered on August 3, 1984 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.